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Equal Respect and Global Egalitarianism

I

If the moral requirement of equal respect for the autonomy of all persons dictates some kind of an egalitarian distributive principle domestically, then surely it is beyond question that it dictates some kind of an egalitarian principle globally. After all, the requirement contains a universal quantifier. But Richard Miller and Michael Blake have presented interesting and powerful challenges to the idea that domestic egalitarianism on such a basis requires egalitarianism globally. The strategy of their arguments is to claim that egalitarian justice is required domestically only under contingent conditions, which involve centrally relations that compatriots have to one another, and that these conditions do not obtain between non-compatriots.ⁱ I agree that duties of egalitarian justice require contingent conditions. But I shall argue against Miller's and Blake's views that these conditions are limited to (for the most part) relations between compatriots. Rather, I shall argue, that the relevant conditions obtain between non-compatriots.

II

Richard Miller argues for a patriotic bias of two kinds: A priority of attention to compatriots' needs, and a budgetary bias towards meeting those needs.ⁱⁱ Although it might not be apparent from this manner of expressing the distinction, both kinds of bias have fiscal implications for Miller takes attending to compatriots needs to require expenditures on aid programs. The budgetary bias ensures that such expenditures are proportionally much larger than expenditures in foreign aid.ⁱⁱⁱ

The first bias is the basis of the second, and the first will therefore be the main object of my criticism. The moral grounds for the patriotic bias, according to Miller, are twofold. The first is our

interest in having relations of mutual respect and trust with persons whom we are especially interdependent. The second is that the self-respect of less privileged compatriots requires an incentive to follow the laws that are imposed upon them.^{iv} Although these grounds are distinct, both of Miller's two central arguments bases an appeal to the first moral ground upon a prior appeal to the second.

Miller's first argument in defense of priority of attention to compatriot needs is based upon the psychological limits of trust. It asks us to consider a "failure to provide tax-financed aid sufficient to relieve serious burdens of inferior life-prospects among compatriots, when this shortfall is due to provision for neediness abroad."^v The consequential evils of this failure, Miller asserts, are the reduced cooperation on the part of the disadvantaged, which cooperation is substituted by mere acquiescence, deference out of self-abnegation, or compliance out of ignorance.^{vi} Thus, for the disadvantaged it is "psychologically insupportable to engage respectfully in the political process that ultimately enforces these rules."^{vii} This, I take it, is an appeal to the second ground of patriotic bias, stated in the previous paragraph. And insofar as all persons have "an interest in having one's relationships of dependence be relationships of mutual respect and trust"^{viii} all persons, not merely the disadvantaged, have an interest in avoiding social evils described above. This appeals to the first ground of patriotic bias.

Nothing that Miller says about the consequential social evils of failing to fund aid to disadvantaged compatriots depends upon the cause of the failure being a diversion of resources to fund global institutions or programs. The argument is general in the sense that it could be invoked for any competing funding interest. Assume that the appeal to impossibility of cooperation on the basis of respect and self-respect is plausible, the generality of the argument raises the question of how to weigh redistributive duties to compatriots against other duties. Some such comparison would be in order in situations in which of scarcity of resources renders the fulfillment of duties extremely difficult or impossible.

Miller takes up the question of the costs of acting on duties in his discussion of the budgetary bias. There he argues that educational costs increase the bill for preventing domestic social evils and international cost sharing reduce the bill for preventing social evils experienced by non-compatriots.^{ix} But if this is correct, the attention bias does not follow. Supposing that domestic social evils are more costly to prevent, does not entail that we are required by a morality of equal respect to give them greater attention.

Miller offers a comparison of the moral weight domestic and global moral demands only by considering the importance of respect and trust internationally. Because the interdependence among compatriots is “specially intense and specially vulnerable to distrust and disrespect” great attention must be paid to their relationships.^x Moreover, the special valuing of a relationship requires taking one’s own participation in the relationship as “a specially demanding reason for appropriate forms of concern for the other.”^{xi} Miller seems to believe that if the values that are important in compatriot relationships are not apparent in relationships between non-compatriots, then moral demands that non-compatriots may make are either Kantian imperfect duties or supererogatory. For it is only the basis of a claim such as this that his argument, which has been that compatriot relations are a sufficient condition for duties of egalitarian justice, can yield the additional conclusion that compatriot relations are a necessary condition for duties of egalitarian justice. Miller never explicitly defends the claim that the only values in relationships that yield duties of egalitarian justice are those found in compatriot relations. And as Samuel Scheffler notes, nothing about the claim that one person has a special obligation to another, rules out the possibility that the first also has a special obligation on a different basis to a third person.^{xii}

In sum, then, Miller’s first argument is not convincing because it is incomplete. It is vulnerable to a challenge that gives a plausible account of the value or values involved in the non-compatriot

relationship as well as adequate reasons to believe that these values are no less important, given the demand of equal respect for all, than the values in the compatriot relationship.

Miller's second argument in defense of priority of attention to compatriots alleges a requirement to compensate for the existence of coercion in state's legal system. Self-respect is incompatible with support for a system of coercion under which one's life prospects are seriously burdened, through no choice of one's own, if that burden could be eliminated at little cost to the advantaged. If self-respect is incompatible with the disadvantaged supporting such a system, support for such a system on the part of the advantaged fails to respect the disadvantaged.^{xiii} These considerations do not favor improving the compatriot relationships of others because the special requirements of respect within a system of coercion are specially important to each person in his or her compatriot relationships.^{xiv}

Richard Arneson observes, correctly I believe, that there is something odd about the view that justice necessarily requires compensating a person coerced by a system of laws, if such compensation can be achieved at little cost to those compensating.^{xv} For if the laws are otherwise approximately just, without the compensation, then the least advantaged have a *prima facie* moral reason to follow those laws, even if self-respect also requires advocating for greater socio-economic equality. But if the laws are unjust, then perhaps self-respect requires advocating for a change in those laws as well as advocating for greater socio-economic inequality. In this latter case, achieving greater equality in the absence of other reforms to the legal system would not make the laws acceptable to a self-respecting person. If a system of otherwise just laws, without equality, is with regards to the just laws acceptable to a self-respecting person, and system of unjust laws, with equality, is unacceptable to a self-respecting person, then equality is neither necessary nor sufficient for a self-respecting person to accept the rest of the legal system.

The above argument appears devastating to the claim that coercion necessarily requires compensation. But suppose for the sake of argument that it is not. Suppose that Miller's point at this point in the argument is generally correct. This argument would nonetheless be vulnerable in the way that the first argument is. That is to say that it would be vulnerable to a challenge that gives a plausible account of the value or values in the non-compatriot relationship as well as adequate reasons to believe that these values are no less important, given the demand of equal respect for all, than the values in the compatriot relationship

III

Whereas Miller believes that a kind of partiality towards compatriots is compatible with equal respect for all, Michael Blake argues that an impartial respect for the autonomy of all person will yield different principles of distributive justice domestically and internationally.^{xvi} Domestically the principle will be sensitive to relative deprivation and tend towards equality; internationally it will be sensitive to absolute deprivation and require only sufficiency for autonomous living.^{xvii} As Blake recognizes, even a commitment to sufficiency will condemn the abject poverty that nearly half the world's population finds itself in. So, Blake in no way wishes to defend current global distributions. Indeed, his sufficiency principle is radical in the current political context and worthy of support to the extent that it finds its way into real political debate. But Blake's argument that equal respect for autonomy requires only a commitment to sufficiency is, I believe, unconvincing. Although I find it plausible that different distributive considerations apply domestically and globally, I disagree that the equality is not applicable globally.

Blake's argument involves the application of a liberal principle of autonomy to both domestic and international cases with different results. This principle states that "all human beings have the moral entitlement to exist as autonomous agents, and they have entitlements to those circumstances and

conditions under which this is possible.”^{xxviii} Notice that in referring to “all human beings” this principle does not distinguish between compatriots and non-compatriots. Since famine, abject poverty, and serious oppression can severely impair autonomous agency all persons are entitled, by the principle of liberal autonomy, to insurance against these.^{xxix} Thus, liberal global justice, according to Blake, makes significant redistributive demands.

Blake takes egalitarian distributive justice to be a justificatory requirement of the coercive character private and tax law; and such coercion is required to justify egalitarian distributive justice.^{xx} The idea is that legal coercion of this sort requires justification in order to be consistent with the liberal value of autonomy. Blake suggests that the justification appeals to a version of hypothetical consent, namely that a coercive measure is unjustified if it could be reasonably rejected by an autonomous agent.^{xxi} In ascertaining whether a legal regime meets with hypothetical consent of those governed by it one has to set aside certain morally arbitrary properties of actual persons that might influence their willingness to consent. One useful device, then, for ascertaining the whether hypothetical consent exists is the Rawlsian original position.^{xxii} Blake contends, that “The liberal principle of autonomy requires that coercion be justified through hypothetical consent, and that the conditions of this consent in the arena of private law may require—as Rawls argues they do—consideration of relative deprivation and material equality.”^{xxiii}

Although I shall return presently to discuss this further, let’s assume without further discussion right now that egalitarian distributive justice is necessary for the justification of private law. The move from that claim to the additional claim that the existence of coercion is necessary for justified claims of egalitarian justice is puzzling.^{xxiv} For the additional claim does not follow from the fact that egalitarian justice is required to justify coercion. It may be that egalitarian justice is so needed *and* that other circumstances justify a commitment to egalitarian justice. As an example, if it is the case that egalitarian distributive justifies a system of taxation, it does not follow that in the absence of a tax

system a commitment to egalitarian justice is misplaced. In other words, the claim that egalitarian justice is sufficient for a justified system of coercion does not entail the claim that such system is necessary for a justified system of egalitarian justice. Yet Blake's statement of the argument seems to rely on such entailment. Consider the argument in the quotation that ended my previous paragraph once again and its continuation with a conclusion in the next sentence:

The liberal principle of autonomy requires that coercion be justified through hypothetical consent, and that the conditions of this consent in the arena of private law may require—as Rawls argues they do—considerations of relative deprivation and material equality. It is not the case, therefore, that liberalism is committed to an equality of material shares in the global arena.

One possible source of the confusion could be the changing application of the predicate “justified.” From the claim that E is sufficient for justified C, we may not conclude that C is necessary for justified E. Blake's argument seems myopic in a way that Miller's was. Both argue for the importance of egalitarian distributive justice domestically, but fail to argue additionally that it has no role globally.

Blake does, however, cite the explanatory value of the view that institutions of egalitarian justice require coercion for their justification. Taking coercion as a necessary condition of justified egalitarianism would explain why egalitarian principles are required of states but not of churches and universities.^{xxv} But there is a better explanation of this. Churches and universities are voluntary organizations and we tend to believe the principles of justice do not govern the internal life of such organizations so thoroughly. For example, not only is not the case that such organizations must adhere to principles of egalitarian distributive justice in their internal affairs; it is also not the case that they must be internally democratic. Liberals have long held that voluntary organizations are not required to satisfy the demands of justice in their internal affairs.^{xxvi}

The claim that egalitarian distributive justice is necessary to justify private and tax law seems to contain an ambiguity. According to one possibility the relationship between egalitarian distributive justice on the one hand and private and tax law on the other is external. By this I mean that whatever

reasons there are for the law—reasons of self-interest for example—they have nothing to do with egalitarian distributive justice. But these reasons are insufficient morally speaking for the justification of the coercion that the law permits or requires. According to this way of looking at the matter, compensation is required to those coerced, compensation sufficient to render morally permissible acting on the other reasons for the law. Blake may have something like this in mind since this model would explain why one would think that in the absence of coercion there are no moral reasons for egalitarian distributive justice. It is noteworthy, however, that this view, that takes apparent redistribution as actual compensation is associated with Nozick's libertarian account of justice, rather than with Rawls's egalitarianism.^{xxvii}

Egalitarians, on the other hand, typically understand distributive justice and private and tax law to be internally related. Rawls, for example, takes the justification of institutions to occur at the constitutional and legislative stages.^{xxviii} According to this account the relationship between justified principles of justice and justified institution is that the latter serve the goals of the former. It would seem a confusion then to claim that principles of distributive justice were not justified in the absence of the institutions.

Although Blake argues that his account is the proper interpretation of Rawls's view, I have suggested that we have reason to doubt this. There is more. In contrast to Blake's coercion model, we might call Rawls's model "institutional." He distinguishes "between those institutions or aspects thereof which must inevitably apply to us since we are born into them and they regulate the full scope of our activity, and those that apply to us because we have freely done certain things as a rational way of advancing our ends."^{xxix} Rawls takes us to have natural duties of justice in regard to the first kind of institutions, but not in regard to the latter kind. Call this the non-voluntary requirement. Rawls takes an institution to be "a public system of rules which defines office and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like."^{xxx} As examples of institutions, Rawls offers "games and

rituals, trails, and parliaments, markets and systems of property.”^{xxxxi} As Rawls’s discussion of promising makes clear a public system of rules need be neither written nor legislated by an official body.^{xxxii} There is nothing in this account to suggest that duties of justice require a coercive framework. Although, as Blake notes, *Political Liberalism* is centrally concerned with the justification of the use of coercive political power, this is because that work is not centrally concerned with the justification of principles of justice.

IV

Like Miller and Blake I find it implausible to believe that duties of egalitarian distributive justice exist to between persons just in virtue of their personhood.^{xxxiii} We are in agreement then that such duties are special moral duties, as are for example duties to fulfill promises. We disagree about the grounds that trigger these duties. In this section, I shall offer an account of these grounds that is not reliant on compatriot relations.

Rawls’s institutional account seems generally correct to me. Duties of justice exist between persons who have a moral duty of equal respect to one another only if those persons are co-members of an association of a certain kind. An association is an interaction of a particular type. An association is strong to the extent that it is enduring, comprehensively governed by institutional norms, and regularly affecting the highest order moral interests of the persons associated. Weak associations blur into mere interactions. And so the limit between where an association ends and interaction begins is not always clear. Nonetheless certain applications are. Not all associations generate duties of justice. Duties of justice arise among persons just in case their on-going association is largely non-voluntary and constitutes a significant part of the background for the various relationships of their public lives.

The global market, comprising, *inter alia*, foreign direct investment, international trade, and international finance, especially lending and currency exchange, constitutes institutional scheme of

cooperation that assigns benefits and burdens to persons, the effects of which on their life prospects are (to employ Rawls's words) "profound from the start."^{xxxiv} Elizabeth Anderson has aptly characterized the division of labor in an economy as cooperative venture:

The comprehensiveness of the division of labor in a modern economy implies that no one produces everything, or indeed anything, they consume by their own efforts alone. In regarding the division of labor as a comprehensive system of joint production, workers and consumers regard themselves as collectively commissioning everyone else to perform their chosen role in the economy. In performing their role in an efficient division of labor, each worker is regarded as an agent for the people who consume their products and the other workers who, in being thereby relieved from performing that role, become free to devote their talents to more productive activities.^{xxxv}

Life prospects are dramatically unequal depending upon one's place within this institutional scheme. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) notes that the total income of the world's richest 1% of people is equal to that of the poorest 57%.^{xxxvi} The assets of the richest 3 people in the world are more than the combined GNP of all of the least developed countries.^{xxxvii} Nearly half of the world's population lives in abject poverty on \$2 PPP per day.^{xxxviii} Worse still, 1.15 billion people live on less than a \$1 PPP a day.^{xxxix} 1.3 billion people lack access to clean water; and 840 million children are malnourished.^{xl} According to the World Health Organization (WHO), "Over 60% of deaths in developed countries occur beyond age 70, compared to about 30% in developing countries."^{xli} The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund reports that 30,500 children under five die every day of mainly preventable causes.^{xlii} According to the WHO, "In one hour over 500 African mothers lose a child; had they lived in a rich European country, nearly 490 of these mothers and their children would have been spared the ordeal."^{xliii}

Most developing world countries have pursued development through greater integration into the global market. This development path produces significant constraints on domestic policy options. For example, the UNDP observes that "The pressures of global competition have led countries and employers to adopt more flexible labor policies, and work arrangements with no long-term commitment between employer and employee are on the rise."^{xliv} As of April 2003, the World Trade

Organization (WTO) comprised 146 member countries,^{xlv} accounting for over 97% of world trade.^{xlvi}

WTO membership requires commitment to treaty provisions that constrain various domestic policies.^{xlvii}

Although state leaders are formally free either to deepen engagement with the world market or not, if they have no reasonable alternative path to development, the moral significance of this area of choice is slight. Moreover, in many cases, citizens of countries that choose such a development path have effectively no choice in the matter. The burdens of unequal life prospects and the constraints on domestic policy of the global market are not therefore in a morally relevant sense voluntarily assumed.

With a background moral assumption of equal respect for all persons, we have moral reasons aplenty to value the functioning of the global market.^{xlviii} It has immense capacity to affect the life prospects of persons around the globe. It can directly affect their health, longevity, educational opportunities, living and working conditions, access to employment and meaningful work, income, and opportunities for leisure and personal development. And it can indirectly affect, through the political effects of economic disruption and pressure, the range of policy choices available and the civil and political liberties that persons enjoy. These are among our most significant political and social concerns. A great many of these effects can be influenced by institutional design and policy formation. If the effects of our institutions on persons are within our power to influence, and if these effects concern our most significant political and social values, then we have reason to be concerned with whether the effects are fairly distributed.

Cooperation can be fair or unfair, and whether it is one or the other does not depend only whether some set of acknowledged rules of cooperation are followed since these rules could result in an unfair outcome.^{xlix} Intuitively this is obvious to us in the case of competitive arrangements. A competitive event may be unfair either because existing fair rules were not enforced or because the

ground rules were unfair. So, even if the global market were to proceed according to its institutional rules, this would provide no guarantee of fairness.

A cosmopolitan commitment to respect all persons equally places justificatory constraints on policy.¹ These constraints have an egalitarian tendency. Imagine a policy that would result in massive disparities in life prospects, rendering some significantly worse off (than if prospects were equalized) and rendering others significantly better off (than if prospects were equalized). Consider as a defense of this policy that it would make some persons better off. Equal respect for persons would disqualify such a justification since it permits some to suffer merely to advance the well being of others. Now in fact a policy that would have such unequal effects might be defended on multiple other grounds. A full account of the justificatory demands of equal respect would require an account of which reasons are arbitrary from a moral point of view and therefore to be disqualified. A thought experiment, which disqualified these reasons from entering the deliberative process, would be of great use in determining what equal respect requires. This, I take it, is the promise of the Rawlsian original position.^{li}

Even without a full defense of the Rawlsian original position globally we can discern an egalitarian tendency in the justificatory requirements of equal respect. Some commitment to burden and benefit sharing is a basic requirement. Without a fuller discussion of which properties of persons are morally arbitrary it is not possible to say in advance which considerations, if any, might outweigh the basic commitment to equality. But I hope that it is clear that at the level of basic principle, equal respect requires an egalitarian commitment.

Miller is especially concerned about competition in resource allocation. He advocates compatriot priority in order to insure that in cases of competition duties to compatriots will trump whatever morality demands in the way of appropriate treatment for non-compatriots. Miller seems to infer, wrongly I argued in section II, that if reasons that we owe duties of egalitarian distributive justice to compatriots do not apply to non-compatriots, then we have no strict distributive duties towards them.

Instead, he seems to hold that we have Kantian positive duties or supererogatory duties to non-compatriots. The present argument is that we have duties of distributive justice, duties with an egalitarian tendency, towards non-compatriots. This does not deny that we may also have special duties to compatriots. Indeed if we value democratic politics, there might be limits to the extent of domestic inequality that is permissible and a need to insulate the political arena from the effects of the otherwise acceptable inequalities. I see no reason to assume that there are insufficient resources to meet both the duties to non-compatriots that I have been defending and the assumed duties to compatriots. There may, however, be insufficient political will to meet both. There is, I believe, no clear answer about what ought to be done in such cases.^{lii}

V

Although I have argued, against Blake, that equal respect requires a commitment to a global egalitarianism at the level of fundamental principle. According to at least one account of the distributive of distributive justice the practical force of our accounts converge. If global egalitarians should seek to equalize a set of basic capabilities, the egalitarian position and the sufficiency position may have similar requirements. This depends upon how short the list of basic capabilities is. For the shorter the list, the greater the room for inequality in other areas of social life.

One of the central philosophical questions of the capabilities approach is what are the fundamental human capabilities that justice ought to be concerned with. Some writers develop lists that are much more expansive than others. Anderson argues for a conception of democratic equality that offers a principled limitation to the list.^{liii} A state should seek to equalize capabilities to function as equals in society. She does not apply a similar analysis to the global economy although she recognizes the desirability of doing so.^{liv}

Perhaps some headway can be made in determining the focus of a global egalitarianism of capabilities by considering which capabilities are important for equal membership in a global economy that functions on the basis of free contract for employment. There are first of all the capabilities important for basic human functioning: capabilities to obtain adequate nutrition, sleep, health, healthcare, and security. Securing these requires the enjoyment of basic socio-economic and security rights or entitlements. Second, there are the capabilities important for choosing a job that is commensurate with one's goals, abilities, and interests. These include first and foremost the capability to exercise one's own judgments about how to evaluate market opportunities. Securing this seems to require the public provision of sufficient basic education, and the enjoyment basic liberties, among others freedom of contract, and conscience and thought are required in order to exercise one's own judgments about how to evaluate the fruits of the economic association. Third, there is the capability to work effectively. This would seem to require a workplace that is free of intimidation and discrimination, that is safe, and that offers pay socially proportionate to the work as well as guarantees of freedom of movement and unionization. Finally, there is the capability for advancement within the economy commensurate with one's abilities. Securing this would seem to require a comprehensive commitment to equality of opportunity for advancement.

V

I have sought to show that equal respect for all persons in the context of economic globalization requires, at the level of basic principle, a commitment to egalitarianism despite important arguments to the contrary. And secondarily that thinking in terms of equal membership in the global economy may serve to provide a principled limit on the list of capabilities that global egalitarian should be concerned to equalize.

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- ⁱ. I use “compatriots” as shorthand for fellow citizens or long-term residents residing in the same country. Non-compatriots lack one of these properties.
- ⁱⁱ. Richard W. Miller, “Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 27:3, 1998, p. 206.
- ⁱⁱⁱ. *Ibid.*
- ^{iv}. *Ibid.*, p. 204 & 210.
- ^v. *Ibid.*, p. 211. Emphasis added.
- ^{vi}. *Ibid.*
- ^{vii}. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
- ^{viii}. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
- ^{ix}. *Ibid.*, p. 219-220.
- ^x. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
- ^{xi}. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
- ^{xii}. As Samuel Scheffler notes an account of special responsibilities (such as Millers) that does not reduce them to acts of voluntary acceptance “is compatible with the view that such responsibilities can be outweighed by other considerations. It is also compatible with the view the strength of one’s responsibilities depends on the nature of the relationships that give rise to them, and on the degree of value that one has reason to attach to those relationships.” Samuel Scheffler, “Relationships and Responsibility,” in his *Boundary and Allegiances* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 102.
- ^{xiii}. Miller, “Cosmopolitan Respect,” pp. 215-216.
- ^{xiv}. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
- ^{xv}. Richard Arneson, “Do Patriotic Ties Limit Global Justice Duties?” *Journal of Ethics*, 9:1-2, 2005, forthcoming.
- ^{xvi}. Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State, Coercion, and Autonomy,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 30:3, 2002, 257-296.
- ^{xvii}. *Ibid.*, p. 258-261
- ^{xviii}. *Ibid.*, 267.
- ^{xix}. *Ibid.*, 271.
- ^{xx}. *Ibid.*, pp. 265, 274, 276, 280, 283, and 289.
- ^{xxi}. *Ibid.*, pp. 274ff.
- ^{xxii}. *Ibid.*, pp. 282-283.
- ^{xxiii}. *Ibid.*, p. 284
- ^{xxiv}. Blake explicitly commits himself to this view (and in any case he must be committed to the view to make his case): “Coercion, not cooperation, is the sine qua non of distributive justice, making relevant principles of relative deprivation.” *Ibid.*, p. 289.
- ^{xxv}. *Ibid.*, 288.
- ^{xxvi}. This is, for example, fundamental to Robert Nozick’s account of his framework model of utopian. Cf. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 297-334.
- ^{xxvii}. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
- ^{xxviii}. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard university Press, 1999), pp. 172-175
- ^{xxix}. Rawls *Theory*, 302.
- ^{xxx}. *Ibid.*, 47.
- ^{xxxi}. *Ibid.*, 48.
- ^{xxxii}. *Ibid.*, 303.
- ^{xxxiii}. I rehearse some of the reason for this skepticism in “Persons’ Interests, States’ Duties, and Global Governance,” *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism*, Harry Brighouse and Gillian Brock eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- ^{xxxiv}. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 7. I discuss the details of this association much more fully in “Persons’, Interests, States’ Duties, and Global Governance.”
- ^{xxxv}. Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” *Ethics* 109:2, January 1999, p. 322.
- ^{xxxvi}. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report* (2002) 19 <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/pdf/chapterone.pdf>.
- ^{xxxvii}. *Ibid.* 38.
- ^{xxxviii}. World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries* (2002) 30 <http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep2002/chap1.pdf>. “PPP” stands for purchasing power parity. \$2 PPP means the local currency equivalent of what one could purchase with \$2 in the United States.
- ^{xxxix}. *Ibid.*
- ^{xl}. UNDP *Human Development Report* (1999) 28.

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- ^{xli} World Health Organization, *Discussion Paper 54*, Colin Mathers, et al., *Global Burden of Disease in 2002: data sources, methods and results*, 44. The study may be downloaded at http://www3.who.int/whosis/menu.cfm?path=whosis,burden,burden_estimates&language=english.
- ^{xlii} United Nation's International Children's Emergency Fund *The State of the World's Children* (2000) <http://www.unicef.org/sowc00/>.
- ^{xliii} World Health Organization, *Discussion Paper 54*, 44-45.
- ^{xliv} . United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1999*, 37, <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/>.
- ^{xlv} http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm.
- ^{xlvi} http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr02_e.htm.
- ^{xlvii} . See for example my "Global Justice and the WTO," *Confronting Globalisation: Humanity, Justice and the Renewal of Politics*, Patrick Hayden and Chamsy el-Ojeili, eds., (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Sigrid Sterckx, "Patents and Access to Drugs in Developing Countries: An Ethical Analysis," *Developing World Bioethics*, 4:1, May 2004, 58-75, and Gopal Sreenivasan, **Errone. Solo documento principale.** "Does the GATS undermine democratic control over health?" *Journal of Ethics*, 9:1-2, 2005 forthcoming.
- ^{xlviii} . "[T]o value one's relationship with another person is to see it as a source of reasons for action of a distinctive kind." Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibility," p. 103.
- ^{xlix} . See also Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 106-109.
- ^l . See also Charles Beitz, "Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice" *Journal of Ethics*, 9:1-2, 2005 forthcoming.
- ^{li} This account of the original position is defended by Ronald Dworkin in "The Original Position" in Norman Daniels ed. *Reading Rawls* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 17-53.
- ^{lii} . For a discussion of this see my *Cosmopolitan Justice* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 49-50.
- ^{liii} . Anderson, "What is the Point of Equality?" pp. 316-323.
- ^{liv} . *Ibid.*, p. 321, fn. 78.