 Bertrand Russell in 1916 |
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It is obvious that the knowledge of logical forms
is something quite different from knowledge of existing things. The form of "Socrates
drank the hemlock" is not an existing thing like Socrates or the hemlock, nor does it
even have that close relation to existing things that drinking has. It is something
altogether more abstract and remote. We might understand all the separate words of a
sentence without understanding the sentence: if a sentence is long and complicated, this
is apt to happen. In such a case we have knowledge of the constituents, but not of the
form. We may also have knowledge of the form without having knowledge of the constituents.
If I say, "Rorarius drank the hemlock", those among you who have never heard of
Rorarius (supposing there are any) will understand the form, without having knowledge of
the constituents. In order to understand a sentence, it is necessary to have knowledge
both of the constituents and of the particular instance of the form. It is in this way
that a sentence conveys information, since it tells us that certain known objects are
related according to a certain known form. Thus some kind of knowledge of logical forms,
though with most people it is not explicit, is involved in all understanding of discourse.
It is the business of philosophical logic to extract this knowledge from its concrete
integuments, and to render it explicit and pure. Retrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, Open Court, Chicago 1914, pp. 43-44 |
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