

# **An exploration of our widely shared intuitions about responsibility and circumstances focused on disability.<sup>1</sup>**

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(draft : all comments welcome)

## **1. Introduction**

In order to face the growing expenditure of health services, it is argued that health insurance systems should take into account that individuals may be held responsible for risky behaviour. Public health insurance should no longer cover health care related to such behaviour. Smokers who get lung cancer and skiers who break their legs should rely on private insurance or pay fully for health care related to their ‘chosen’ behaviour. This position is argued for not only to limit expenditure but also on the basis of ethical considerations.

Philosophers and economists, notably Ronald Dworkin, have argued that social policy should rely on a clear distinction between chance and choice. More precisely, it should take into account the lack of personal, e.g. health-related, resources, but not the personal characteristics such as ambition or taste. On the basis of this viewpoint, one could arguably advance that that public insurance should similarly distinguish between responsibility and circumstances. Other philosophers have severely criticized the relevance of ‘Dworkin’s cut’, and pointed to some difficulties, some of these ethical, and some other related to feasibility constraints.

However, the topic is not only of theoretical interest. Besides the discussion of the soundness of the ethical viewpoints, the distinction between chance and choice is also demanding from the perspective of *political* and economical feasibility. Solidarity systems such as public health insurance are in general massively supported by the public. A more fine-grained insurance system might be the object of political debate.<sup>4</sup> This is all the more likely to be the case to the extent that our widely shared opinions about responsibility are not well known. Neither is it known to what extent people are likely to agree with an ‘unforgiving’ system which refuses solidarity with people who are victims of their

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<sup>4</sup> For the relation between normative arguments and empirical research see Swift and Miller. (ref)

own risky choices. And, more generally, it is not clear the people are willing to compensate for the lack of resources which is clearly beyond any individual responsibility.

Our paper discusses some experiments which aim to clarify what our “widely shared opinions” on responsibility and circumstances consist of. We particularly conduct a survey focused on disability and policies which aimed to cover disabilities. We try to know more about ethical intuitions and preferences of individuals concerning which disabilities- nature of disability, in what way and to what extent- should be covered or not by public intervention.

Following Schokkaert (for example, 1995, 1998), Schokkaert, Devoogt (1998, 2003) and Gaertner (2002) we use some criteria which have been proposed by philosophers and economists, either as principles or as axioms. However, it should be noticed from the start that the scope of this paper is broader than that of an experimental test of axiomatic approaches to responsibility and compensation (overview Fleurbaey 1998). In other words, although “Dworkin’s cut” is quite important, we also tested other normative claims. The basic inspiration is some recent philosophical literature on egalitarianism and on disability. Section 1 gives a brief survey of the main topics discussed in this literature.

We elaborate some scenarios which permit the revelation of ethical intuitions and preferences of the individuals of our sample. This sample is now constituted by French students (n= 116) and by Cameroonian Students (n=66) in order to compare the impact of cultural influence on ethical preferences.<sup>5</sup>

The main results of our questionnaire are:

Firstly, public opinion is not likely to reject all forms of monetary compensation policies and to limit public intervention to a policy which may be defended only in terms of non discrimination. In other words, public opinion seems in between Dworkin (and other luck-egalitarians) and Silvers (1998) or Anderson (1999). Social integration, even at some expense beyond mere compensation, is approved. Yet an important minority prefers to isolate disabled persons, even when this is costly. Secondly, respondents are divided about ‘Dworkin’s cut’. The partitioning of between choice and circumstances goes from the position in which even productive capacities are considered to be chosen to the rejection of responsibility over preferences. Thirdly, all-over, there seems to be a negative bias towards mentally or psychologically handicapped people. Fourthly, the intercultural differences between French and Cameroonian students turn out to be less important than one could expect. Our decision to make an intercultural comparison was influenced by Gaertner & Jungeilges (2002). We thought that people’s opinions would be strongly biased by the fact that they were living in a country with or without an elaborate Welfare State, but we guess that the observed ‘cultural’ differences may

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<sup>5</sup> Our aim is to complete the study with a comparison with results taken from a population with a specific background (social workers).

be explained by a much more down-to-earth factor, i.e. poverty. Fifth, people are clearly 'perfectionist' and reject the consideration of disability in terms of 'difference' rather than in terms of 'impairment'. This is also clearly reflected in their opinions about the right to procreate or the right to increase the chance to conceive a baby with a particular impairment.

Section 2 gives a short survey of the recent economical and philosophical discussion about the relationship between, luck, insurance and justice. Section 3 presents the questionnaire on disability and its results. Section 4 concludes.

## **2.The normative discussion**

In this section we give a brief survey of different problems related to disability that philosophers and economists have recently discussed. Our aim is not to defend any particular position within this debate, but merely to sketch the theoretical background of our questionnaire. The different questions ('scenarios') which treat a particular problem will be mentioned in passing.

### **2.1 Luck, Compensation and Justice**

Alisdair MacIntyre (1998) claims that, in the history of political philosophy and ethics, philosophers largely neglected the issue of disability, dependency and the vulnerability of the body. This judgment should be qualified: during the last decades the philosophical debate about disability has been developed, and more particularly within the discussion among different brands of egalitarianism.

Egalitarians typically argue that rights are not innate, but rather follow from institutional arrangements which are considered as just on the basis of independent criteria. Contrary to libertarians they do not reject the idea that disabled people may have legitimate claim-rights from the start.<sup>6</sup> The fundamental principle which underlies these rights and the corresponding obligations to contribute to the effectiveness of these claim-rights is 'equal respect'. However, among egalitarians there is no unanimous interpretation of the precise implications of this principle.

In order to clarify their relative position egalitarians as Dworkin, Cohen, Arneson or Van Parijs often invoke 'handicaps'. However this invocations have to be understood against the

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<sup>6</sup> For libertarians, who consider that every individual has inviolable rights, more particularly property rights on body and talents, a just society is a cooperative system conceived as a mutually advantageous arrangement. Consequently, to the extent that it seems impossible to set up a mutually advantageous arrangement with severely disabled people, this people « fall beyond the pale of justice » (Gauthier 1986).

background of a predominant discussion within the egalitarian approach. This approach is strongly focused on not to say biased by the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate inequalities. Egalitarians in general have made much effort to argue that some inequalities are totally legitimate. Beside the reference to the economic constraint of incentives, they have stressed that inequalities which are the result of personal choices (and luck related to such choices, i.e. option luck) are legitimate. The following quote from Dworkin illustrates this general tendency:

“In principle, I said, individuals should be relieved of consequential responsibility for those unfortunate features of their situation that are brute bad luck, but not from those that should be seen as flowing from their own choices. If someone has been born blind or without talents others have, that is his bad luck, and, so far as this can be managed, a just society would compensate him for that bad luck. But if he has fewer resources than other people now because he spent more on luxuries earlier, or because he chose not to work, or to work at less remunerative jobs than others chose, then his situation is the result of choice not luck, and he is not entitled to any compensation that would make up his present shortfall” 287.

Within the brand of luck-egalitarianism, authors have stressed the distinction between chance and choice, that is factors for which one should be held responsible and other factors for which one should not be held responsible, up to the point that, some have argued, they have lost out of sight the very issue of what inequality means within the social justice debate. In other words, the problem is “to check whether the core of egalitarianism has not been lost in the operation” (Fleurbaey 2001: 499). It has been spelled out that one consequence of the focus on responsibility is that egalitarianism may be interpreted in a harsh, unforgiving way: it may be totally legitimate that someone who spilt his resources due to a stupid choice at the age of twenty suffers for the rest of his life. By focusing on responsibility, egalitarianism ends up in a conservative theory at the opposite from the basic moral intuitions it started from, such as, say, equal respect or solidarity with the destitute (Anderson, 1999). Causes of disability and consequences for the moral legitimacy of transfers are explored in scenario 14.

We think that this criticism of undue harshness, formulated by Fleurbaey (2001) is in general warranted. However, it has an interesting flipside. Disability came into the picture in this discussion about legitimate compensation related to brute luck from two different perspectives, and this, so we argue, had the effect that not only basic egalitarian concerns but also disability as such, were lost out of sight. The first reason why one obviously refers to disabled people in this context is illustrated by the preceding quote from Dworkin. Unlike unemployed or other victims of poverty, the personal responsibility of people who suffer from the bad consequences of an inherited impairment is beyond question: there is no suspicion of laziness, irresponsible options, and so on. Someone born blind cannot be blamed.

The second angle from which disabled people came in the picture is related to a more technical aspect from the so-called ‘currency’, i.e. the ‘equality of what?’ debate. Handicapped persons are sometimes invoked to illustrate the rather unpredictable link between resources and welfare. Disabled people are either too good in converting resources into utility, e.g. Tiny Tim is always happy despite his handicaps, or they are not good enough, like when a paralyzed person turns out to be unable to convert a resource (e.g. a bicycle) into utility.<sup>7</sup> Considering disabled persons from the sheer perspective of resource conversion seems indeed inadequate as an expression of ‘equal respect’.

What is particularly interesting in this context is that luck egalitarians who were eager to argue in favour of some ‘legitimate’ inequalities did so in order to respect the supposed commonsense concern for personal responsibility (Fleurbaey 2001: 527). This commonsense is unquestioned even by authors who criticize the obsession of egalitarianism with responsibility. However, our results put some doubt on this generally accepted idea.

In 2.2. we present the idea of compensation in some more detail. In 2.3 we turn to some recent ways to tackle more directly the question of what we in general owe to disabled people. Some authors have rejected arguments in terms of compensation and proposed to argue rather in terms of non discrimination (Silvers 1998), very much in line with the general criticism of luck egalitarianism as it is famously formulated by Elizabeth Anderson (1999). Although this opposition dominates the disability debate, it is far from being the only relevant topic.

## **2.2. Responsibility and compensation**

For luck egalitarians, social justice consists above all in neutralizing the effects of bad luck on people’s lives. Brute luck should be compensated, not option luck (cf. supra). Being disabled, typically a situation that one has not chosen, is the obvious example of brute bad luck. Since personal characteristics such as abilities or inabilities, the so-called internal resources, cannot be transferred from one person to another, compensation should be realized in terms of transferable resources, cash for instance.

As we mentioned in the preceding section, this perspective of disability can be questioned as such. Here we briefly recall some internal problems of luck egalitarian compensation. Within this luck egalitarian branch of political philosophy there are some quarrels about what the specific ‘currency’ of egalitarian justice is: should people be able to reach an equal level of preference satisfaction, or rather dispose of the same bundle of resources (internal and external combined). The second question, related but not reducible to the first one, is about what the characteristics are one should be compensated for, i.e. about the ‘responsibility cut’. The third is about how we can determine the level of compensation.

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<sup>7</sup> In a comparable perspective to this of utilitarian who consider, as B. Williams writes, individuals as ‘utility containers’, (Sen & Williams 1982: 4) and not individuals as such.

Fourth, we recall an internal inconsistency in the compensation framework once there is an agreement on the responsibility cut and the level of compensation. Fifth, we mention an alternative, weaker position which avoids some difficulties but leaves a strict egalitarian framework.

Ronald Dworkin (2000) has proposed an answer to the first three questions, and we take his viewpoint as a starting point for brief sketch of the background of our questionnaire. According to him, people should be held responsible for their preferences, tastes and ambitions. People identify themselves with their preferences, they are “an essential part of what gives value to their lives” 2000: 82. Dworkin admits that people may sometimes regret that they have particular, e.g. expensive tastes, and even think that they would be better off without them. Nevertheless, they would find it painful to ignore them.<sup>8</sup> People are not addicts, and, therefore, they are responsible for what they make of their lives within their means. Equality of welfare would, according to Dworkin, illegitimately transfer resources from modest people to people who choose to cultivate expensive tastes.<sup>9</sup> This position has been criticized. It has been argued (by G.A. Cohen) that preferences and ambitions may themselves be characteristics which deserve compensation.<sup>10</sup>

Dworkin’s answer to the third question is based on a hypothetical insurance mechanism. The level of compensation for handicaps or the relative lack of skills could be fixed “by asking how much insurance someone would have bought, in an insurance sub-auction with initially equal resources, against the possibility of not having a particular level of skill”<sup>92</sup>. We leave aside here many criticisms that have been formulated against this device, as well as against the problematic distinction between brute bad luck and option luck.<sup>11</sup>

A formal analysis of the link between responsibility and compensation has revealed a consistency problem among different principles akin to luck egalitarianism. We present here briefly a loose adaptation of the Fleurbaey & Bossert axioms applied to a disability context. Bossert and Fleurbaey distinguish between characteristics for which people are held responsible (‘responsibility characteristics’) and characteristics for which they can’t be held responsible (‘compensation characteristics’). They propose two axioms which catch fundamental intuitions of luck-egalitarianism. A model of income redistribution which satisfies both axioms should model a desirable form of luck-egalitarian social justice. We present a formulation of the axioms in a form very similar to those presented by Schokkaert Devoogt (1998, 2003).

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<sup>8</sup> Fleurbaey: responsibility by delegation. (ref.)

<sup>9</sup> Note that the value of a bundle of external resources is to be determined in a competitive market in which everyone has the same amount of money and bids according to his tastes. Tastes play therefore an indirect role in the compensation mechanism.

<sup>10</sup> Our scenarios 5 and 15 explore this question

<sup>11</sup> Cf Fleurbaey, Anderson, etc.

In a disability context and in the simplest case, we suppose that there are  $n$  individuals in society, characterised by a vector of individual characteristics  $a_i \in \mathbb{R}^m$ , which determined their gross income (before tax and subventions)  $f(a_i)$ ; we also suppose that  $F_i(\tilde{a})$  is the vector of post tax (paid by people who dispose of their work capacity) and post subventions allocated to disabled people without or having lost their work capacity, either partially or completely.

The problem is to find a redistribution mechanism which permits to obtain a post tax and subventions income levels  $F(\tilde{a})$  given the possible profile characteristics.

– The first axiom sets that two individuals with the same ‘responsibility’ characteristics - for which they can be considered as equally responsible for should pay the same own contribution (Full compensation). Formally that means that :

for any  $\tilde{a}$ ,

$$a_i^R = a_j^R \Rightarrow F_i(\tilde{a}) = F_j(\tilde{a})$$

with  $\tilde{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{R}^{nm}$  is a characteristics profile and  $a_i^R$ , the vector of relevant characteristics for every «  $i$  » and  $F_i(\tilde{a})$ , the vector of post tax and subventions income and budget constraint satisfied for the set of individuals in the economy (first best solution without any inefficiency), that means

$$F_i(\tilde{a}) = f(a_i)$$

the second one says that two individuals with the same characteristics for which they are not responsible for must be equally compensated for (strict compensation). Formally, that means :

$$\text{for any } \tilde{a}, a_i^S = a_j^S \Rightarrow F_i(\tilde{a}) - f(a_i) = F_j(\tilde{a}) - f(a_j)$$

with  $a_i^S$ , a vector of non relevant characteristics of individuals. This principle is also called ‘natural reward’ for the following reason, unlike the first axiom which tackles inequality from the angle of compensation (redistribution should fully neutralize lack of internal resources) the second axiom focuses on responsibility sensitivity: Final income should reflect differences related to the factors one controls (notable different ‘effort’, or foolish behaviour).

Bossert & Fleurbaey (1996) show that the satisfaction of both axioms cannot be simultaneously satisfied unless individual pre-tax income is an additively separable function of responsibility and compensation characteristics. This is not the case insofar as the amount of transfer (tax) which is supposed to compensate is a function of both ‘responsibility’ and ‘compensation’ characteristics.

Schokkaert & Devooght (1998, 2003) have done some experimental work on this, and they concluded that “full compensation is clearly rejected in favour of more conservative distribution rules. Our questioning is not focused on the relative attractiveness of both axioms, but rather on the first question

(which Schokkaert & Devooght assumed resolved) the partitioning of responsibility and compensation variables.

An alternative way to fix the level of compensation, against the background of the existence of a universal grant for every citizen has been proposed by Philippe Van Parijs. Van Parijs proposes, in his argument in favour of the highest sustainable uniform basic income a supplementary measure that should take into account that internal endowments may strongly differ. A uniform basic income would lead to a very unequal amount of “real freedom” if some people have, according to Van Parijs a legitimate claim to a complementary compensatory allowance, up to the point that there is undominated diversity. That means that there, the distribution of endowments (external and internal combined) is such that it is not the case that, of two people of the society, everyone in the society prefers the bundle of endowments of one of them over the bundle of the other. In our society, it seems obvious that the bundle of Johnny is “dominated” in this sense. Van Parijs does not “find it shocking to claim that targeted transfers, whether in cash or in kind, can legitimately stop once undominated diversity is achieved” (1995 : 60).

The Undominated Diversity (UD) principle states that what must be avoided in a society is a situation where everybody considers that a person is worst off than everybody else in the society.<sup>12</sup>

Suppose that “w” represents the transfers to be allocated to people. Their amount is determined by the forms of f and  $F_{i,j}$  and  $\varphi$  is a function of w,  $a^s$  and  $a^r$ ,

UD says :

there is no pair i,j so that  $\varphi_k(w_i, a_i^s, a_i^r) > \varphi_k(w_j, a_j^s, a_j^r)$

### 2.3. Non discrimination (formal justice) versus compensation

The criticism of social policy in favour of disabled persons conceived in terms of compensation has been strongly formulated by Anita Silvers (1998). What primarily matters to the disabled is being recognized as social persons in a full and meaningful sense. Focusing on their neediness rather leads to their exclusion. According to Silvers, the “debilitating proliferation of neediness” (1998: 145) reduces disability policy to a question of distributive justice. However, allocative schemes neither do justice to the disabled nor equalize them. The disabled desire a public sphere that embraces their presence as competent contributors, which supposes that the idea of the intrinsic badness of being impaired is abandoned.

Silvers’ argument draws on what is commonly called the “social model” of disability, as opposed to the medical model, which supposes an immediate link between impairment and disability.

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<sup>12</sup> derived from non envy criterions (for a literature survey, see for example, Arnsperger 199?).

The social model qualifies this vision. Physical or psychological impairments are functional defects, unlike cosmetic or aesthetic ones. However, not every such deficit constitutes a disability. Some result merely in inabilities. Only inabilities which interfere with socially significant performances constitute a disability. Consider the example of color blindness. Color blindness is not a disability, but it could become so. Suppose that a majority of people prefer colour coding to other forms labelling, colour blindness would become a functional defect. As a consequence, people with a particular impairment may become more or less disabled as the environment shifts. Therefore, a disability can be defined as a mismatch between someone's abilities and inabilities and the socially demanded tasks. If there is such a mismatch, there are, in principle, two possibilities: changing the individual or changing the social environment. Silvers gives a striking example of an unfavourable environmental shift:

“When DOS was the predominant computer operating system, many blind and visually impaired people, using devices for reading the screen text aloud, embarked on careers that depended on the use of computer applications. Computers opened new avenues of productivity for people in this group. But the Microsoft Windows program that succeeded DOS substituted screen icons or graphics for the lines of text that could be read aloud by voice output devices. Microsoft, claiming that business necessity demanded secrecy, refused to reveal the computer codes for Windows to the specialized companies that developed voice output software [...] The result was that more and more blind and visually impaired individuals suddenly found themselves unable to perform the computer tasks essential to their jobs” (Silvers 1998: 107).

In general, according to the social model of disability, the dominant institutional infrastructure – in the example the mild preference of the sighted majority for pictures over text - determines who will be disabled. The dominant infrastructure is often justified in terms of efficiency. Silvers contests, according to us unconvincingly this justification. “There is no reason to accept [...] the supposition that the practices of the dominant cooperative scheme are maximally efficient or productive because they are dominant.” (1998: 109). Silvers pushes the argument further and argues that exclusion - the fact that some disabled people are excluded from the cooperative scheme because of the arbitrary choice of the dominant infrastructure – takes a toll in lower productivity, because the productivity of disabled people remains unexploited. She is probably right to the extent that some potentially productive disabled people are victims of discrimination, but as an overall statement it is doubtful. For example, people who remember the DOS days are unlikely to want to give up Windows.

Silvers rejects arguments about disability in terms of distributive justice because this leads to exclusion. What Silvers defends is ‘formal justice’. Formal justice requires full equality of opportunity, including modifications of the environment which implement such equal opportunity. Formal justice rejects the distribution of benefits to ‘compensate’, which serve to exclude those who could function very well if equal opportunity existed. Compensating systems do not create inequality since they rely on the assumption of inferiority and lead to isolation.

“To illustrate, suppose my dog-sitter places two bowls of dog food, one for my Great Dane and one for my dachshund, on a four-foot-high table. Because the Dane has more options in regard to reach, actions that will be effective in getting the food are available to the Dane but not to the dachshund. So my dog-sitter fails to follow my instruction not to favour one of the dogs, for although she similarly puts out food, she does not equally give each his dinner”<sup>127</sup>.

These remarks are echoed in Anderson 1999, who underlines that luck egalitarian theory starts implicitly from an assumption of inferiority and, as a consequence is self-defeating with regard to the principle of equal respect which their theory aims to incorporate.

Despite the *prima facie* attractiveness of the social model, - this model has the merit to foster respect (Cf. Pogge 2000: 49), it is limited in scope. Silvers herself admits that an exception should be made for the “profoundly impaired”. Pogge proposes to complete the social model with a friendlier medical model: “Can we not *affirm* that certain persons, irrespective of any social factors, have defects that make them needy and dependent en yet *deny* that their lives are any less worthwhile than ours? [...] Rather than throw out the medical model altogether, we should try to cleanse it of the traditional associations with inferiority and pity and then apply it to, in particular, people with severe mental disabilities” Pogge 2000: 48).

Some of our scenarios try to find out the relative importance of compensation versus integration in general.<sup>13</sup> However, we also focused on a particular aspect of integration in the labour market: the question up to which point jobs for people with low productivity level should be sponsored with public money. Gregory Kavka has argued quite convincingly in favour of affirmative action for disabled people on the job market. He analyses the main arguments against affirmative action to conclude that they do not weigh up against the positive points: the relative harm done to a nonhandicapped person under such programs is a lesser harm than leaving a disabled person without a job. Kavka argues that the absolute limit for the collective sacrifice in order to give jobs to the disabled is a level of aid that is collectively counterproductive for the disabled themselves, that is so costly that it would interfere so much with economic growth that the disabled would suffer more in the long run (p.190). This is a very high limit, which may imply a burden on the rest of the society which some may consider unreasonable. Scenario 3 tests intuitions on this topic.

## **2.4. Perfectionism and the medical model**

Another issue of debate about disability is the issue of perfectionism. Leaving aside the complexities of the philosophical discussion, the question is roughly whether there is a universally

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<sup>13</sup> The discrimination issue is also evaluated in terms of equal access to health care (scenario 9). Check other numbers.

accepted, objective list of bodily and mentally characteristics which seem essential for a valuable human life. The answer to that question and the content one gives to that objective list matters a lot for social policy in favour of handicapped people. ‘Perfectionism’ says that there is such a list. Some reject perfectionism because it has a paternalistic flavour (Cf Arneson 2000 for a discussion). Other because it implies that people who lack some of these would be considered as inferior. Silvers would say that disabled people are ‘different’ rather than ‘impaired’.

To make the topic lively, consider the following example, taken from Dworkin. There is an expensive equipment that would enable a paraplegic to lead a normal life, and the community in which he lives can afford that equipment. However, the paraplegic prefers the money of the equipment to buy a violin with it. Should the community agree?<sup>14</sup> From a perfectionist point of view certainly not: if ‘walking’ is to be considered as an essential functioning, ‘playing the violin’ isn’t.

The consequences for compensation are obvious: perfectionisms would rather compensate by means of targeted equipment than by means of cash. Scenario 11 and 12 explore opinions about this.

An important issue directly related to perfectionist concerns the right of disabled people to procreate and, moreover, the right of people to improve their chances of conceiving a handicapped child. For anti-perfectionists both rights should be admitted (Silvers 1998: 77, 94). This topic is treated by scenario 10.

Martha Nussbaum (ref.) has proposed a list of essential characteristics. She does so within the so-called capability approach and moreover, she does not defend egalitarianism but rather a framework which should permit to assess to which extent basic needs are met. Scenarios 11 and 16 explore to which extent impairments or functionings are considered to be ‘essential’.

## **2.5. Wolff on social policies**

A last topic of the normative debate we would like to mention is the question of the most desirable and defensible social policy. Compensation should not necessarily mean cash compensation. Jo Wolff (2004) (also Wolff et de-Shalit 2003, 2004) distinguishes four different policy strategies to ‘compensate’ disabled persons. First there is cash compensation. Secondly, there is personal enhancement: spending resources to training, education, surgical interventions, etc, which may enhance internal resources. Third, external resources may be targeted, as in the preceding example of the paraplegic, for a particular purpose (two and three are clearly perfectionist). And, fourth, we may try to modify social attitudes or the social environment. This may enhance the relative status of disabled people. The last strategy reflects the social model of disability. Scenarios 11 and 13 examine attitudes towards the different strategies.

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<sup>14</sup> Note that Dworkin uses this example in an argument against welfarism.

### 3. Data and Results

#### 3.1 Data

To explore intercultural differences we conducted a questionnaire in two French-speaking countries: France and Cameroon. The samples were constituted of third and fourth year students in economics. None of them had been exposed to any teaching on formal or philosophical theories of justice. More detailed information on the samples is given in the table there after. We followed the argument of Schokkaert and Devoogt (2003): concentrating on students allows to control for much interindividual variation in personal characteristics (age, schooling). This results in “a better basis to interpret the remaining differences between the samples as resulting from differences in national (or cultural) background.” The Cameroonian version of the questionnaire was adapted with respect to the relative difference in purchasing power (level of salaries and benefits) and with respect to some culturally determined hobbies.

Beside the issues mentioned in the survey of the normative debate, we explored two more issues. First, intercultural differences. Secondly, whether there might be some form of discrimination between different types of disability, especially between physically handicapped and mental or psychologically handicapped (see scenario 1, scenario 4 and scenario 15 when compared to scenario 5).

Practical details The questionnaire consists of 16 questions (see appendix). People needed about 45 minutes to answer the questions.

Table : informations about samples

France	Cameroon
Economics faculty, Catholic university of Lille	Economics faculty, University of Yaoundé
Years of study : 3	Years of study : 3
2003	2003
N= 116	N= 66

#### 3.2 Results :

##### 3.2.1. Responsibility and compensation: what to compensate for and to what extent ?

Scenarios 5 and 15 deal with compensation for disabilities

The first thing we try to find out is which characteristics are considered to be part of the ‘compensation’ characteristics and which are considered to belong to the ‘responsibility’ characteristics, one should not be compensated for.

All persons become paraplegic. People may be held responsible for their tastes or their preferences such as the choice of their hobby. If they happen to lose the necessary internal resources to practice their hobby, so the worse for them: they could have chosen another, less demanding one. A stronger option is to consider also one’s choice of profession a matter of taste or preference. A builder who can no longer execute his task, because he lost his legs, is in this case the victim of *option luck*: he should have chose to become an accountant.

In the latter perspective, compensation should be the same for all four people, whatever their job or their hobby. This vision is shared by, in our view, an amazingly large group of people: 35 % of the respondents when the loss of productivity is related to a physical impairment and even 47 % if it is related to a psychological impairment (France and Cameroon combined). Underlying this difference is probably that idea a merely psychological impairment does not make someone unable to work with his hands, or, stronger ‘exempt him from the obligation’ to work with his hands. Within this vision, i.e. the vision which considers profession as a preference one is responsible for, and only within this one, policy A incorporates strict compensation (natural reward): the remaining income differences will be considered as the result of the factors within the individuals’ control. This result, i.e. the astonishing attractiveness of the principle or natural reward, despite the relatively questionable assumption that one’s productive capacity is ‘chosen’, seems to confirm to some extent the findings of Schokkaert & Devooght. Of course the last remark is only tentative since it is within the context of this scenario, impossible to separate the topic of the responsibility cut from the one of the mostly approved luck-egalitarian axiom.

More people consider the loss of one’s productive capacity (for the earlier chosen job) as brute bad luck for which a particular compensation is legitimate. But, in the case of a psychological impairment, only slightly more people do think so. Among these people, we can distinguish between those who compensate also for the loss of the capacity to practice certain non productive activities (hobbies) (C and D) and those who don’t. (B). The latter consider the fact to practice any hobby at all to be a matter of personal choice (taste, preference). Therefore, if you happen to lose the capacity that your hobby demands, so the worse for you (bad option luck). Within this vision (and only within this one), which very few people share, policy B incorporates full compensation: since all people may be considered as equal with respect to their ‘responsibility’ characteristics, they end up, conformingly full compensation, with the same income.

The former group of the people who consider productive capacity as well as the possibility to practice *some* hobby as a compensation characteristic (in total more than half of the respondents) are to be divided according to the question whether or not they consider the fact to have chosen a

*particular* hobby as a choice one controls (and should therefore not be particularly compensated for the loss of the capacity to exert one' particular hobby). More than twice as much reason according to a capability logic and are not willing to compensate the loss of a particular hobby. The loss of a capacity in general is compensated for: most people clearly consider the choice of a hobby as something one is responsible for (be it merely by delegation).

The group of people who choose D consider the choice of a hobby as an endogenous preference one is not responsible for. Within their particular vision, they respect the axiom of strict compensation in the sense that, if outcome is supposed to include the welfare which represent a hobby, it is equalized by the compensations (effort is, like in the whole scenario, supposed to be equal).

Scenario 5				
Meaning of policies		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policies	Policy n°A : equality (people choose jobs and hobbies)	36.4%	30.3%	34.7%
	Policy n°B : no 'hobby' compensation, only productive capacity compensation	4.5%	3.0%	4.1%
	Policy n°C : productive capacity compensation + general hobby capacity compensation	43.2%	36.4%	41.3%
	Policy n°D : productive capacity compensation + specific welfarist hobby compensation	15.9%	30.3%	19.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference not statistically significant here.

Scenario 15				
Meaning of policies		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	

Policies	Policy n°A : equality (people choose jobs and hobbies)	50.6%	40.4%	46.9%
	Policy n°B : : no 'hobby' compensation, only productive capacity compensation	6.0%	2.1%	4.6%
	Policy n°C : productive capacity compensation + general hobby capacity compensation	38.6%	34.0%	36.9%
	Policy n°D productive capacity compensation + specific welfarist hobby compensation	4.8%	23.4%	11.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference not statistically significant

### 3.1.2. Undominated Diversity (Van Parijs, 1995)

Scenario 6 shows that the principle underlying the axiom of undominated diversity is rejected. In fact, we tested two versions of this policy, one in which targeted social policy is limited to the dominated person (Johnny) and one in which this limitation is combined with an overall increase of the uniform basic income. Both proposals are massively rejected. People clearly opt for a targeted policy, but a more generous one that a policy focusing on the worst off case.

Scenario 6 deals more generally with consequences of productive capacities in terms of compensation when effort is being equal (except for tetraplegic ). We test the extent to which one should compensate the lack of productive capacities. Our finding is that people do not make the link between weak productivity (limited internal endowments since it is explicitly mentioned that wages are related to productivity) and disability. 63% of the people do not compensate Joseph, who is obviously poorly endowed<sup>15</sup>. On the other hand, these same people give an allowance to Jim, because he has a visible physical handicap, although is quite highly skilled and earns about twice the minimum wage (and about twice as much as Joseph). If one defined disability by reference to poor internal endowments, the latter is, by definition, handicapped. There is probably some framing affect here (respondents were focused on disability), but the observation also reflects some aspects of social reality (e.g. working poor).

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<sup>15</sup> In fact, the number of people who opted for 3 is much higher. As one can see on the table, many people made a personal proposal, but more than half of these proposals were slight variants of 3. In one group, we run the questionnaire without the personal proposal option : 80% opted for 3.

Scenario 6				
Meaning of policies (N= 102, missing =80)		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policies	Policy n°1 : compensation for the low productivity	4.1%	12.2%	6.9%
	Policy n°2 : only physical handicapped are compensated for	26.1%	21.2%	24.5%
	Policy n°3 : compensation for the low productivity due to physical handicap	64%	63.6%	63.7%
	Policy n°4 : nothing is compensated for	0%	0%	0%
	Policy n°5 : test of strict undominated diversity	5.8%	3.0%	4.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference non statistically significant

### 3.1.3 Responsibility and option luck

Scenario 14 deals with causes of responsibility and legitimacy of transfers according to the causes of disability. Several people have the same disability but the reasons why they are handicapped differ: some of them can be held at least partially responsible for the handicap they have.

Scenario 14				
Meaning of the policies		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policies	A : all <i>accidents</i> considered as bad brute luck (crime is not an accident)	6.2%	2.0%	4.6%

B : degrees of responsibility: total for the criminal, absent for the traffic victim, the drunk is considered to relatively more responsible than the hunter (risks are more severely judged when they concern other people)	1.2%	12.2%	5.4%
C : degrees of responsibility like in B, but with a minimum benefit even when total responsibility is obvious.	25.9%	36.7%	30.0%
D : similar as B with more tolerance for the drunk than for the hunter (weakness of will)	1.2%	2.0%	1.5%
E : responsibility is not taken into account at all	50.6%	22.4%	40.0%
F : C and D combined: weakness of will is more tolerated (alcohol addiction) than voluntary choice of risk (hunting)	14.8%	24.5%	18.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

(note: Intercultural difference statistically significant)

- The results show that many people (in France particularly, twice as much as in Cameroon) don't want to take into account any facts of responsibility or risky behaviour.
- Very few people want to 'punish' the criminal who seems totally responsible for his bad fortune.
- People tend to be more severe with people who have addicted behaviour rather than with people who have risky behaviour (they punish more drunks than hunters)

### 3.2 . Non-discrimination, integration and compensation

According to Gregory Kavka, having a job, for a disabled person, is valuable as such, independently of the fact that the job is somehow productive. Having a job contributes to social integration even if productivity is negative.

Scenarios 3 and 2 deal with this issue.

Scenario 3 asks how much people are likely to pay to integrate disabled persons by giving them a job in a ordinary environment, or also, how much they want to pay to exclude disabled persons from the regular work floor and to organize particular jobs for them in specialized centres. Different assumptions are made: in A the cost to integrate people in a 'normal' environment ('integration') is supposed to be equal to the cost of a specialized centre. In B 'integration' is slightly more expensive. In C much more. In D integration is supposed to be half as expensive as the specialized centre.

Scenario 3a				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policy: cost A	<i>special centres for handicapped workers</i>	21.6%	30.2%	24.7%
	<i>Ordinary company gets subsidies for hiring handicapped workers</i>	57.7%	42.9%	52.3%
	<i>Indifferent</i>	20.7%	27.0%	23.0%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference non statistically significant

Scenario 3b				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policy : cost B	<i>special centres for handicapped workers</i>	36.6%	41.0%	38.2%
	<i>Ordinary company gets subsidies for hiring handicapped workers</i>	57.1%	52.5%	55.5%
	<i>indifferent</i>	6.3%	6.6%	6.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference non statistically significant

Scenario 3c				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policy : cost C	<i>special centres for handicapped workers</i>	62.5%	56.5%	60.3%
	<i>Ordinary company gets subsidies for hiring handicapped workers</i>	32.1%	37.1%	33.9%
	<i>indifferent</i>	5.4%	6.5%	5.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference non statistically significant

Scenario 3d				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policy : cost D	<i>special centres for handicapped workers</i>	25.9%	46.0%	33.1%
	<i>Ordinary company gets subsidies for hiring handicapped workers</i>	69.6%	46.0%	61.1%
	<i>indifferent</i>	4.5%	7.9%	5.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference statistically significant

The results show that most people prefer the integration of disabled in an ordinary company when there is no supplementary cost. Nevertheless, an important minority prefers to isolate this people in a specialised environment. The majority still prefers to integrate the cost is only slightly higher. However, when integration costs much more, people opt for specialised institutions. Priority is inversed. Rather surprisingly, even if it would be fifty percent cheaper to integrate disabled people in a normal company twenty five percent of the people still prefer not to have them around (ostracism).

Very much in line with this findings are the results of scenario 2.

Scenario 2				
Meaning of the policies		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policies	<i>Nothing</i>	0.9%	4.6%	2.2%
	<i>Strict compensation of the productivity gap to the employer</i>	29.8%	16.9%	25.1%
	<i>Overcompensation to the employer</i>	35.1%	24.6%	31.3%
	<i>Strict compensation for the low productivity (benefit given to the handicapped person)</i>	34.2%	53.8%	41.3%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference statistically significant

First, in France, everybody wants to compensate the lack of productivity of the disabled persons. More than a third of the respondents judge that one should *overcompensate* the employer for the lack of productivity of the disabled workers. Insofar as they want to compensate to effort to hire disabled persons, they approve affirmative action. Seventy percent of the respondents think that we should compensate indirectly towards the employer and only twenty eight want to allocate a rent in an immediate way to the disabled persons.

Secondly, there is a statistical significant intercultural difference: majority of the Cameroonians is in favour of direct payment to disabled persons. There are several hypotheses: lack of trust in the employers (they could keep the money for themselves), a more hierarchical society which is less sensitive to stigmatization related to dependence.

## Scenario 7

The results are quite surprising and difficult to interpret. For one thing, a large majority of the respondents do not want to make any difference between both unemployed people. For another, when people do make a difference, they rather compensate the person who formerly had the lowest salary, as if unemployment benefits should compensate low salaries.

Remark that this way of remunerating unemployment is totally opposite to the current French system in which unemployment benefits are proportional to former salary (Gerard would have a higher allowance than Norbert in the current system)<sup>16</sup>. (one reason maybe that part of the respondents did not well understand the question )

Scenario 7				
Meaning of policies		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policies	Same unemployment allowance	51.4%	46.0%	49.4%
	Discrimination in favour of handicapped	42.9%	50.8%	45.8%
	Efficiency	5.7%	3.2%	4.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference statistically significant

### Scenario 8

The question simply asks to give a preference ordering over different discriminated groups : respondents are asked which group should be given priority if the government implements some form of affirmative action. Discrimination of women is considered to be worse than the discrimination of handicapped people (there is no significant difference between the answers of male and female respondents). The interpretation is this is not obvious: one might argue that, in the eyes of public opinion, discrimination of women is obviously illegitimate. With respect to other groups, people may equally think that discrimination should be condemned but nevertheless by inclined to understand some motivations which underlie discrimination (low productivity etc.)

There is not much solidarity with poorly qualified people, but this may be a bias related to the fact that our sample was formed by university students.

Scenario 8
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<sup>16</sup> In Cameroon, there is no system of unemployment benefits.

Affirmative action		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Priority to	Handicapped	25.9%	30.6%	27.9%
	women	40.0%	32.3%	36.7%
	Young immigrants	20.0%	24.2%	21.8%
	Low qualification	14.1%	12.9%	13.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference statistically significant

### 3.3 Perfectionism

Scenario 12 focuses on the dilemma between ‘perfectionism’ and ‘liberalism’: if a costly device could help the disabled person to overcome the disadvantages caused by a particular impairment, should the impaired person be allowed to opt for the cash corresponding to the price of the device?

Unsurprisingly, correspondingly to the French social security system which reimburses medical expenses but doesn’t pay any compensation, almost everybody agrees with a solidarity system which wants to repair physical impairment. Remarkably thirty percent of Cameroonian respondents judge that people should have the choice between medical treatment and monetary compensation corresponding to the cost of the treatment. We guess that no cultural difference is at work here, but merely poverty.

Scenario 12				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Scenario 12	System A : liberalism	11.8%	29.2%	18.3%

	System B : perfectionism	88.2%	70.8%	81.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference statistically significant

## Scenario 10

In scenario 10 we ask for answers about three cases of disability and manipulation of procreation.

This scenario took as a starting point some famous recent controversies.<sup>17</sup> As for the first question, whether or not it seemed allowed to sterilize mentally disabled persons, public opinion is divided. 55 % is in favour of sterilization, 45 % against. Most justifications are not in terms of straightforward discrimination, but rather indirect arguments: they will not be able to educate them, etc.<sup>18</sup>

Therefore it is not possible to make strong conclusions about perfectionism here

The second part is related to the topic of 'perfectionism'. Are people with an impairment simply 'different' or are they 'lacking' something quite important? See section 2.3.

Then we contrast two questions :

First one: whether or not it would be allowed for deaf people to guarantee that their child should have their own handicap, that is to intervene positively to create a handicap). In second question we ask whether or not extremely small people should be allowed to avoid having an extremely small child, i.e. to prevent such a handicap.

The results are quite unsurprising. There is an overwhelming majority against the intentional 'creation' of impairment. They think that, e.g., deaf people should not be allowed to rely on a deaf sperm donor who may guarantee the deafness of their future child. People are clearly perfectionist and contradict massively the position defended by Silvers and Anderson, Cameroonians more than French.

Yet, and this may be somehow surprising, people approve a similar intervention to avoid an impairment (in our example to avoid a extremely small child)

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<sup>17</sup> references see downloaded documents.

- The Guardian Monday April 8, 2002.

- Opinion on the contraception for the mentally handicapped. Report. April 3, 1996

N°49 - April 3, 1996

[http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/english/avis/a\\_049p02.htm#IV](http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/english/avis/a_049p02.htm#IV)

<sup>18</sup> see ccne site on note 15 for similar arguments.

Therefore, in a more shocking, politically incorrect but otherwise correct language, we may say that people rather approve eugenics. However, the conclusion that people that are ‘perfectionist’ in this sense does not imply that they would adhere to the idea of compensation (by cash transfers) of all forms of imperfectness (as will be shown by scenario 11).

Scenario 10 case 1 : preventing procreation of mental handicapped				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policies	Yes	56.4%	53.3%	55.3%
	No	43.6%	46.7%	44.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference statistically non significant

Scenario 10 case 2 : deaf people wanting a deaf child				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policies	yes	31.4%	15.5%	25.6%
	no	68.6%	84.5%	74.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference statistically significant

Scenario 10 case 3 : extremely small people wanting to avoid an extremely small child				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
policies	yes	80.4%	85.0%	82.1%

	no	19.6%	15.0%	17.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference statistically non significant

### Scenario 11

Scenario 11 explores a combination of two issues. opinions about essentialism or perfectionism on the one hand, and opinions about the adequate form of compensation on the other hand. Moreover, a distinction is made between 2 types of ‘handicap’. The first list contains impairments for which no physical functioning can be recovered. The 2<sup>nd</sup> list presents impairments for which some recover is possible.

The scenario is inspired on a set of distinctions made in a recent paper by Jonathan Wolff (see section 2.5)

		Total	
		Cameroon	
albinism	<i>a) no compensation</i>	39.7%	40.7%
	<i>b) financial compensation</i>	10.3%	10.2%
	<i>c) resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	44.8%	44.1%

	<i>d) financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	5.2%	5.1%
Total		100.0%	100.0%

Light mental handicap				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Light mental handicap.	<i>a) no compensation</i>	15.1%	10.7%	13.4%
	<i>b) financial compensation</i>	38.4%	44.6%	40.8%
	<i>c) resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	24.4%	23.2%	23.9%

	<i>d) financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	22.1%	21.4%	21.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Blindness				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Blindness	<i>a) no compensation</i>	1.0%	3.4%	1.9%
	<i>b) financial compensation</i>	18.8%	23.7%	20.6%
	<i>c) resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	47.5%	33.9%	42.5%
	<i>d) financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	32.7%	39.0%	35.0%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Ugliness				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Ugliness	<i>a) no compensation</i>	87.9%	81.0%	85.4%

	<i>b) financial compensation</i>	10.1%	10.3%	10.2%
	<i>c) resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	1.0%	8.6%	3.8%
	<i>d) financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	1.0%		.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Restricted growth: restricted growth				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Restricted growth	<i>a) no compensation</i>	21.2%	50.0%	31.6%
	<i>b) financial compensation</i>	6.1%	10.7%	7.7%
	<i>c) resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	59.6%	37.5%	51.6%
	<i>d) financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	13.1%	1.8%	9.0%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference statistically non significant

Paraplegia				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Paraplegia	<i>b) financial compensation</i>	4.0%	21.3%	10.6%

	<i>c) resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	18.2%	13.1%	16.3%
	<i>d) financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	77.8%	65.6%	73.1%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference statistically significant

Infertility				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Infertility	<i>a) no compensation</i>	78.8%	69.5%	75.3%
	<i>b) financial compensation</i>	16.2%	20.3%	17.7%
	<i>c) resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	3.0%	6.8%	4.4%
	<i>d) financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	2.0%	3.4%	2.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Sexual impotence				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	

Sexual impotence	<i>e) free medical treatment and nothing else</i>	94.8%	89.7%	92.9%
	<i>f) free medical treatment and financial compensation</i>	3.1%	5.2%	3.9%
	<i>g) free medical treatment and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	1.0%	5.2%	2.6%
	<i>h) free medical treatment, financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	1.0%		.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Breast amputation				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Breast amputation	<i>e) free medical treatment and nothing else</i>	61.9%	39.7%	53.5%
	<i>f) free medical treatment and financial compensation</i>	28.9%	32.8%	30.3%
	<i>g) free medical treatment and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	4.1%	24.1%	11.6%
	<i>h) free medical treatment, financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	5.2%	3.4%	4.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Amputated limb**

		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Amputated limb	<i>e) free medical treatment and nothing else</i>	7.1%	11.9%	8.9%
	<i>f) free medical treatment and financial compensation</i>	15.3%	15.3%	15.3%
	<i>g) free medical treatment and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	45.9%	42.4%	44.6%
	<i>h) free medical treatment, financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment</i>	31.6%	30.5%	31.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Partial deafness		
Meaning of the policies	Comparison	Total

		France	Cameroon	
Partial deafness	e) free medical treatment and nothing else	39.2%	27.6%	34.8%
	f) free medical treatment and financial compensation	12.4%	8.6%	11.0%
	g) free medical treatment and resources to help the person fit into their environment	37.1%	41.4%	38.7%
	h) free medical treatment, financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment	11.3%	22.4%	15.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The conclusions are the following.

People are unwilling to pay *cash* compensations to the following list of impairments:

Ugliness, Infertility, Restricted growth, Impotence. However, we can imagine (but this could easily be checked!) that people would, if an insurance scheme would be available, buy an insurance against the loss of capacities represented by these impairments. Therefore, according to Dworkin's scheme, compensation for this would be likely (depending on the preferences one has, one would take an insurance to cover the risk of these impairments).

The answers do not only pit doubts on the relevance of Dworkin's insurance scheme as a device to mimic social policy, strict welfarism is rejected too. People accept to adapt the environment – a case in point is albinism (We guess they think about sun protection and dimmed light; albinos often have problems with their skin and their eyes) However, just like in the case of 'ugliness', cash compensation seems pointless, since the 'handicap' does not lead to social exclusion. This is fully in line with the result of scenario 12. Remark that people, though in favour of subsidies to adapt the environment, massively reject financial compensation for restricted growth ('dwarfs'). Although almost all people accept the idea of avoiding this disability by radically intervening in the procreation process, they still consider extremely small people not disabled enough to be 'compensated'.

On the other hand, people accept to some extent cash compensation for paraplegia, intellectual (mental) impairment and blindness. The underlying reason is, so we think, that in the eyes of the

respondents, it is very likely that the latter impairments have an incidence on essential functionings, and indirectly, on the income level.

Moreover, we observe, that even in these cases people prefer to pay to adapt the environment, if this is possible, rather than cash transfers. Blindness is a good example: twice as much people prefer to spend resources to help the blind persons (43 %) fit into their environment without cash transfers, rather than to give merely financial compensation (35 % thinks that the combination of both is legitimate). This result confirms rather the Silvers/Anderson position.

### 3.4. Perfectionism and the capability approach

### 3.5. Non discrimination versus compensation

72% of the respondents judge that “equal access” is far more important than a possible utility (pleasure minus pain) gain. The example suggests that the suffering (pain) of Juliette is much higher than the one of Jeannette. In other words, the results show that non discrimination is judged to be prior to compensation in a welfarist sense.

Here we have a significant difference between the French and the Cameroonian respondents. The latter judge equal access even more important (82%). The reasons are obvious: public transportation is dramatically lacking and lots of people have no access to medical services.

Scenario 9				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policies	Project A : utilitarianism	35.6%	15.0%	28.0%
	Project B : equal access to health care	64.4%	85.0%	72.0%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference significant

Scenario 13 applies Wolff's (2002, 2004) policies classification (see section 2.5).

We observe that personal enhancement is the most approved policy in Cameroon (51%), followed by policy 4, i.e. status enhancement, (40%). The latter is most approved in France (49%), followed by the former (27%). Rather nobody in both countries thinks that people should receive cash. This is quite surprising concerning Cameroon (see the results of scenario 12). Policy 3 concerns the increase of targeted resources. 6% in Cameroon and 18% in France prefer this policy.

Scenario 13				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policies	Cash compensation	6.6%	3.2%	5.3%
	Personal enhancement	27.4%	50.8%	36.1%
	Targeted resources	15.1%	6.3%	11.8%
	Status enhancement	50.9%	39.7%	46.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference significant

### 3.5 Discrimination among handicapped persons

We also tried to find out whether there is some discrimination between different types of disabled persons. We therefore assumed that the different disabilities had no implications on productivity.

#### Scenario 1

Scenario 1 deals with the allocation of work equipment when the budget is constrained and when only one out of three handicapped persons may benefit from this allocation: one has a physical disability, another one has a psychological disability and the last one has a mental disability. Given that the three persons have the same productivity, the choice should be either a lottery or a discriminating preference.

The results show that in France, 55% refuse to attribute a priority between the three forms of disability. In Cameroon 32 % of the respondents opt for the lottery. In France, the priorities over the three types of disability are as following:

Physical handicap : 26.3%

Psychological handicap : 16.4%

Mental handicap : 8%

In Cameroon, priorities are as follows:

Physical handicap : 36.9%

Psychological handicap : 7.7%

Mental handicap : 23.1%

We observe an inversed (and unexplained) result between treatment of psychological and mental handicap in France and Cameroon.

Scenario 1				
		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Scenario 1	lottery	55.5%	32.3%	46.9%
	JPR	7.3%	21.5%	12.6%
	JRP	12.7%	15.4%	13.7%
	PJR	10.9%	6.2%	9.1%
	PRJ	5.5%	1.5%	4.0%
	RJP	6.4%	12.3%	8.6%
	RPJ	1.8%	10.8%	5.1%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Intercultural difference significant

Remind : JPR , John (J) suffers from a physical handicap, Peter (P) from a psychological handicap and Robert (R ) from a mental handicap

In Scenario 4 specialized (and costly) work equipment has to be allocated to one of two disabled persons. One is suffering from a mental handicap and the other is suffering from a physical handicap.

In despite of his mental handicap, the former has a higher productivity than the latter. In France, only 35% of the students give priority to productivity, which is prior to 58% of the Cameroonians. We observe in both countries an important group who wants to discriminate in favour of physical handicapped (15% in France and 25% in Cameroon). Lottery is somewhat less chosen in Cameroon than in France. Cameroonians tend to reject psychological handicaps as not being a serious handicaps.

Scenario 4				
Meaning of the policies		Comparison		Total
		France	Cameroon	
Policies	Alan (physical handicap, lower productivity)	15.0%	24.6%	18.5%
	Jacques (mental handicap, higher productivity than Alan)	35.4%	58.5%	43.8%
	lottery	49.6%	16.9%	37.6%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

### Scenarios 5 et 15

As mentioned before, Scenarios 5 and 15 deal with compensation of disabilities when people are not responsible for their disability. With regard to the discrimination between types of disabled persons, we can compare results between scenarios 5 and 15. Indeed, they are almost similar. They only differ according to the type of handicap at stake. In scenario 5 we ask people to choose between policies in favour of physically handicapped persons whereas in scenario 15 the four people are psychologically handicapped.

The results show that more people choose equal transfers (which implies that people are considered to be responsible for the choice of their job as well as for the choice of their hobby, nothing is compensate for) in the scenario 15 (mental impairment) than in scenario 5 (physical impairment). This suggests some discrimination, related to a different perception of responsibility between the two types of disability, between physical impairment and psychological handicap and that psychological handicapped is less recognized as a disability. Just like in question 4, the opinions are more clear-cut in Cameroon.

### 3.5. Intercultural differences

#### **Conclusion**

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## Appendix: Questionnaire (French students version)

### **PUBLIC OPINION AND ATTITUDES TO SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY REGARDING HANDICAPPED PEOPLE**

#### **AIM OF RESEARCH PROJECT**

This survey intends to reveal people's attitudes to social and economic policy regarding handicapped people. It is made up of several hypothetical cases; which we call 'scenarios'. We would like to know your instinctive reactions and personal opinions. **There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers.** All answers are relevant as long as they faithfully communicate your point of view. Your answers will help us to clarify the principal theories behind the policies to be implemented, which may be found in philosophical and economic writings on the subject, but for which it is difficult to evaluate the real amount of public support.

Please fill in this survey anonymously (your name should not appear anywhere) and answer every question.

#### **Personal Details**

Age

Sex

Highest educational qualification

Profession

Parents' profession

**Scenario 1**

John, Peter & Robert are all handicapped: John is paraplegic, Peter has psychological problems: (he has a phobia against crowds to the extent that he can't use public transport), Robert has a mental handicap, and he has Down's syndrome. All three have the same, fairly low, level of productivity, in their jobs and the special equipment required for them to work costs the same amount.

*Question:*

*The Government has a limited budget and cannot afford to buy the special equipment for all three men. Which option would you choose to decide which of them should receive the equipment he needs to work?*

*1. Toss a coin*

*2 : Provide equipment in one of the following orders :*

*John, Peter, Robert*

*John, Robert, Peter*

*Peter, John, Robert*

*Peter, Robert, John*

*Robert, John, Peter*

*Robert, Peter, John*

*Justify your answer (2 lines):*

**Scenario 2:**

The authorities wish to encourage employers to hire handicapped people using a system of financial subsidies. Consider the following situation: handicapped people produce on average 50% less than able-bodied people (supposing a society where each person is paid according to their productivity and therefore where handicapped people earn 50% less than able-bodied people). The table below suggests different ways of implementing this policy with varying amounts being paid to the employer and the handicapped person.

On average an able-bodies person earns 1200€per month.

<b>Put the policies in</b>		<i>Allowance paid to the</i>	<i>Subsidy paid to the</i>	<i>Monetary value of the</i>	<i>Handicapped person's</i>	<i>Handicapped person's</i>
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<b>order of preference from 1 to 4</b>		<i>handicapped person</i>	<i>employer</i>	<i>handicapped person's productivity</i>	<i>salary before allowances</i>	<i>total income</i>
	<i>Policy 1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>500</i>
	<i>Policy 2</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>400</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>900</i>	<i>900</i>
	<i>Policy 3</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>550</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>900</i>	<i>900</i>
	<i>Policy 4</i>	<i>400</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>500</i>	<i>900</i>

Place the policies in order of preference from the one you consider the fairest (1) to the one you consider the least fair (4)

Justify your choice :

### Scenario 3

In a certain country, there are some handicapped people; because of their handicap they produce 50% less than the able-bodied inhabitants. They are therefore only paid half the salary earned by able-bodied people.

*The State has the choice between two policies which cost the same and which are explained in the following table. Handicapped people can either be placed in special centres to work (like the French CAT centres) or employers can be subsidised to encourage them to employ handicapped people.*

	<i>Cost A (in millions of euros)</i>	<i>Cost B</i>	<i>Cost C</i>	<i>Cost D</i>
<i>Policy 1(special centres for handicapped workers)</i>	200	250	200	200
<i>Policy 2(employer subsidies for hiring handicapped workers)</i>	200	300	500	100

Question :

If the relative cost of the two options is A....	1 is preferable to 2	2 is preferable to 1	No preference
B	1 is preferable to 2	2 is preferable to 1	No preference
C	1 is preferable to 2	2 is preferable to 1	No preference
D	1 is preferable to 2	2 is preferable to 1	No preference

**Scenario 4:**

Alan is physically handicapped. The equipment he needs in order to work effectively is heavy and expensive. Alan is aware of his handicap and of the cost of the equipment he needs. However, he wants to work and he has a good productivity rate. Jacques was born with a mental handicap. The equipment he needs for his work costs the same as Alan's. Like Alan, he wants to work, but his productivity is slightly higher.

Every person in their society is paid according to their productivity. There are funds available for the necessary equipment for only one of these two men.

**Question :**

*Choose one of these three options and justify your choice :*

- Give the equipment to Alan*
- Give the equipment to Jacques*
- Toss a coin*

**Scenario 5 :**

Matty and Matthew are builders. Constantine and Charles are accountants. They all earn about the same salary (1200 euros). Matty and Charles are music lovers and spend nearly all their free time making music, which gives them great pleasure. Matthew and Constantine are enthusiastic hikers and spend all their holidays in the mountains.

Unfortunately, all four men are injured in a road accident and are paralysed from the waist down. The Social Security system intervenes and does all it can to enable the two accountants to continue in their profession. Obviously, the two builders cannot continue to do their former job.

The men's handicap affects their leisure activities in the following way : the music lovers can continue their musical activities. The hikers are stuck in their wheelchairs and cannot continue. The social security system has 3000€ per month to distribute between these four people. Look at four different ways this could be done in the table below :

<b>Suggested allowances</b>	<b>Matty (builder &amp; music-lover)</b>	<b>Constantine (accountant &amp; hiker)</b>	<b>Charles (accountant &amp; music-lover)</b>	<b>Matthew (builder &amp; music-lover)</b>
<b>A</b>	750	750	750	750
<b>B</b>	1200	0	0	1200
<b>C</b>	1200	200	200	1200
<b>D</b>	1200	200	0	1400

Question :

*Choose between A,B,C & D the suggestion which seems fairest to you. (or which seems the least unfair suggestion)*

## Scenario 6

Imagine a society where everyone, whether they work or not, receives a monthly allowance of 300€ from the State, which enables them to survive (for example, this occurs in Alaska where the income from natural resources, like petrol, provides the money).

The question which concerns us here is whether handicapped people ought to receive more than the others.

Imagine five people in this society : Julian, Jim, Johnny, Jonah & Joseph. Julian and Joseph are in perfect health and have a job for which they are paid according to their productivity. Jim, Johnny & Jonah are handicapped : Jim & Jonah are paraplegic and Johnny is tetraplegic. Jim and Jonah have both found a job but, in spite of all his efforts, Jonah earns less than Jim. Johnny cannot work and, in addition, needs someone to do his shopping and housework for him. The average salary of an able-bodied person is 1200€/per month. The minimum salary is 500€

The following table gives the men's income and various possibilities for giving them an extra allowance. The government has 2000€/per month to share between them, but is not obliged to spend it all. Can you help the government decide what to give to whom in the fairest possible way (or the least unfair way)?

	<b>Julian</b> <b>(able - bodied)</b>	<b>Jim</b> <b>(works, paraplegic)</b>	<b>Joseph</b> <b>(able - bodied)</b>	<b>Jonah</b> <b>(works, paraplegic)</b>	<b>Johnny</b> <b>(tetraplegic, cannot work) )</b>
Net income before allowances	2000	900	900	500	0
Standard government allowance	300	300	300	300	300
Policy 1	0	0	0	200	500
Policy 2	0	200	200	500	1000
Policy 3	0	500	0	500	1000
Policy 4	0	0	0	0	0
Policy 5	0	0	0	0	500

### **Scenario 7:**

*There is a high unemployment rate in a given society. The employment of handicapped people has caused a certain debate. In general, government policy is to combat poverty by paying an allowance to each unemployed person. Imagine that Norbert is handicapped and has just lost his job. He has the same qualifications as Gerald who had a similar job which he has also just lost. On account of his handicap, Norbert's productivity was 25% lower than Gerald's. Imagine that everyone is paid according to their productivity and that Norbert does not receive any handicap allowance.*

*What should the State do?*

- *Give equal unemployment benefit to both men.*
- *Give a different rate of unemployment benefit to the two men. If so, to what extent and who should get the most?*

### **Scenario 8**

Imagine a country called Syldavia. In this country 50% of women, handicapped people, young immigrants and poorly qualified people are unemployed. The government has a policy of positive discrimination (in order to encourage the employment of people who may suffer discrimination on the job market). However, for various reasons, they have to prioritise. If you were asked to advise the government, how would you place these four groups in order of priority ? Justify your answer.

### **Scenario 9 :**

Juliet is able-bodied but suffers very badly from psoriasis and needs weekly ultraviolet ray treatment at her local hospital. She is in a lot of pain.

Jeannette is paraplegic and has psoriasis on her forearms which itches and causes her some discomfort. She cannot get regular treatment because of transport problems.

The Social Security budget has some money put aside which may be used for one of the following schemes : buying special equipment to reduce Juliet's pain and enable her to reduce her hospital sessions to one per month (project A) or buying an ambulance which could take Jeannette to hospital for treatment (project B).

Which project should they choose ? A or B

### **Scenario 10**

**Here are three case studies where we would like you to say what you think the government should decide.**

**Case 1 : a mentally handicapped man and woman of an age to have children regularly have sex and may have a child. Should anything be done to stop them reproducing ? (eg. sterilisation) Justify your answer.**

**Case 2: A man and a woman who are both stone deaf wish to have a child. Unfortunately the man is infertile. They agree to use artificial insemination and request a sperm donor who is very likely to produce a deaf child. Is this a legitimate request ? Justify your answer.**

**Case 3 : A man and a woman of restricted growth (dwarves) wish to have a child. Their handicap is genetically transmitted through the male only. They agree to use artificial insemination and request a donor who is very unlikely to produce a dwarf child. Is this request legitimate? Justify your answer.**

Scenario 11

**Here are two lists of personal characteristics which may prevent people living a fulfilling life. A policy of compensation may be established. Four possible systems are described here : a,b,c & d**

**List 1 : permanent states, no treatment possible**

*Possible compensation plans :*

- a) no compensation**
- b) financial compensation**
- c) Resources to help the person fit into their environment**
- d) financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment**

**For each of the following characteristics (they are in alphabetical order) say whether you consider a,b,c or d the most appropriate policy.**

**Learning difficulties**

**Blindness**

**Ugliness**

**Restricted growth**

**Paraplegia**

**Infertility**

**List III : some improvement is possible with medical treatment, but no cure**

*Possible compensation policies :*

**e) free medical treatment and nothing else**

**f) free medical treatment and financial compensation**

**g) free medical treatment and resources to help the person fit into their environment**

**h) free medical treatment, financial compensation and resources to help the person fit into their environment**

**For each of the following characteristics (in alphabetical order), place the letter corresponding to the policy you think is the most appropriate.**

**Impotence**

**Mastectomy (one breast amputated)**

**Amputated limb**

**Partial deafness**

**Scenario 12 :**

. John had an accident which broke the ligaments in one of his knees. Without a medical treatment John can only walk with difficulty and limps. He could receive medical treatment for his condition but the treatment is long and very expensive.

Choose between the two following options:

System A :

- John can choose between having the medical treatment or the cost of the treatment.

System B :

- John can have free medical treatment, but if he decides not to have it he gets no compensation

Justify your choice

### **Scenario 13**

Matilda is paraplegic. The government has to adopt a policy for handicapped people like her. There are several possibilities. Place them in order of priority. You may choose one, two or three options as long as you justify your choice. All four cost the same.

1) A compensatory down payment is made to the handicapped person because they cannot get the same satisfaction out of life as an able-bodied person.

2) The government should pay for physiotherapy and massage for Matilda in order to improve her circulation et minimise her discomfort at work. It should also pay for counselling so that she will feel better psychologically and be better able to work normally.

3) Matilda should be given the money to buy a wheelchair and equip her car, so that she can get around more easily. The money should be exclusively reserved for this.

4) The government should provide accommodation adapted to the needs of people like Matilda and provide the necessary equipment for her workplace (also training for her colleagues), adapted layout, extra parking space, lift etc.

### **Scenario 14**

Four people all suffer from the same handicap, they only have one leg. They are all fifty years old and their former jobs required them to use both legs (postman, builder etc.) It seems unlikely they will find another job.

1) Paul's handicap is due to a road accident where he was run over by a driver who was breaking the highway code at the time.

2) John's handicap was the result of a hold-up he was involved in and for which he has spent time in jail. During the hold-up a policeman shot him in the leg.

3) Peter's handicap is the result of a careless accident when he was cleaning his shotgun. He shot himself in the leg.

4) Frank's handicap is the result of a road accident when he drove his car into a tree after drinking quite a lot of beer.

In order to provide specially adapted living conditions for each of these men a monthly budget of 666€ per person is required. However, only 2000€ per month are available to share between them (insurance premium etc.)

<b>Question :How should the money be shared out between the four men ? Indicate the solution which you think is fairest (or the least unfair one)</b>	<b>Paul</b>	<b>John</b>	<b>Frank</b>	<b>Peter</b>
A	666	0	666	666
B	800	0	475	725
C	750	200	400	650
D	800	0	725	475
E	500	500	500	500
F	750	200	650	400

### **Scenario 15**

.Clement and Alex are heads of department at an Auchan hypermarket. Mark and Anthony are farmers. They all earn about the same amount. Clement and Mark are enthusiastic bodybuilders. Alex and Anthony like to play chess.

All four of them are also good horseriders. They all fall off a horse and suffer brain damage. Clement and Alex can no longer work – they can no longer cope with crowds or concentrate on their daily routine. The doctor certifies their inability to continue. With regard to their leisure activities the body builders have no problem, but the chess players can no longer play the game. The Social Security system receives various suggestions for compensating the men (in euros per month).

<b>Suggestions</b>	<b>Clement</b> Retail & bodybuilding	<b>Anthony</b> Farming & chess	<b>Mark</b> Farming & bodybuilding	<b>Alex</b> Retail & chess
<b>A</b>	<b>1200</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1200</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>1200</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>1200</b>
<b>C</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>750</b>
<b>D</b>	<b>1200</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1400</b>

#### **Question :**

*Choose the solution which seems fairest to you (or the one which seems the least unfair).*

### **Scenario 16**

Some charities insist on handicapped people's « right to pleasure ». They denounce the fact that handicapped people suffer because of involuntary sexual deprivation. This subject was for a long time completely taboo. Which of the following suggestions, financed by the State, seems morally acceptable to you?

- 1) Medication to reduce handicapped people's libido.
- 2) Technical help with sexual relationships by qualified personnel. (putting paralysed people into position, help with penetration etc.)
- 3) Sexual aid for people who are physically incapable of masturbating.
- 4) Carresses or full sexual relations by professional sex workers.
- 5) None of the above.

Justify your answer.