

8/26/2003

**Participatory Development:  
The Capabilities Approach, and Deliberative Democracy**

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8/26/2003

This paper aims to improve the theory and practice of participation in grassroots or micro-development initiatives. I argue that recent work in the deliberative theory of democracy appropriately supplements Amartya Sen's capabilities approach to development and enriches Sabina Alkire's recent efforts to apply Sen's theory with a value-oriented conception of participation to micro-projects. I conclude that the resulting ideal of what I shall call "deliberative participation" is ethically defensible, required by Sen's capabilities approach, and appropriately deepens Alkire's impressive effort to "operationalize" the approach.

The paper proceeds in four steps. First, I sketch four different levels of governmental and nongovernmental fora in which public deliberation and deliberative democracy might reasonably play a role. As a working -- but not uncontroversial -- definition of deliberative democracy I follow Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson: "Deliberative democracy is a conception of democratic politics in which decisions and policies are justified in a process of discussion among free and equal citizens or their accountable representatives."<sup>1</sup> Second, I examine Sen's capabilities approach to international development and argue that this approach requires democracy and would benefit from explicit adoption of a version of deliberative democracy. Third, as resources to strengthen the social choice dimension of the capabilities approach, I discuss the theory and practice of deliberative democracy and draw on several useful theoretical versions and institutional experiments<sup>2</sup> Fourth, I argue that a version of deliberative democracy also enriches Sabina Alkire's effort to "operationalize" the capabilities approach for use in improving the theory and practice of participation in small-scale, grassroots development initiatives.

8/26/2003

The achievement of these four aims – related to the themes of participation, democratic democracy, Sen’s formulation of the capabilities approach, and Alkire’s proposed implementation of this approach – would have a wider significance. My purpose is to find ways to improve the theory and practice of democratization and poverty alleviation, two morally urgent goals of national and international development.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Four Levels for Deliberative Participation**

Since their inception after World War Two, national and international initiatives to bring about “development” in “less developed” countries periodically have aspired to make development “participatory.” Usually, however, what was meant by “participation” – while somehow positive in meaning -- was vague. Somehow the recipients of development aid were to be involved in or contribute to beneficial change. Even when concepts of participation were precise, they frequently differed over the goals, processes, agents, effects, and value of “participation.” Drawing from recent work on deliberative democracy, I propose an ideal of “deliberative participation,” a conception more defensible ethically than thinner models of participation such as citizen “input” – the expression of preferences (in contingent valuation, focus groups, or casting of ballots) or opinions in public hearings or polls.

In *Valuing Freedoms: Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction*,<sup>4</sup> Alkire engages the capabilities approach to international development with the theory (such as it is) and practice of participatory approaches to development strategies. The participatory model that she works out in the book is informed by, and applied to, her field work with three small rural Pakistani groups that have sought to generate individual or family income and promote collective action. Moreover, the three communities have received development assistance in

8/26/2003

the form of start-up loans and technical aid from an international and national nongovernmental groups. Finally, participation facilitators put into practice and evaluated the value-laden participatory method that Alkire advocates.

In the last section, I analyze the sort of participation exhibited in these three communities and argue that democratic deliberation fruitfully supplements Alkire's model. In this section I identify the levels and range of development groups, institutions, and venues for which some form of democratic deliberation has been or should be considered. A rough and incomplete sketch includes the following:

(1). **Grassroots or face-to-face groups**. Local face-to face groups are the first level in which public discussion and deliberative decision-making may occur. These groups may be governmental or part of civil society, inwardly or outwardly oriented, and relatively self-sufficient or largely dependent on outside aid. The groups might be or emerge from urban neighborhoods or rural villages; alternatively, group members – such as members of a school council -- might be drawn from several local areas. Sometimes face-to-face groups address a single local problem, and sometimes their concerns are more inclusive.<sup>5</sup>

The three groups that constitute Alkire's Pakistan case studies – the loan for goats project with women from four villages near Senghar, Sindh; the Khoj literacy centers near Lahore; and the rose cultivation project in the village of Arabsolangi, Sindh – are all examples of nonpublic, local income generation projects partially dependent on outside help from both an international development agent (Oxfam) and Pakistani NGOs. Although help may come from beyond the local community, the focus is on bottom-up and small-scale development.<sup>6</sup>

Although these local groups are potential venues for local level democracy and deliberative participation, they also may be hierarchical or despotic. Moreover, fledgling democratic groups

8/26/2003

may be captured by local elites. As a result local groups may resist both insiders and outsiders who urge democratization. In order to protect themselves from being overwhelmed by anti-democratic forces in their environment or in order to include more agents affected by their decisions, local groups may have to “scale up” horizontally, by combining forces with similar groups, and vertically, through groups on the next level.<sup>7</sup>

(2). **Middle Level Institutions**. Sometimes middle level institutions emerge to coordinate and build capacity in members of grassroots groups.<sup>8</sup> Sometimes intermediate institutions have few links to face-to-face groups. In any case, I include in this category local governments, county, and state governments, and their agencies, such as school boards, planning and zoning boards, or juries. The range of middle level institutions also comprises nongovernmental institutions, such as city-wide advocacy groups, or hybrid public-private institutions such as amateur sports leagues or managed health care institutions.<sup>9</sup> If these middle level institutions become venues for deliberative democracy, and then we may call them, “middle democracy.”<sup>10</sup> The Porto Alegre city-wide participatory budgeting process would be a middle-level and public-private hybrid, as would the commercial fairs in Barquisimeto, Lara State, Venezuela and the thirty-year old citizen-generated and self-managed city of Villa El Salvador outside Lima, Peru.<sup>11</sup> Although citizen participation and democracy may flourish on this middle level, nondemocratic forces, such as a regional economic elite or a domineering or stingy national government, may limit or weaken intermediate democracy.

(3). **National Level**. Federal or national governments, their constitutions,<sup>12</sup> branches (executive, legislative, and judicial), and administrative agencies constitute a national level of institutions with potential for (more robust) deliberative citizen participation. National level institutions also would include governmental ministries,

8/26/2003

especially those concerned with poverty alleviation, housing, education, health, and the environment as well as nation-wide civil society groups.<sup>13</sup> Finally, nongovernmental national institutions are potential sites for deliberative democracy. These include business enterprises and associations, national nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, federations of professional agencies, professional associations, and so forth.

If national *governance* is democratic, it will – to cite Thomas Pogge’s comprehensive conception -- have the following traits:

Democracy means that political power is authorized and controlled by the people over whom it is exercised, and this in such a way as to give these persons roughly equal political influence. Democracy involves voting – on political issues or on candidates for political offices – in accordance with the general idea of one-person-one-vote. But genuine democracy involves a lot more besides. Votes must feature alternatives that give voters a genuine choice. People must have a way of influencing the agenda (political issues and options) or the list of candidates. Votes must be shielded from pressure and retaliation by government officials and private citizens alike; they must, more generally, be safe from extreme economic need and from arbitrary physical violence and psychological duress, any of which might make them excessively dependent on others. Voters must be free to assemble and discuss, and free also to inform themselves, which presupposes freedom of the press and of the other mass media. Political power must be exercised pursuant to standing, public rules so that the consequences of electoral results on political decisions can be assessed and at least roughly predicted by the voters. Last but not least, democracy requires certain dispositions and conduct on the part of citizens: a readiness to accept majority decisions and a commitment to exercise their responsibilities as voters by informing themselves about candidates and political issues and going to the polls.<sup>14</sup>

On this national level, citizen participation in a democracy takes various forms, such as voting for candidates, legislative initiatives, and referenda on office holders; communication with elected representatives; expression of opinion in public hearings, focus groups, and public opinion polling, lobbying, protests, the media, publications, and public events. Above and beyond these important democratic actions, deliberative

8/26/2003

theorists seek ways and means in which the citizens or their representatives can collectively reason about social ends and means. Often, of course, rich as well as poor countries are burdened by rule by an economic or a military elite rather than rule by the people. Or citizen participation it is limited to voting, sometimes – as in Hussein’s Iraq or Castro’s Cuba – for only one candidate.

Bilateral or multilateral efforts to promote democracy target national governmental institutions and often restrict themselves to a multi-party system, free elections, an independent judiciary, and rule of law. Only recently has aid for democratization promoted and sought to institutionalize on the national level a more robust and deliberative democratic ideal, for example, through helping human rights advocacy groups and truth and reconciliation commissions.<sup>15</sup>

(4). **Global Level.** Although international and global institutions, such as the UN, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the new International Criminal Court often appear impervious to citizen participation and democratic reform, deliberative democrats and other have recently protested their democratic deficits and examined these institutions as potential venues for citizen participation and other forms of democratization.<sup>16</sup>

Theorists of deliberative democracy have applied their normative models of deliberative democracy to each of these four institutional levels in “developed” democracies. Although the focus of this paper is primarily on the deliberative potential of grassroots groups, I believe that the theory and practice of deliberative democracy has much to offer the theory and practice of democratization in developing countries at each of the four levels.<sup>17</sup>

8/26/2003

### **Sen's Capabilities Approach and Democratic Deliberation**

It has been increasingly clear that Sen's capabilities approach to international development permits and, better, requires a strong democratic component. Hence, I have been gratified by Sen's recent and increasing assertion, especially in *Development as Freedom*, of the importance of public discussion and democratic decision-making as ethically-justified processes for collective choice.<sup>18</sup>

On the level of nation-state governance, Sen argues that democratic governance is important for three reasons. First, democracy is intrinsically good in so far as it enables people to exercise their agency and participate politically. As I argue presently, these freedoms and activities are grounded in Sen's basic norms of agency and well-being. Democracy is also instrumentally good, for democracies do not fight each other and in bad times democracies are more responsive than nondemocracies to meeting human needs and protecting well-being. Finally, democratic governance is "constructively" good insofar it provides institutions and processes in which people can define their own needs, well-being, and priorities.<sup>19</sup>

This third justification reveals a lacuna within the capabilities approach that the theory of deliberative democracy might fill by offering an account of the determinant ways in which groups can decide collectively which capabilities and functions (well-being) they have reasons to value, how these capabilities should be specified, which of them are most basic, whether to expand their valuable capabilities beyond the basic ones, and – when capabilities clash – to prioritize or trade them off against each other. Rather than, on the one hand, throw up his hands at the impossibility of moving from individual

8/26/2003

preferences to a social function or, on the other hand, give the job of valuation to philosophers, bureaucrats or economists, Sen rightly throws the valuational ball to democratic venues and public discussion. Democratic deliberation theory, I argue, provides needed specificity to Sen's "constructive" justification.

I now analyze the heart of Sen's attempt to justify democracy as well as the reasons why democracy is needed in his capabilities approach to development. Central to the normative "foundation" of Sen's social ethic are two cross-cutting distinctions: (1) agency and well-being, (2) achievement and freedom:

Agency	Well-being
Agency Achievement	Well-being Achievements (Functionings)
Agency Freedom	Well-being Freedoms (Capabilities)

Agency and well-being are two distinguishable but linked aspects of human life, each of which call for respect (aid, protection) on the part of institutions and individuals. Humans can and should be agents in the sense of beings that decide and act to realize their aims, often making a difference to the world. Regardless of whether a person's goals are altruistic or self-regarding, her "agency achievement refers to the realization of goals and values she has reasons to pursue."<sup>20</sup> For Sen, if one happens to act on a whim or by impulse but for no reason, one is not an agent (in charge of herself) but a "patient," or passive object, acted on by internal or external forces over which one has no control. A person as agent is "someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well"<sup>21</sup> Likewise, one's agency freedom is "one's freedom to bring about the achievements one values and which one attempts to

8/26/2003

produce.”<sup>22</sup> I might be an agent, but due to external coercion or internal compulsion at present I am not free to choose or to achieve what I choose. One reason that development, as good social change, is important for Sen is that it provides a variety of social arrangements in which human beings express their agency or realize agency achievements in and through their own actions:

Social arrangements, involving many institutions (the state, the market, the legal system, political parties, the media, public interests groups, and public discussion forums, among others) are investigated in terms of their contribution to enhancing and guaranteeing the substantive freedoms of individuals, seen as active agents of change, rather than a passive recipients or dispensed benefits.<sup>23</sup>

In terms of the medieval distinction between ‘the patient’ and the ‘agent,’ this freedom-centered understanding of economics and of the process of development is very much an agent-oriented view. With adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other. They need not be seen primarily as passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs. There is indeed a strong rationale for recognizing the positive role of free and sustainable agency – an even of constructive impatience.<sup>24</sup>

One challenge to deliberative democratic theorists is to give an account of how public deliberation provides devices for *collective* agency, a process for combining the decisions and agency freedoms of many agents.

It should not be thought, however, that Sen’s emphasis on agency entails that an agent’s freedom must mean that the agent herself always exercises or controls the “levers” of change.<sup>25</sup> Even if I do not choose to vote, so long as I am not prohibited or restrained from voting I have agency freedom to vote. For Sen, my agency freedom is enhanced when something I value occurs when I had nothing to do with its occurrence but would have chosen that it occur. If someone else eliminates the famine that besets me, not only is my wellbeing improved but my agency freedom is enhanced. For, if I had

8/26/2003

been able, I would have chosen and contributed to end the famine. Tyrants are restrained not only by agency freedom as active doing (what Sen calls “control”), but also by their knowledge that their “subjects” have the freedom of agency (even though they don’t choose to use it right now).<sup>26</sup> Even though my Senator -- and not me -- casts a vote to disconfirm the president’s nomination to assistant secretary for Latin America, my agency freedom has been expanded even though my role was less direct or participatory. (I voted for my Senator but didn’t cast *this* vote. However, I would have voted the way he did had I had the chance).

In addition to the norm of agency – both agency achievement and agency freedom – Sen proposes that democracy can be justified in relation to the norm of human well-being. Sometimes humans as agents choose to benefit only themselves, and sometimes their goals or adopted causes reach beyond themselves and even require that they sacrifice themselves. For Sen, “the well-being achievement of a person can be seen as an evaluation of the “wellness” of a person’s state of being (rather than, say, the goodness of her contribution to the country, or her success in achieving her overall goals.”<sup>27</sup> Of course, if a person decides that his own personal welfare or advantage is his exclusive life goal, then he has exercised his agency exclusively in the service of his well-being. But most people have commitments to others and to goals beyond their own well-being.

Sen conceives well-being not as preference satisfaction exclusively but as composed of a plurality of states of being and a variety of doings, which he calls functionings. One exercise that individuals and groups engage in is that of evaluating which functionings they have reason to value. Unlike Nussbaum’s list of those functionings, which she claims we need into order to be “fully human”<sup>28</sup> or to flourish,

8/26/2003

Sen adamantly refuses to prescribe a list. However, to illustrate the kind of well-being achievement or functionings that may be valued he typically gives examples of functions that people judge valuable. Moreover, to illustrate what evaluators take to be minimally acceptable levels of the most valuable or basic functionings – and thereby define poverty as the deprivation of these functionings -- he frequently offers the following as a typical result of valuation:

The functionings relevant to this analysis [of poverty] vary from such elementary physical ones as being well-nourished, being adequately clothed and sheltered, avoiding preventable morbidity, etc., to more complex social achievements such as taking part in the life of the community, being able to appear in public without shame, and so on. These are rather ‘general’ functionings, but . . . the specific form that their fulfillments may take would tend to vary from society to society.<sup>29</sup>

Like agency, well-being has a freedom dimension as well as an achievement dimension. My life goes well not only when I am adequately nourished (and have other functionings that I have reason to value), but also when I am free to continue to be so or am free to be so again. Because I am on a hunger strike to protest a military invasion, I may be very deficient with respect to numerous functionings that I value, but -- unlike the starving person -- I have the capability (given my income and opportunities) or freedom to escape from hunger and the other deprivations. The valuable capabilities or freedoms are not part of my current well-being achievement but are *possible* achievements. *Being able* to fight off disease is as much a part of my current well-being as being healthy right now. The freedoms that enrich human life and constitute the primary end of development include not only agency freedom, just discussed, also basic capabilities or well-being freedoms:

8/26/2003

The substantive freedoms include elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well as the freedoms that are associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so on. In this constitutive perspective, development involves expansion of these and other basic freedoms.<sup>30</sup>

Although sometimes Sen regrets introducing the term “capability” as a fundamental notion in his development ethics, it is a useful term as long as we note that it refers both to external opportunities and general but internal powers or abilities. I may have the ability to cast a ballot, but not be able to vote because I live in a repressive dictatorship that holds no elections. I may live in a country with fair and free elections but be incapable of voting because I am an infant or have Alzheimer’s Disease. To have an (actual and not potential) capability to be healthy is to have both access to health care and the internal ability to make use of it.

How does Sen wield his norm of well-being achievement and freedom to support democratic governance? First, the exercise of democracy as rule by the people is a practice in which citizens vote and participate politically in many other ways and have the guaranteed right or freedom to do so. Although Sen believes voting is important, he believes that it is overemphasized in much democratic theory and practice. There are many kinds of political participation that people have reason to value as part of their lives going well. Not to be able to vote, to be forced to vote, to have only one candidate to vote for, to be unable to dissent – all these are ways of being impoverished. In addition, these same well-being freedoms may be evaluated as among the means as well as the end of development; for other aspects of well-being, such as a freedom not to starve,

8/26/2003

frequently benefit instrumentally from the “protective power of democracy.”<sup>31</sup> For example, a free press may identify a pressing problem and – before it becomes a catastrophe -- demand appropriate public action.

Valuable well-being freedoms also contribute instrumentally to the agency achievement of collective choice. For example, the Huaorani are an Indian tribe in the Ecuadorian Amazon, a region that is undergoing rapid change due to oil exploration, new inhabitants, new protected areas, and new income - generating opportunities such as ecotourism. A long-time resident of the area remarks on the Huaorani’s right to be among the agents of their own change:

Change is inevitable. The Huaorani cannot avoid change. The real question is, on what terms will change occur? The right the Huaorani have – a basic moral right that all people have – is to be allowed to evolve their own cultural tools for dealing with change, rather than having that change imposed upon them.<sup>32</sup>

Another observer of the Huaorani remarks that in one of their villages (Quehueire Ono), the Huaorani have evolved a creative mixture of old and new:

[The stack of written documents that an Huaorani association had produced in its first two years of operation] suggested that while it would be tempting to see Quehueire Ono as a return to tradition, that would be inaccurate. If anything, Quehueire Ono represented a Huaorani synthesis: a traditional way of living enhanced by certain modern tools that offered access to an *abundancia* not found in the forest and on which, increasingly, they had come to depend. That is, *cowode* [non-Huaorani] abundance. And in what must be considered a rats nest of paradox and irony, one of the most valued of these new tools was literacy.<sup>33</sup>

Sen would judge the Huaorani synthesis less as paradoxical and more as a creative outcome of agents exercising their human rights to decide collectively what parts of their traditional life to abandon, what parts to retain, what parts to adapt, and how to supplement or modify their traditional life with new ideas:

8/26/2003

We come back again to the perspective of capabilities: that different sections of the society (and not just the socially privileged) should be able to be active in the decisions regarding what to preserve and what to let go. There is no compulsion to preserve every departing lifestyle even at heavy cost, but there is a real need – for social justice – for people to be able to take part in these social decisions, if they so choose. This gives further reason for attaching importance to such elementary capabilities as reading and writing (through basic education), being well informed and well briefed (through free media), and having realistic chances of participating freely (through elections, referendums and the general use of civil rights). Human rights in the broadest sense are involved in this exercise as well.<sup>34</sup>

One tough question, of course, is how to enable not only the Huaoroni and other Amazonian tribes but also other affected groups -- including the Ecuadorian government and the foreign oil companies -- to decide collectively and fairly the fate of the region. What is needed are principles for deciding who comes to the table, sets the agenda, and deliberates about the ends and means of policy.

Combining the norms of both agency and well-being, both achievement and freedom, Sen reconceives development and proposes an “ethic of social arrangements.”<sup>35</sup> Although development must (usually) include economic growth, such growth is a means to *something more*. That “something more” is a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. Such expansion of freedoms concerns both “the primary end” and the “principle means” of development.<sup>36</sup> And, as we have seen, both agency freedom and well-being freedoms are facilitated and guaranteed by democracy and public discussion. Hence, “popular participation” is not a dispensable means nor “sanctimonious rubbish,” for “the idea of development cannot be dissociated from it”<sup>37</sup>

We have seen that with his ideals of dual norms of freedoms and achievements Sen normatively justifies democracy and public discussion, and that his emphasis on collective choice fits with his non-prescriptive and open-ended version of the capabilities

8/26/2003

approach. Sen insists that citizens should have “the liberty to participate in social choice and in the making of public decisions,”<sup>38</sup> for “the freedom to participate in critical evaluation and in the process of value formation is among the most crucial freedoms of social existence.”<sup>39</sup>

What, more precisely, does Sen believe are the choices that a group can and should subject to public discussion as it evaluates its past successes and failures and decides on its future direction? The group may decide not only on its development strategies and tactics but also on the fundamental goals of development and the values by which to judge the past and inform the future. For Sen, these fundamental choices include the following:

1. The choice of agency, who or what is to make (further) choices. Should the group make its own choices or choose to have some other agent make them?
2. The choice of the process of decision making. Just as individuals can make their own decisions in many ways (such as coin-flipping, whim, appeal to authority, appeal to expertise, critical reflection) so groups have a choice from among several collective decision-making procedures, including some form of democratic decision-making.
3. The choice of agency versus well-being. When the community’s choice to make its *own* decisions (rather than have someone else make them) is likely to reduce the well-being of its members or vice-versa, it has a fundamental decision not only about agency but also between agency and well-being. This choice is the social version of an individual’s choice between what Sen calls the opportunity aspect and the process aspect of freedom:

8/26/2003

A person may, in a specific case, have more direct control over the levers of operation and yet be less able to bring about what she values. When such a divergence occurs, we can go in somewhat different directions. We may, in many cases, value real opportunities to achieve certain things no matter how this is brought about (“don’t leave the choice to me, you know this restaurant and my tastes, you should choose what I would like to have”). But we may also value, in many cases, the process of choice (“I know you can express my views much better than I can, but let me speak for myself”).<sup>40</sup>

4. The choice between agency goals and well-being capabilities. A society also has a choice between helping individuals achieving their agency goals, such as building a statue to some citizen’s hero, or rather “mak[ing] sure that no one has to starve, or fail to obtain medical attention for a serious but eminently treatable ailment.”<sup>41</sup>
5. The choice between functioning and capability. Within the “space” of well-being, a community sometimes must choose between a functioning, such as its present members being adequately fed now, and a capability, such as its present members being able to be adequately nourished.
6. The choice between functionings (or capabilities) now and functionings (or capabilities) in the future. A community with scant food may have to decide between being ill nourished now and being ill nourished the future. A militant group in a repressive society may have forgo public protest now in order to be able achieve it in the future.
7. The choice and weighting of *valuable* capabilities and functionings. Once in the “space” of capabilities and functioning, a community must select those that are most valuable, those that are less valuable, those that are trivial, and those that are evil. Nussbaum conceives the philosopher’s task as that of constructing – through

8/26/2003

- critical dialogue with others – an objective but incomplete and revisable list of valuable capabilities (and a good government would ensure that all its citizens had those capabilities).<sup>42</sup> The choice that Nussbaum gives to the philosopher and the constitution, Sen gives to the society or group itself. For Sen, a society has the freedom to choose which capabilities and functionings are valuable and to weight or prioritize them for diverse purposes in different contexts. This additional opportunity for collective choice is increased because for Sen we have reason to want to be free of ex ante priority rules, algorithmic formulae of rationality<sup>43</sup> or even a “unique blueprint for ‘the just society’,”<sup>44</sup> for such weightings would “lock” a group “prematurely into one specific system for ‘weighting’ some of these competitive concerns, which would severely restrict the room for democratic decision making.”<sup>45</sup>
8. The choice of *basic* capabilities and thresholds. Not only can a society select certain capabilities as ones that it generally has more reason to value than others, it can – for certain purposes – designate some capabilities as *basic*. For Sen a “basic capability” is “the ability to satisfy certain elementary and crucially important functionings up to certain levels.”<sup>46</sup> This exercise, of course, requires that the community decide on a threshold or level, taking into account its level of prosperity and expected external assistance.
  9. The choice between *basic* capabilities and expansion of *all* valuable capabilities. Alkire correctly identifies a further choice that is only implicit in Sen but one that communities sometimes face, namely between the promotion of basic capabilities and the expansion of all valuable capabilities or freedoms. As Alkire remarks this

8/26/2003

choice “allows commendation of activities that may be expected to meet basic needs” “but it also allows a community to choose to leave some basic needs unmet.”<sup>47</sup>

10. The choice to specify general capabilities and functionings in culturally relevant and resonant ways. Supposing that a group selects certain capabilities and functionings as valuable and even basic, it is still free to specify its selections in certain ways. It can, as Richardson argues, reason collectively about ends by specifying them, making them more precise. The capability to appear in public without shame can be specified differently in the Costa Rican rain forest than in the Norwegian tundra.

11. The choice of distributive and other values. Communities also can and should choose their values, how to interpret them, and how to prioritize them. Among the values open to a community are those of equality or justice. It belongs to a community to decide the “metric” for equality (equality of what? income, commodities, utilities, capabilities?) and principle for just or fair distribution (strict equality; proportionate shortfall from one’s potential? capability to be above a threshold?). But, while important, justice – contends Sen – is not everything, and a community has the freedom to decide to value and sometimes prioritize other values such efficiency (the maximizing of the sum of individual advantage no matter how distributed),<sup>48</sup> social cohesion, social stability, or social tranquility (freedom from anxiety-producing choices)<sup>49</sup>

Sen makes the same point for each of these issues of choice. Each of the eleven types of choice may confront groups at all four levels and call for decisions. Who should

8/26/2003

make the choices and how should they be made? It is clear, as we have seen, that for Sen “public scrutiny and criticism,”<sup>50</sup> and participation have a role to play in these valuational debates and that such debate “is a crucial part of the exercise of democracy and responsible social choice.”<sup>51</sup> Rather than authorizing rule by philosophers, other experts, or a mere aggregation of citizen preferences, Sen endorses public discussion and democracy. But what does he mean by public scrutiny? How does he conceive of the process of public valuational discussion? What are his views on democratic decision-making as a kind of “responsible social choice?”

It is precisely at this point that Sen needs to go further. Alkire correctly identifies what is missing in Sen’s approach:

The problem is that, although Sen regularly refers to the need for explicit scrutiny of individual and social goals, for reflectiveness, value judgement, practical reason, and democratic social choice, he chooses not to specify the possible range of procedures by which valuational issues are to be resolved or by which information on valuations is to be obtained.<sup>52</sup>

Sen himself recognizes that literature on deliberative democracy provides a resource for addressing these questions of democratic procedures and principles. When discussing the “practice of democracy” in both democratic and nondemocratic regimes, Sen observes that people must seize the participatory opportunities that exist. Then he adds that whether or not people take advantage of these opportunities “depends on a variety of factors.” In a formal democracy, these factors would include “the vigor of multiparty politics” while in a nondemocracy or predemocracy the role of opposition parties may be important. Another and related factor, presumably in all societies, would be “the dynamism of moral arguments and value formation.”<sup>53</sup> In a footnote Sen continues: “An important factor [in people seizing democratic opportunities] is the reach

8/26/2003

of deliberative politics and of the utilization of moral arguments in public debates,'<sup>54</sup> and then Sen cites leading examples of the then current (1999) works on deliberative democracy.<sup>55</sup> However, although Sen opens the door to an explicit engagement between the capabilities approach and deliberative democracy, he does not himself venture through it.

### **Deliberative Democracy**

In this section, I argue that there are several ways in which Sen's capabilities approach can benefit from recent work on deliberative democracy. At least one deliberative democracy theorist, James Bohman, has adapted Sen's ideas to solve problems within deliberative democracy. It may be, then, that dialogue between Sen and deliberative democracy will prove beneficial in both directions. In particular, Sen's approach can be strengthened and rendered more complete by considering the way certain deliberative democracy theorists answer questions concerning the purpose, conditions, process, and outcomes of deliberation. Is the purpose of deliberation to approximate some independent truth (public good), give participants an equal chance at influencing the decision, overcome disagreements, or forge joint intentions to solve a common problem? Who should be the deliberators and who should decide on who "comes to the table" and sets the agenda? How should we understand the process of deliberation? Is it rational or nonrational or both and how should we understand the meaning of these terms? If rational, in what way? How might participants rationally scrutinize the past and reason together about future? Is there a place for considerations of self-interest in democratic deliberation or should all such considerations be filtered out in

8/26/2003

the interest of impartiality? Is reasoning together a matter of moving deductively from “public reasons” to conclusions that all can embrace? Is it the making and evaluating proposals for joint intentions? What conditions are necessary or conducive to deliberative democracy? If the process of deliberation has nonrational element, such as strong expressions of moral outrage, are these always at odds with the rational elements or may they supplement the latter? How, if at all, might rational deliberation be protected from capture by economic or intellectual elites? What kinds of personal traits on the part of group members impede and facilitate fair and fruitful deliberation? How might deliberative discussion weaken the attraction of “group think” and information cascades?<sup>56</sup> What should happen in the face of deep disagreements? When are consensus, majority rule, and agreement to disagree appropriate? What efforts should be made to accommodate minority views? What are the likely outcomes of deliberative democracy. How should answers to these questions vary with the four levels – sketched above – of democratic venues, especially when the third level governmental institutions issue in legally binding duties?

In attempting to answer these and other questions, the deliberative democracy literature – both for and against – has become in recent years a cottage industry. It is a heterogeneous literature that sports different versions and diverse criticisms of deliberative democracy, and some of the former have been formulated to meet some of the later. In the present paper I have insufficient space to analyze in a systematic way the merits and weaknesses of the various theories or criticisms, although occasionally I will take sides in particular controversies. Rather my aim here is to identify several key ideas in the deliberative democracy movement that I believe would strengthen Sen’s

8/26/2003

capabilities approach and, in the last section, contribute to an ideal of “democratic participation” in and for grassroots development initiatives.

In this section I first take up the question of the purpose of deliberation, and then, second, explain three ideals that seem to me to be especially important, namely, reciprocity, publicity, and accountability. Third, drawing on these ideals, I explore answers to the question “Who deliberates?” Fourth, I address the question of background conditions that need to be more or less fulfilled for group members to deliberate. Fifth, I follow Richardson’s reconstruction of the process of deliberation to emphasize that a deliberative group reasons together about what ought to be done by, among other things, forming joint intentions. Finally, I consider the personal capacities and virtues of deliberators.

**Deliberative Aims.** A popular conception of both actual and ideal democracy is that democracy is a government that holds regular, competitive elections in which the candidate or issue with the most votes wins. A somewhat more robust, but still minimalist, definition conceives democratic politics as entailing “a rule of law, promotion of civil and political liberties, free and fair election of lawmakers.”<sup>57</sup> One aim of deliberative democrats is to start with the idea that democracy is rule by the people and then deepen the conception of “rule” by stressing that such rule be extended to nongovernmental associations.

If such is the aim of deliberative democrats, then how do they understand the aims of deliberative discussion and decision-making? One aim or rather an aim with suitable means – is to provide a fair way in which free and equal members of a group can come to a decision. Deliberative democracy provides a collective device to get decisions made but

8/26/2003

to do so in a fair way – one in which each member is treated with respect and is free to make his voice heard.

A group informed by this aim contrasts with a group in which many are excluded from the decision-making process. A deliberatively democratic group also contrasts with a group that practices a democratic procedure that is merely aggregative. The aim of aggregative democracy is to elicit and combine its members' preferences. If all the members prefer the same policy or objective, everyone gets what they want. In the usual cases, where group members differ – sometimes radically -- in their preferences, mere aggregation means either that the majority (or option with the most votes) wins or there is no non-arbitrary winner due to voting “cycles.” In aggregative democracy, preferences are formed in private and then expressed and added together in public.

In the version of deliberative democracy that I favor and from which the capabilities approach arguably could benefit, the focus of collective choice is not on preferences (on what members want to do) or beliefs (what members believe should be done) but on joint and shared intentions to strive for certain goals or policies.<sup>58</sup> The point of deliberation is to provide a fair way for roughly equal group members to cooperate together and forge – through the give and take of proposals, reasons, and criticisms – a reasoned agreement about their goals, values, and policies.<sup>59</sup> As a result, deliberative democracy “transforms”<sup>60</sup> rather than aggregates preferences. Or, more accurately, in deliberative democracy group members together rationally scrutinize proposals for goals and – through deliberative give and take -- form mutually acceptable intentions.

**Deliberative Ideals.** Another contribution of deliberative democracy – especially Gutmann and Thompson's version -- to Sen's capabilities approach consists of three

8/26/2003

principles that should inform collectively reasoned agreements: reciprocity, publicity, and accountability. The ideal of reciprocity prescribes that each group member makes proposals and offers justification in terms that others can understand and could accept: “Deliberative democracy asks citizens to justify public policy by giving reasons that can be accepted by those are bound by it.”<sup>61</sup> And each would do so knowing that the others will do likewise. Reciprocity is an apt term, for it suggests that each make an appropriate response to a good received<sup>62</sup>: “The ‘good received’ is that you make your claims on terms that I can accept in principle. The ‘proportionate return’ is that I make my claims on terms that you can accept in principle.”<sup>63</sup> The aim, presupposing that the group involves cooperation among equal and free members, is to form an agreement that is mutually acceptable. Ideal deliberators build on whatever common commitments they share or come to share in order to reduce their disagreements. In such reciprocity each does more than tolerate the – perhaps radically different – views of others, for each makes accommodations – and sometimes deep compromises with -- the others in order to fashion something each can endorse.

The ideal of publicity is likewise important, and Gutmann and Thompon’s ideal fleshes out Sen’s reference to “public” discussion and the importance of “rich” information for rational choice. Publicity demands, among other things, that each member is free to engage in the deliberative process, that the process is transparent to all (rather than being done behind their backs), and that each knows that to which she is agreeing or disagreeing. Sometimes, of course, publicity must be set aside in favor of secrecy, but publicity should be the presumption and any general limits to publicity should issue from public deliberation.

8/26/2003

A third ideal for deliberation is that of accountability. Each group member is accountable to all (and not to herself alone) in the sense of giving acceptable reasons to the others. It should not be thought that deliberative democracy concerns only face-to-face groups in which all are directly present in the give and take of reasons. In larger scale deliberative forums, representatives, officials, or leaders “who make decisions on behalf of other people, whether or not they are electoral constituents, should be accountable to those people.”<sup>64</sup> Although constituents do not directly participate in the course of deliberation, they are more or less represented by and themselves accountable to someone who gives and receives reasons and forms joint intentions. Moreover, due to publicity, constituents can both monitor the course of deliberation and the group’s eventual decision and through their representative intervene in the former and challenge the latter.

Accountability extends then not only to one’s fellow group members and their subgroups and not only to those one represents, but also those in other groups who are bound by the group’s decisions or affected by its actions. Deliberative democrats differ over whether these persons – affected by the group but not members of it – deserve an accounting or even should have a voice or other sort of role in the decisions that affect them. Gutmann and Thompson say no, but they permit that two contiguous groups may both gain voice by scaling up to form a more inclusive group or by forming a new higher level and overlapping group to address mutual problems (for instance, a joint committee of the US House and the Senate or an inter-county committee for two adjacent counties).

**Who Should Deliberate?** This last point about voice enables us to identify a third contribution that deliberative democracy can make to Sen’s version of the capability

8/26/2003

approach. If we are to emphasize deliberation and some conception of the ideals that might guide the process of deliberation, then we must answer two related questions: Which groups should practice deliberative democracy and, within the deliberating groups, which members (and perhaps nonmembers) should deliberate and decide? These are large and important questions, and all I can hope to do in this paper is identify them and urge defenders of the capabilities approach to take them up and proponents of deliberative democracy to contribute to their resolution.

I address first, the question of the scope of deliberative democracy. The most radical answers would be monistic, for they would either affirm or deny that deliberative democracy should be the ideal for every group at each of the four levels identified in section: local, middle, federal, and global level. For a radical deliberative democrat, like Iris Young, all groups that currently operate on non-democratic or anti-democratic principles should be targets for internally adopted or externally promoted deliberative democracy. This list would include families, including patriarchal ones; small scale income generation projects in Afghanistan; associations, such as Augusta National Golf Association; governments (at all levels), such as Iran; international institutions, such as the World Bank; and global institutions, such as the Roman Catholic Church. The trouble, of course, with this perspective is that it fails to respect what William Galston calls “the expressive liberty” of groups to conduct their affairs according, if they so choose, nondeliberative and nondemocratic principles and practices.<sup>65</sup> A less radical alternative would be to affirm that deliberative democracy has limits, for example, in scientific inquiry, judicial review, or private golf clubs, but that democratic deliberation is relevant for democratic politics and such governing institutions as legislative bodies,

8/26/2003

administrative agencies, and nongovernmental groups whose members view themselves as free and equal and engaged in a cooperative enterprise. Even this less radical first-level position that affirms the limits of public deliberation might appeal to democratic deliberation on a second or meta-level. On this second-level approach (for instance, that of Gutmann and Thompson) the clashes between groups – whether democratic or nondemocratic – as well as the scope and limits of deliberative democracy would be settled by democratic deliberation. Who has the best answer to the question of the limits and applicability of deliberative democracy? It is not yet clear, but capabilities proponents should take up these issues and the various proposals. Which groups or individuals are authorized to make these decisions regarding the scope of democratic deliberation? This question segues to the question not of what groups should be democratically deliberative but which members of groups should engage in deliberation?

Some deliberative groups have formed already, some are in the process of formation, and sometimes unaffiliated individuals decide to form a deliberative group. Who in the group – or currently outside it -- should have an (equal) opportunity to deliberate and vote? Should there be a minimum threshold of cognitive ability, perhaps with age as a proxy? Can one forfeit one's right to participate by committing a felony? Should legal or illegal immigrants have a voice but not the right to vote or should the latter be extended only to citizens? More generally, should those outside the group have a voice in deliberations and a right to vote? What, if anything, should qualify someone to join a citizen's forum addressing a contentious issue such as damming a pristine river or preventing snow mobilers from entering a wilderness used by cross country skiers? Can anyone interested join the group? Is it first come first served? What if more skiers than

8/26/2003

snow mobilers attend? How small should the decision-making group be kept and who should decide?

One answer to these kinds of questions is to give responsibility to the deliberative body itself and let it debate and decide who should be a member. That answer, however, is not completely satisfying for it already, perhaps arbitrarily, excludes people from deliberation. Alternatively, one might say that anyone *affected* by the group should have a role in its deliberations and decisions, but that might give someone halfway around the world the same deliberative and decision-making status as those in the group. Perhaps, these outsiders should be consulted for their view, but should they be treated as equal members with the right to decide? Are Gutmann and Thompson right when they say that “If representatives are accountable to their moral constituents as well as their electoral constituents, deliberative democracy should create forums in which citizens of foreign countries could present their claims and response to the counterclaims of our legislators.”<sup>66</sup> Should protesters in Washington, D.C. not only be listened to or consulted and but also be given a vote in Bank proceedings about debt forgiveness? Just because the rose cultivation project in Pakistan affected neighbors (some neighbors were envious of the rose cultivators’ success), does not seem to entail that they should be included in the group’s discussions and decisions. Again, these are pressing questions being debated by deliberative and other democratic theorists. Sen could benefit from the controversy and perhaps contribute to its resolution.

**Enabling Conditions.** A fourth way in which deliberative democracy can contribute to the capabilities approach is to identify background and institutional conditions that are presupposed by – or conducive to – a group’s democratic deliberation.

8/26/2003

These conditions overlap at many points with institutional arrangements that Sen advocates for other purposes. That they are conducive to democratic deliberation only provides additional justification for their instrumental importance. Richardson has helpfully identified what he calls “institutions needed to preserve the background justice of democratic deliberation,”<sup>67</sup> especially with respect to the normative equality (to be discussed presently) of deliberators within or between groups. Where these conditions do not exist – be they in dictatorships, racist and anti-poor oligopolies, or failed states beset by civil war – democratic deliberation may exist in underground venues but it is exceedingly vulnerable. What conditions contribute to democratic deliberation?

**(1). Equal Political Liberty.** Equal political freedoms, contends Richardson, where “each citizen is to enjoy the same freedoms of speech, assembly, and political participation,”<sup>68</sup> contribute to deliberator equality in nation states and lower level venues, including nongovernmental forums. These liberties must *actually* be protected and not merely part of the legal code. Sen concurs: “one of the strongest arguments in favor of political freedom lies precisely in the opportunity it gives citizens to discuss and debate – and to participate in the selection of – values in the choice of priorities.”<sup>69</sup> Although universal human rights stimulate deliberation with respect to their national and local adaptation and although these rights are institutionalized in treaties and many transborder practices, the absence of global constitutional *guarantees* weakens the kind of *global* democratic equality and deliberation that is possible.

**(2). Equality Before the Law.** This condition affords the same fundamental constitutional rights to each citizen, regardless of ethnicity, religion, class, or education.

8/26/2003

More generally this background condition means that both no one is justified in claiming to be above the law and no one is beneath the protection of the law.

(3) **Distributive Justice.** Sen is keenly aware how economic poverty, inequality, and economic concentration can impede if not doom people's freedoms and how important it is to create just conditions that enable people to choose the lives they want to lead:

It is . . . important . . . to favor the creation of conditions in which people have the real opportunities of judging the kind of lives they would like to lead. Social and economic factors such as basic education, elementary health care, and secure employment are important not only on their own, but also for the role they can play in giving people the opportunity to approach the world with courage and freedom.<sup>70</sup>

Richardson reiterates Sen's point and applies it to the conditions for democratic deliberation. If citizens are to be roughly political equals, background justice must implement "effective measures designed to mitigate the tendency for economic power to concentrate in the hands of the few" and guarantee – or at least strive for – a basic minimum of secure subsistence:

The background justice needed for qualitative democratic equality should see to it that each citizen enjoys a secure, decent minimum of substance and hence is not so easily prey to being influenced by the more powerful. More positively put, the basic institutions of society should be arranged so as to support the capability of each citizen to engage meaningfully in democratic deliberation. Part of this needed support is economic, but education and the social basis of self-respect are also elements important to sustaining citizen's sense that they have something to contribute to public discussion.<sup>71</sup>

(4) **Procedural Fairness.** Richardson's final background condition for equality among deliberators is that "the process of democratic debate and decision must itself be structured so as to allow each person a fair chance to participate and to counteract to a

8/26/2003

degree the potential influence of disparities in economic and political power.<sup>72</sup> Different measures – to provide fair chances and reduce the threat of elite capture – will be appropriate in different contexts. Campaign finance reform and an abolition of the US Electoral College may do the job in US national elections. Encouraging shy persons to speak out in small scale development projects may be another effective device.<sup>73</sup>

It should not be thought Richardson's background conditions, however, must be fully in place before free and equal citizens can engage in deliberation. In spite of political and economic inequalities, with the help of "self-conscious intentional design efforts,"<sup>74</sup> such as training in public speaking and reason giving, people in and through the deliberative process may reduce or fairly accommodate their differences as they together forge an answer to a practical problem. Baiocchi submits evidence that the Porto Alegre experience has had this outcome:

Despite significant inequalities among citizens, the didactic features of the [Porto Alegre] experiment have succeeded in large part in offsetting these potentials for domination. This confirms the expectations of democratic theorists who, while assuming that persons may come to deliberative settings with certain inequalities, expect that over time participation will offset them.<sup>75</sup>

The Porto Alegre experiment also seems to show that the participatory budgetary exercise has been "highly redistributive,"<sup>76</sup> contributing to the conditions that in turn help make deliberative democracy possible. Deliberative democracy often results in the bringing about of conditions that in turn contribute to more egalitarian deliberation.

**Process of Deliberative Democracy.** A fifth contribution that deliberative democracy can make to the capabilities approach is to enrich the capabilities account of the process of public discussion and decision making. It is at this point that the recent work of Richardson becomes particularly relevant. One of Richardson's innovative

8/26/2003

contributions to deliberative democracy is to recast the understanding of the deliberative democratic process from a focus on preferences – regardless of whether simply aggregated or transformed through discussion – to a focus on partially joint intentions and shared ends. One advantage of the intention/action perspective is that it enables us to see deliberation as a kind of practical reasoning in the sense that deliberators reason together about what the group (and they as individuals) ought to do. The aim is to agree on, or fashion together, a plan or policy (end plus means) that all can agree to and act to realize.

I turn now to Richardson’s modeling – in terms of reasoning about and deciding on partially joint intentions – of “collective, political deliberation by individual reasoners with potentially distinct views.”<sup>77</sup> Joint intentions are the outcome of a four stage process of “formulating proposals; discussing their merits; coming to an informal agreement; and converting informal agreement into official decision.”<sup>78</sup> It is appropriate that Richardson designates each stage with a gerund for public deliberation is a practice or complex action, structured by norms, whose outcome is a joint intention to act (or an agreement to disagree).<sup>79</sup>

**(1). Formulating Proposals.** If, instead of deliberating, we were merely aggregating private preferences, we would observe our choices and those of others, ask about willingness to pay for a benefit, accept compensation for a burden, or consult (our express preferences in) the relevant focus group. If, instead of deliberating, we were to defer to some wise man or expert, we would ask what we should do. If, we had nothing but a fair procedure for each of us to try to outdo the others, we might -- as Richardson says -- begin with the group members’ “attempts to exert their influence.”<sup>80</sup> And a group

8/26/2003

might try to eliminate deliberation by uncritically appealing to its constitution or its judicial interpreters.

Richardson, however, reframes our task as that of reasoning together to fashion an answer to what we collectively ought to do.<sup>81</sup> We begin when one among us makes a proposal to the rest. It is an individual – and not some big collective or corporatist deliberator – that makes the proposal. Although it may (or may not) also express private preferences or desires, the act of proposing what we ought to do is a *public* act, the performance of which the others are aware and the content of which others can grasp.<sup>82</sup> Each and every group member is free to make proposals, for each has equal status as a source of claims and, *eo ipso*, as a group member. I face my fellow group members not (merely) as enemies to be hated or rivals to be bested but (also) as fellow participants in a cooperative scheme. The ideal of reciprocity demands that what I propose to others is something that they understand (no foreign languages in the absence of translators) and either do or might accept (given appropriate reasons), for I require the same from them. Finally, although my proposal is about what – I propose – we should do together, to make the proposal honestly is also to promise my willingness to do my part in carrying out the plan, if it is agreed to. The making of such a promise, of course, would be contingent, negatively, on encountering no unforeseen obstacles as well as, positively, on others (who accept the proposal) freely agreeing to do their parts. (A possible proposal *sans promise to help* might be offered merely to get the discussion going.) The making of one proposal often results in the making of additional proposals, whether they are modifications of the first or rivals to it. This brings us to stage two

8/26/2003

(2). **Arguing the Proposals' Merits.** In deliberative democracy those who make proposals give reasons for the actions or policies they favor, and the members engage in deliberative give and take to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. Here is it important to connect the notion of a proposal with the concept of intention as a sort of means-end package. Richardson explains:

An intention is naturally thought of as the result of deliberation that considers end and means and hence as a form of decision that incorporates at least an implicit reference to pursued end and selected means within it. Thus an intention paradigmatically takes the form to do A for the sake of end E.<sup>83</sup>

In proposing that my group cultivates roses, I offer as a reason that selling roses will be more profitable and easier to grow and market than bananas and, implicitly, that we need combat our shared poverty (since poverty is humiliating). Other group members do not just listen to or record my proposals (as interviewers might record my expression of willingness to pay or as focus group members might acknowledge my opinion). Rather each member has the opportunity to scrutinize rationally both means and ends. Others may defend my proposed action but as a means to some additional or alternative ends; they may reject it in favor of what they take to be a better means; they may reject my intention altogether and propose different actions and ends. Agreeing with Habermas, Richardson criticizes exclusive reliance on instrumental thinking that takes ends as given and reasons only about the most efficient or effective means. Practical reasoning should assess ends, for we often differ on and decide not only about "know-how" but also on "know-whether." Going beyond Habermas, Richardson gives an account in stage three of how more specifically we can reason about ends.

8/26/2003

Such assessment of ends can (but need not) lead back to what Richardson calls “final ends,” ends which are valued in themselves (whether or not they are also valued instrumentally). One way to interpret these final ends is as different interpretations of a public good, not as something independent waiting to be discovered but as something to be agreed to through discussion. Democratic deliberation, however, need not push back (or down) to one’s ultimate ends in the sense of those highest goals in one’s goal hierarchy. The principle of reciprocity requires that I offer only reasons that my fellow deliberators can understand and accept. Here Richardson departs from Gutmann and Thompson, however, for he permits deliberators to *supplement* their publicly accessible reasons and values with their ultimate values<sup>84</sup> -- for instance, religious values -- presumably when these ultimate values may help other members understand where a person is “coming from.”<sup>85</sup>

**(3). Coming to an Informal Agreement.** In Richardson’s account of deliberation, the first two stages give the deliberators an abundance of riches. Group members may offer competing proposals about what to do, but the proposed actions, ends, and values submitted may be significantly – even radically – different. How does Richardson’s version of deliberative democracy deal with these differences? How can the many be reduced to a one that yields unitary collective action? Here is one place that deliberative democracy advances beyond both majoritarian democracy and absolute consensus. It advances beyond the former because, in stage three, deliberation includes several ways in which (most) group members cooperate together to forge a joint intention.

8/26/2003

One way to form a joint intention is to agree on the same action and policy and to agree to disagree on its justifications: “We may all agree on what ought to be done but each have quite different reasons for coming to this conclusion”<sup>86</sup> Cass Sunstein terms an agreement of this sort an “incompletely theorized agreement on particular outcomes”<sup>87</sup> Alternatively, we may agree on intermediate final ends and refuse to advance together to the realm of potentially divisive higher-order final or ultimate ends.<sup>88</sup> We may deliberate about two competing final ends, each showing the other that there is good reason to be guided by the hitherto neglected end. Agreeing on a final end but disagreeing on its specification, through give-and-take we may come to agree on one of the competing specifications or together invent a new and more adequate specification. Furthermore, deliberators may creatively and collectively fashion a new and higher order end that can be specified in two complementary rather than competing lower-order ends. Finally, and most radically, through what Richardson calls “deep compromise,” ends can be refashioned rather than holding them as fixed: “Deep compromise, by contrast [with “bare compromise,” which is only a change in means] is a change in one’s support of policies or implementing means that is accompanied and explained or supported by a change in one’s ends that itself counts as a compromise.”<sup>89</sup>

The joint intention (action or action combined with ends) that is agreed to is not just a set of individual intentions to perform a similar action. Rather it is an agreement to do something together, and this “togetherness” means that “(1) each of the parties intends to do his or her part as required by the joint plan; (2) each of the parties believes that the joint action can be carried out if enough do their parts; and these intentions and beliefs are common knowledge.”<sup>90</sup>

8/26/2003

Why would fellow deliberators want to adopt one of these ways to handle disagreement about ends, especially deep compromise? Richardson offers two plausible explanations. First, through increased information that discussion brings to light, one or more members may become convinced that the limited available means require a change of ends or that past attempts to realize a given end resulted in unintended and unanticipated effects that now should be avoided.<sup>91</sup> Richer information leads to refashioning of values. Second, deliberators, as free and equal partners informed by the ideal of reciprocity in a fair cooperative enterprise are obliged to be responsive to and – within limits -- accommodate each other's ends:

Once someone has shifted their ends in order to accommodate you, you owe them something; and what you owe them is not appropriately measured by reference to their resultant set of ends. . . Each side having modified its intentions 'in accordance with and because of' the position of the other, each thereby comes under some obligation to follow through on the joint intention that results. In this way, then, the formation of informal agreement can affect what it is that democratic bodies ought to do.<sup>92</sup>

Does this affirmation of an obligation based on a debt of gratitude “pull a normative rabbit out of a positive hat”? Not if we accept the principle of reciprocity and the notion that a I owe you fitting response when you assume a burden or bestow on me a benefit. A balance obtains between self-interest and obligation.

**(4) Coverting Informal Agreement into Official Decision.** Majoritarian democracy emphasizes majority vote and downplays or neglects public discussion. In contrast, deliberative democracy emphasizes the first three stages of the deliberative process and views majority vote as one means to obtain official conversion (stage four) of the informal mutual agreement already achieved (stage three). Rather than an aggregator of preferences, voting in deliberative democracy is a “closure device”<sup>93</sup> that expresses or

8/26/2003

acknowledges acceptance of a proposal and commitment to a joint intention, including one's role in executing it. Sometimes the voting is a mere formality, for it is readily apparent that most members have already agreed to a joint intention. At times the vote indicates that more members are for than against it (or for one proposal rather than another). Those in the majority will have tried but failed sufficiently to accommodate the minority to the joint intention, making it partially rather than completely joint. There are deliberative disagreements as well as deliberative agreements. Minorities, however, can accept the results insofar as the process was fair – they had their say – and the majority tried to accommodate what turned out to be minority views. The result is a partially joint intention that gains legitimacy or authority from a fair substantive process.

Radical participatory democracy rejects voting because it allegedly violates the rights of the losing minority and sets people – as competitors – at odds with each other. Instead, radical democrats urge that deliberation continue until there is absolute consensus or complete unanimity. Then everyone in fact would get what they want, people would not be set at odds with each other, and a majority would not tyrannize a minority. In fact, rule by consensus can be more tyrannical than majority voting, for one or a small number of dissenters can block a decision to make changes. And, as Richardson points out, the consequence of rule by consensus is that the status quo, no matter how unjust, is “unduly privileg[ed].”<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, as Gutmann and Thompson see, a decision of when to use majority rule and other decision rules, such as the unanimity rule in juries, executive action, or parental authority, should itself be a matter of public deliberation rather than imposed by the individual or faction that controls the agenda.<sup>95</sup>

8/26/2003

Several reasons converge to make Richardson's four stage process both morally attractive and an appropriate specification or consistent development of some of Sen's commitments. First, the positive valuation of the *outcome* of the deliberative process -- a partially joint intention -- is coupled with the positive evaluation of the *process* itself. Just as a soccer team committed to fair play not only wants to win but to win fairly, so a deliberatively democratic community values not only a joint intention but also the fair process by which group members generate that intention. Richardson's stages are a nice illustration of Sen's notion of a "'comprehensive outcome' that incorporates inter alia the process through which the 'culmination outcome' [the joint intention] comes about."<sup>96</sup> Second, the so-called "impossibility" or arbitrariness of combining individual preferences into a social function may be able to be avoided if deliberators are conceived as fashioning (partially) joint intentions and (sometimes) shared ends. Third, Richardson's focus on joint intentions enables us to avoid the equally unpalatable extremes of, on the one hand, collapsing individual deliberators into one organic deliberator or, on the other hand, elevating individual intentions to the detriment of joint intentions that both grow out "of what each of us, as distinct individuals, think ought to be done"<sup>97</sup> and enable individuals to act together but with mutual responsibilities to do their share. Another way of making the point is to say that that Richardson has found a "way of conceiving of public decision-making that is at once sufficiently cognitive to make it truly deliberative and also sufficiently responsive to the positions of individual citizens to count as democratic."<sup>98</sup> Finally, Richardson's account of the course of practical reasoning enables him to do justice to the way in which deliberation usually builds on present commitments

8/26/2003

but also – through deep compromise and innovation -- may creatively forge novel purposes that at least a majority of participants can endorse.

**Deliberator Capacities and Virtues.** So far I have explored the resources of deliberative democracy for understanding the aims, ideals, groups and group membership, background conditions, and the process of deliberation. But I have said little about the kinds of persons who would make competent and virtuous deliberators. What sorts of skills and virtues should deliberators have and how might they be acquired?

Bohman has offered an answer to the question of deliberator skills in the context of his adapting some of Sen's ideas about well-being to generate an ideal of political equality. For Bohman, citizens in a democratic society should be equal in the sense that they at least cross a threshold of minimal "political functioning." Just as Sen stresses that economic equality should be defined in the metric of basic functionings such as adequate nutritional well-being and health, so Bohman urges deliberative democrats to view qualitative political equality as minimal political functioning and capacities. A person would be politically poor if she were not able to function above the minimal threshold.

Faithful to the spirit of Sen's approach, Bohman conceives political participation as one way in which our lives go well (or function in a way that we have reason to value). But Bohman also advances beyond Sen in two ways. First, he proposes specific capacities or skills that contribute to political functioning (over the threshold). Secondly, he argues that in opposition to equality of resources and equality of opportunity, "only equality of political capacities makes deliberation fully democratic"<sup>99</sup> In this context I am interested in Bohman's first adaptation, but I also shall comment briefly on the second.

8/26/2003

If we can agree that political functioning is part of our well-being, what specific skills would contribute to that functioning in a deliberative forum? Given the deliberative aims and process detailed above, what sort of personal abilities should people have or acquire? Bohman lists several skills but emphasizes one: “In order to be minimally effective in deliberation, a deliberator must be able to initiate public dialogue about an issue or a theme, in which his or her reasons may receive deliberative uptake”<sup>100</sup> In light of Richardson’s account of the deliberative process, we could specify this ability by saying that a deliberator must be able to formulate proposals and proposals of a specific kind, namely, proposals that other group members will be able to understand and accept (perhaps after deep compromise). Other skills, as Bohman recognizes, are also important. They include the ability to engage in argument and counter-argument – what Bohman calls “the back-and-forth exchange of reasons”<sup>101</sup> and what Richardson terms “sift[ing] reasons and arguments” in order “to figure out what really ought to be done”<sup>102</sup> Other abilities include skills in framing and reframing a debate, showing that dichotomies are neither exclusive nor exhaustive, and finding ways to that competing proposals may be harmonized or opposing members may compromise. An ability that Richardson rightly adds is that a capacity for “persuasive rhetoric,” which he defines as “the art of employing language so as to bring about changes in one’s audience’s practical commitments, especially by making appeal to the emotion.”<sup>103</sup> Such rhetoric need not interfere with but can supplement “reasoning’s truth orientation.”<sup>104</sup>

It is clear that group members differ significantly with respect to these deliberative capacities – just as they may differ with respect to economic power and social status. It is also apparent that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a

8/26/2003

quantitative measure of when someone has crossed a minimal threshold of being able to make proposals and so forth. But, this difficulty should not – as it is in danger of doing – lead Richardson to revert to a realism about extant differences that rejects “direct approaches” to promoting the social ideal of equal (basic) political capacities. He rightly insists that “the basic institutions of society of society should be arranged so as to support the capability of each citizen to engage meaningfully in democratic deliberation.”<sup>105</sup> But his list of these institutions surprisingly does not include both formal and informal educational institutions and capacity-building initiatives, which may play a direct role in nurturing and improving citizens’ deliberative capacities. With respect to political equality, he gives the job of heavy lifting to the “tremendous variety of deliberative fora;”<sup>106</sup> for, he contends these diffuse and mitigate “the impact of the fact that individuals do vary in their persuasive abilities.”<sup>107</sup> But the opportunities that my soccer organization affords me to be deliberative and persuasive and the role that deliberative fora may play as “schools” for deliberation<sup>108</sup> – these do not obviate the role which education at all levels can and should play in promoting deliberative capacities.

In addition to capacities that contribute to an individual’s political functioning in democratic fora, the practice of democratic deliberation requires that group members exhibit and are motivated by certain excellences of character or civic virtues. Gutmann and Thompson have made the most significant contribution to this topic, and -- like Richardson<sup>109</sup> -- I summarize the main points of their convincing analysis. Gutmann and Thompson propose three deliberative virtues: (mutual) respect, civic integrity, and civic magnanimity.

8/26/2003

Admirable deliberators respect each other in the sense that – though they might not like each other and may disagree profoundly – they “have a favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the persons with whom [they] disagree[e].”<sup>110</sup> The term “tolerance” often suggests “grudging forbearance” or putting up with persons with whose views one disagrees. Alternatively and very differently, tolerance can mean “acceptance” of the person with whom one disagrees or of his views.<sup>111</sup> For Gutmann and Thompson mutual respect goes beyond tolerance. The “constructive interaction” of mutual respect is the deliberative process informed by the ideals of reciprocity, publicity, and accountability. The “favorable attitude” concerns both “how citizens present their own political positions” (civic integrity) and “how they regard the political positions of others”<sup>112</sup> (civic magnanimity).

Deliberators demonstrate civic integrity in a deliberative process when they are sincere and honest, putting forward the proposals and reasons they do because they believe them and not (merely) for political expediency. Civic integrity also means that deliberators practice what they preach and accept the practical implications of their moral principles. Civic integrity does not mean that one has to hold dogmatically to the core of one’s values or ends, for – through dialogue – one can freely fashion new values (and a new identity).<sup>113</sup>

Deliberators demonstrate civic magnanimity by the attitudes they have toward the proposals, reasons, or ends of those with whom they disagree. First, deliberators treat each other’s proposals and positions as expressing their sincerely held moral views rather than as a cover for a political strategy or economic interest. Virtuous deliberators show their respect for each other by assessing the moral merits of each other’s *arguments*

8/26/2003

rather than making *ad hominem* attacks, for instance, by claiming the argument was politically or economically motivated. Second, civic magnanimity requires the virtue of open-mindedness, for the person with whom I initially disagree may turn out – on further reflection – to have a better idea or to something to contribute to a partially joint intention. As Richardson remarks, “willingness to search for deep compromise is a particularly important form of open-mindedness.”<sup>114</sup> This virtue, may mean, as we have seen, that we refrain – in supporting our proposal – from offering foundational principles when they are sure to be rejected. Put positively, citizens are magnanimous when they “try to minimize the range of their public disagreement by promoting policies on which their principles converge.”<sup>115</sup>

Many are the personal and social factors that make these deliberative virtues difficult to acquire, maintain, and exhibit. However, although I cannot argue it here, I would contend that civic education, exemplary persons, and initiation in deliberative processes themselves – all have a role in combating these factors and promoting these civic virtues.

### **Alkire’s Capabilities Approach and Deliberative Participation**

In this final section I describe, evaluate, and begin to fill in a lacuna in Alkire’s recent and splendid achievement in giving practical application to Sen’s capabilities approach in relation to those micro socioeconomic development projects involving some sort of outside aid. Offering an insightful interpretation of Sen and showing one way his abstract theory might be implemented in one kind of development practice, Alkire utilizes some ideas of John Finnis and draws on field work with several Pakistani

8/26/2003

communities. The result is an approach to an outside development agent's decision of whether to continue funding an income-generating and community-building activity for which the group has received support. Unique to this approach is the external funder's use of local facilitator-assessors-reporters to elicit, clarify, and then report on the groups' individual and collective evaluation of the impact of the externally-funded income-generating project. In what follows I describe and evaluate Alkire's approach and then conclude by arguing that an ideal of deliberative participation, informed by the ideals and practice of deliberative democracy discussed above, appropriately enriches it.

In her study, Alkire reconstructs and improves – through a mutually beneficial interchange between Sen's ideas and the development literature on popular participation in development initiatives. Alkire's focus is on only one sort of development activity, and she is keenly aware that other participatory approaches may be called for in other contexts. What specific sort of development context does she address?

An international development agent, Oxfam, with the assistance of Pakistani NGOs, had selected and invested in income-generating and community-building initiatives in three different grassroots groups. The projects have been in operation for some time, and Oxfam wants to assess how well the projects have done. Oxfam uses several established methodologies to evaluate success and failure, including cost-benefit analysis and a form of social impact assessment. None of these, however, gives the groups themselves or their members much of a role. To remedy this deficiency, Alkire employs educated but local people and provides Oxfam with a more robust participatory approach. The basic idea is that these local team members elicit from the groups their own evaluations of the impact of the project on their lives. The results of this evaluation

8/26/2003

then will supplement the outcomes of the other methodologies. Hence, Oxfam will have richer information with respect to *its* decision of whether or not to continue funding the projects and what sort of projects to fund in the future.

Alkire does not investigate or evaluate the process by which Oxfam does or might make its decisions about what it ought to do. If she did, it would be important to know to what extent its decision making was deliberative and to what extent, if any, representatives from the affected groups were involved. Her focus rather is on the outsider-facilitated, backward-looking assessment exercise that the groups themselves perform. What role did the outsiders play as well as the groups and their members play?

The facilitators roles were (1) to *elicit* the group member's value judgments about past impacts; (2) *facilitate* the members' and group's clarification, scrutiny, and ranking of those judgments; (3) *comparatively assess and report* to the funding institution the various groups' achievements; (4) *report* the funding body's assessments and funding decision back to the investigated groups.

Before describing briefly each role, it is important to underscore that Alkire is acutely aware of the importance that the outsiders conducted the exercise in a "participatory manner":

To the greatest extent possible the facilitators or 'assessors' wore simple clothing, used the local language, adapted the methodology flexibly to the situation, respected traditional and religious customs, organized the meeting at a convenient time and place, came with the attitude of informal learning and openness, encouraged quieter persons to speak more and dominant persons to speak less. They also spent time both prior to and after the meeting talking informally, gathering other information necessary for a full assessment, and addressing immediate problems in the activity.<sup>116</sup>

8/26/2003

Alkire justifies these attitudes instrumentally insofar as they are likely to elicit “richer” (and more accurate?) information than would people or are arrogant, know-it-alls, or have culturally insensitive attitudes. She could also make it clear that the outsiders – as both fellow human beings and guests – ethically owed this conduct to community members. Although outsiders and insiders are not members of a deliberative group, something like the deliberative virtues of respect for autonomy, civic integrity (especially honesty), and civic magnanimity (especially openness) certainly apply.<sup>117</sup> Assuming this “participatory manner,” I briefly analyze the four outsider roles and related insider activities and assess them in relation to the deliberative ideals sketched above.

**(1) Eliciting Value Judgments.** The outsiders came to the communities informed by an assessment framework of the “dimensions” of human development. This framework is not a Nussbaum-type list that “select[s] those human capabilities that can be convincingly argued to be of central importance in any human life, whatever else the person pursues or chooses.”<sup>118</sup> Nussbaum’s overall project is to defend her list and to argue that it should be enshrined in every nation’s constitution:

The aim of the project as a whole is to provide the philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional principles that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity requires.<sup>119</sup>

If the list is enshrined constitutionally, governments are mandated to get “citizens above” a threshold level for each capability. Although a given polity may specify the list according to its own traditions and culture, “the list is supposed to be a focus of political planning.”<sup>120</sup> Both Sen and Alkire rightly have reservations about such a list – even if freely accepted and specified – for it removes from communities on every level to

8/26/2003

opportunity to decide for themselves what impacts they have reasons to value and disvalue, how to prioritize their various values, and what policies to adopt.

Alkire's outsiders, however, do not come with nothing, thereby leaving everything – the identification of topics as well as the making of assessments – to the group members. Why? Alkire answers: “Unsystematic public discussion and participatory exercises to date (at local and national levels) have often failed to consider key categories of valuable ends implicitly or explicitly”<sup>121</sup> On the basis of Alkire's synthesis and simplification of both Sen and Finnis, the outsiders come with a conception of the multiple *dimensions* or categories of human development and in terms of this framework elicit value information. These dimensions or categories do not prescribe ways of being and doing; instead they *sort* the multiplicity of elicited value judgments into categories of basic reasons for acting. These include:

- ? Life/health/security
- ? Knowledge
- ? Work/play
- ? Beauty/environment
- ? Self-integration/inner peace
- ? Religion
- ? Empowerment<sup>122</sup>

What the outsiders elicit and the insiders provide and clarify are insider valuations of changes – during the course of the project and perhaps attributable to it – with respect to their beings and doing, their functionings and capabilities. In the field, outsiders elicited this information about value judgments in two ways. Initially, the outsiders used the dimensions as an “agenda for conversation”<sup>123</sup> and successively asked for value judgments under each of the above seven rubrics. When this approach seemed too mechanical and to stifle a free flowing interchange, the outsiders subsequently used the

8/26/2003

set of dimensions differently. After explaining “the general intent of the exercise (to think about the full range of impacts of an activity, good and bad, anticipated and unanticipated),” the outsider would ask “a purely open question ‘what valuable and negative impacts have you noticed?’”<sup>124</sup> After discussing the impacts in thematic clusters, whether or not they fit the dimensions, the facilitator toward the end of a session would question whether the group had any value judgments to make under any previously omitted category. Quoting Finnis, Alkire remarks that this use of a menu “could catalyse the missing discussions by providing ‘an assemblage of reminders of the range of possibly worthwhile activities and orientations open to [a community].”<sup>125</sup> The difference between Nussbaum’s prescriptive list and either version of Alkire’s open menu approach is clear. In Nussbaum’s account, the list mandates certain social goals and political planning, although Nussbaum encourages groups to specify the norms in relation to its cultural context.<sup>126</sup> In Alkire’s approach, the dimensions “could usefully spark conversation”<sup>127</sup> about whether there have been any impacts – good or bad – within a given category.

**(2) Value Clarification, Scrutiny, and Ranking.** Facilitators did not just elicit information on valued or disvalued changes; they encouraged group members to scrutinize their choices, rank them by importance, and clarify and prioritize their underlying values. Here, as in the first stage, social interaction among the group members took place. In the goat loaning project, one member -- valuing the empowerment on other issues that she believed resulted from the project – said: “We sit together . . . and whoever gives the best opinion, we do this.”<sup>128</sup> Given the focus on the past, the absence of much disagreement within relatively homogenous group, and the absence of a focus on

8/26/2003

what ought to be done collectively, it might appear that there was no attempt on the part of either the insiders or facilitators to convert the individual judgments and rankings into a social assessment of the past or a choice for future action. In fact, although the text could address this question more explicitly, the participants together ranked – in and through discussion – the various impacts of past projects as well as the basic values expressed.<sup>129</sup> Moreover, the facilitators themselves assessed the groups' assessments. Although I would like to find out more about these facilitator-assessments, Alkire provides one crucial detail: , “[One aim of the facilitator is] to assess impacts in such a way that the concerned community could (and did) reflect critically on *the relative value or desirability of different* impacts and formulate ongoing objectives (and on the basis of these select monitoring indicators).”<sup>130</sup> The group had an opportunity to react to and shape the report to be given to the funding institution.

**(3) Reports to the External Group.** Following this second step, the outsiders reported to the external funding institution the various groups' value information and rankings. Hence, the funders knew how the communities judged and weighed the impacts of the projects on their lives and something of what the communities viewed as their most important values. In addition, the facilitators – also called “assessors” – were responsible to compare, using common categories, the various projects that they investigated and, as noted above, perform their own (group-mediated) assessment of each project. The external funders took the insider information and assessments and the facilitator assessments of various projects, combined them with standard assessments such as cost-benefit analysis and social assessment techniques, and decided whether or not to continue or discontinue funding a particular project. The final decision – whether

8/26/2003

or not made democratically and deliberatively – to continue or discontinue funding resided exclusively with the funding agency and not with the communities. It must be stressed that the communities did have a deliberative role in initially deciding the focus – goats, roses, or something else – of their income-generating projects. Hence in this sense they were not treated as “passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs.”<sup>131</sup> Still, perhaps a fuller deliberative opportunity was missed, for the external donors and communities (and perhaps the facilitators) could and arguably should have engaged *together* in democratic deliberation.

**(4) Reports to the Communities.** Outside investigators, even participatory ones, often neglect to return to the community to share with their informants their assessments and the donor’s funding decisions.<sup>132</sup> Although Alkire provides scant details, the facilitators shared their assessments with the communities themselves. Not only may a community critically assess the way the outside facilitator evaluated both individual and collective assessments, but the community has the occasion “to formulate ongoing objectives.”<sup>133</sup> Yet the account falls silent just at the point in which the possibility emerges for a deliberative, communal process emerges. There is an understandable – yet avoidable -- cause for this failure. The communities responded to the facilitators’ reports and donor decisions in the local language rather than Urdu, the language of the facilitators.<sup>134</sup> Although Alkire’s ideal facilitator would have been able to communicate in the local language as well as in a language, such as Urdu, spoken by at least some group members, in this case the ideal was compromised. Of course, the communities may have resorted to their own language to gain more ownership over the conversation.<sup>135</sup>

8/26/2003

What is significantly underdeveloped if not altogether missing in Alkire's capabilities-based reconstruction of participation is *the group's* – in contrast to the outside assessor's – decision-making and especially the role of deliberation – both in deciding on their assessments of past projects and on future policies and projects. Of course, Alkire's emphasis is more on evaluating the past, the changes in capabilities and functioning, than in offering a collective procedure for deciding about the future. With respect to both past and future, however, she says almost nothing about the process of deliberating, especially in the face of deep disagreements. One reason that Alkire did not address this issue is that social choice in the three groups proved relatively easy given that the groups were composed solely of women and were homogeneous in other ways. Male members or members of different castes surely would have made social choice more difficult and perhaps called for (or made impossible!) deliberation.

Alkire is aware work remains to be done on this issue of social choice. She asks whether her facilitator-assessment methodology overcomes Social Impact Assessment's (SIA) alleged weakness of failing “to provide decision criteria”<sup>136</sup> and admits that her methodology leaves many issues about decision-making “unresolved.”<sup>137</sup> For instance, it “did not treat in depth the problem of combining this information [about valuable capability change] to reach a decision” or “what to do when one agent's choice is contested.”<sup>138</sup> These are among the very issues that deliberative democracy attempts to answer. Finally, although Alkire adumbrates aspects of participation compatible with the ideal of deliberative participation worked out in this paper, she rightly worries about some types of participation:

Participation may also *foster the common good*, by stimulating reflection and collective action on common issues, and helping bring into or keep in the picture

8/26/2003

people whose needs and interests might otherwise have been overlooked. It may also enable participants to act according to their *conscience*. At times the opposite could occur (as when a participatory decision fractures a community, or requires an individual to act against her conscience in order to implement it). Indeed, none of these potentially positive features may occur, which is why such scrutiny may be valuable.<sup>139</sup>

Alkire's participatory model, I conclude, would be improved by injecting a strong dose of deliberative democracy, especially a version thereof that is sensitive to her concerns. Alkire, herself, recognizes the merit of addressing the deliberative interpretations of democracy:

This chapter does not engage with the very large current literature on public deliberation and democratic practice (both theoretical and empirical) which is directly concerned with these very same issues [“of participation (or decision by discussion)”] – not because this is not an important interface to work but, to the contrary it is too important to be done improperly. I respectfully leave that task to others who are already engaged in it.<sup>140</sup>

Furthermore, in a footnote Alkire refers to the work of both Richardson and Bohman, “both of whom,” she says, “carry forward Sen's work directly.”<sup>141</sup> One aim of the present essay has been to contribute to that task. Just as deliberative democracy theory can help Sen specify the concept, justification, and procedures of public discussion and democratic decisions, so deliberative aims, ideals, group membership, background conditions, and processes as well as the ideal deliberator capacities and virtues promise to yield a theory and practice of deliberative participation relevant to – among other things – small scale, externally-funded development projects for the destitute.<sup>142</sup> These communities, as collective agents of their own development, must often make choices about what they ought to do. In addition to clarifying and evaluating what has happened in the past, they together may seek to overcome their differences with respect to ends and means. An ethically defensible way of doing so is by putting into practice – sometimes

8/26/2003

with the assistance of outsiders – and ideal of deliberative participation informed by deliberative democracy. Then the favored definition of participation will include the italicized addition: “‘Participation’ refers to the process of discussion, information gathering, conflict, [*deliberation,*] and eventual decision-making, implementation, and evaluation by the group(s) directly affected by the activity.’”<sup>143</sup>

One way of strengthening Alkire’s approach becomes clear when it is compared with Fong and Wright’s model of Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) discussed earlier. In EPG, the grassroots or neighborhood deliberative sites are both linked together horizontally and are coordinated, monitored, and improved vertically by intermediate bodies, whose functions are reiterated by a higher order body that has “colonize[d] state power and transform[ed] formal governance institutions”<sup>144</sup> Some functions of Alkire’s donor institutions and facilitators, such as funding and assessment, indeed have parallels in EPG. But EPG goes further, for lower level groups send democratically elected representatives to higher levels, and higher levels in turn coordinate, monitor, and build deliberative and other capacities in lower levels. Resources, ideas, and skills are shared both horizontally and vertically in a comprehensive network of direct and representative democracy in which citizens and their representatives deliberate to solve common and practical problems.

### **Concluding Remark**

A frequent criticism of the relevance of Sen’s capability approach for global, national, regional, and local development is that it leaves too many evaluative issues unresolved. Enlisting the resources of deliberative democracy, I have argued that the

8/26/2003

primary resolution of those issues should be done deliberatively and democratically by the communities themselves.

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<sup>2</sup> For helpful comments -- not all of which are yet addressed adequately -- on an earlier draft, I thank Sabina Alkire, Douglas Grob, Christopher Morris, Henry Richardson, and students in the Pro Seminar of the Committee on Politics, Philosophy, and Public Policy at the University of Maryland. Thanks also to those institutions that invited me to give the paper and provided stimulating insights: Philadelphia Area Philosophy Consortium, St. Joseph's University; Fundacion Nueva Generacion Argentina y Centro de Investigaciones Filosoficas, Bajo Belgrano, Argentina; Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University.

<sup>1</sup> Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, "Why Deliberative Democracy is Different" in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, eds. *Democracy* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 161. Compare Gutmann and Thompson's definition with that of Joshua Cohen and that of James Bohman and William Rehg. The former says: "By a deliberative democracy, I shall mean, roughly, an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members." (in James Bohman and William Rehg, eds. *Deliberative Democracy* [Cambridge, Mass., London, England: MIT Press, 1997], p. 67). The latter say "Broadly defined, deliberative democracy refers to the idea that legitimate lawmaking issues from the public deliberation of citizens" (in Bohman and Rehg, eds. *Deliberative Democracy*, p. ix). Notice that Bohman and Rehg restrict deliberative democracy to governmental lawmaking while Gutmann and Thompson and Cohen offer conception that include nongovernmental associations as well. Focusing on the value of deliberation, Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright contend: "In deliberative decision-making, participants listen to each other's positions and generate group choices after due consideration. In contemplating and arguing for what the group should do, participants ought to persuade one another by offering reasons that others can accept . . . The important feature of genuine deliberation is that participants find reasons that they can accept in collective actions, not necessarily ones that they completely endorse or find maximally advantageous" ("Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance" in Fung and Wright, eds., *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*

<sup>2</sup> Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); James Bohman, *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1996); Henry S. Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, and Fung and Wright, eds., *Deepening Democracy*. Other important works in or on deliberative democracy include James Bohman and William Rehg, eds. *Deliberative Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass., London, England: MIT Press, 1997); Jon Elster, ed., *Deliberative Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Stephen Macedo, ed., *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Ellen Frankel Paul, et al, eds. *Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Cass Sunstein, *Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

<sup>3</sup> See David A. Crocker, "Globalization and Human Development: Ethical Approaches," in Edmond Malinvaud and Louis Sabourin, eds., *Proceedings of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, the Vatican, 25-28 April 2001* (Vatican City: Pontifical Academy of the Social Sciences, 2001), pp. 45-65; "Development Ethics and Globalization," *Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly* 22 (Fall 2002): 13-20.

<sup>4</sup> Sabina Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms: Sen's Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> See Fung and Wright, *Deepening Democracy*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>6</sup> In contrast to much government to government funding by the U.S. Agency for International Development, for more than thirty years the U.S. Inter-American Foundation (IAF) has emphasized grassroots development. See Sheldon Annis, Sheldon and Peter Hakim, eds., *Direct To The Poor: Grassroots Development In Latin America*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988) and Ramón Daubón, "A Grassroots View of Development Assistance," *Grassroots Development: The Journal of the Inter-American Foundation*, 23, 1 (2002): 1-9.

<sup>7</sup> One way to justify starting but not ending with the local group level is captured in the principle of subsidiarity: "The principle of subsidiarity holds that the most local agent(s) capable of making a choice should make it" (Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 143).

<sup>8</sup> Fung and Wright's model of "empowered participatory governance" (EPG) emphasizes intermediate institutions that "can reinforce the quality of local democratic deliberation in a number of ways: coordinating and distributing resources, solving problems that local units cannot address by themselves, rectifying pathological or incompetent decision-making in failing groups, and diffusing innovations and learning across boundaries" (*Deepening Democracy*, p. 21.)

<sup>9</sup> For a treatment of managed health care institutions as a possible venues for deliberative democracy, see Norman Daniels, "Enabling Democratic Deliberation: *How Managed Health Care Organizations Ought to Make Decisions about Coverage for New Technologies*," Stephen Macedo, ed. *Deliberative Democracy*, pp. 198-210.

<sup>10</sup> Employing the term "the land of middle democracy" in a much broader sense than I do here, Gutmann and Thompson exclude only "constitutional conventions, Supreme Court opinions, or their theoretical analogues": "The forums of deliberation in middle democracy embrace virtually any setting in which citizens come together on a regular basis to reach collective decisions about public issues – governmental as well as nongovernmental institutions. They include not only legislative sessions, court proceedings, and administrative hearings at all levels of government but also meetings of grassroots organizations, professional associations, shareholders meetings, and citizens' committees in hospitals and other similar institutions," (Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, pp 12-13.) One disadvantage of this inclusive conception of middle democracy is that it neglects the democratically and deliberatively fruitful linkages between the grassroots and the intermediate levels.

<sup>11</sup> For a discussion of these three examples of self-managed and autonomous development, see Bernard Kliksberg, , "The Role of Social Capital and Culture in the Process of Development" <http://www.iadb.org/exr/topics/poverty.htm>. Gianpaolo Baiocchi analyzes and assesses in relation to EPG Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting in "Participation, Activism, and Politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment" (Fung and Wright, eds., *Deepening Democracy*, pp. 45-76).

<sup>12</sup> For the ways in which constitution making has been and can be democratic ("any kind of effective and formalized control by citizens over leaders or policies") and deliberative, see Jon Elster, "Deliberation and Constitution Making," (Elster, *Deliberative Democracy*, pp. 97-122). Cass Sunstein explores how a *democratic* constitution, especially its system of checks and balances, can "protect the processes of reasoning-giving, ensuring something like a 'republic of reasons'." (*Designing Democracy*, p. 239).

<sup>13</sup> Henry Richardson addresses federal administrative agencies as potential and important sites for deliberative democracy as "democratic autonomy" or "collectively reasoned self-rule" (*Democratic Autonomy*, p. 18). Although he main focus is on the United States, he briefly considers the problem of bureaucratic domination in emerging democracies (*Democratic Autonomy*, p. 5)

<sup>14</sup> Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (New York: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 146-47.

<sup>15</sup> Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999). See also World Bank, *The World Bank Participation Handbook* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996).

<sup>16</sup> See Ngaire Woods, "Globalization and International Institutions," in Ngaire Woods, ed., *The Political Economy of Globalization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, ); David Held, *Models of Democracy*, 2<sup>nd</sup>. Ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996) and James Bohman, "International Regimes and Democratic Governance," *International Affairs*, 75 (1999) 499-514; "Citizenship and Norms of Publicity: Wide Public Reason in Cosmopolitan Societies," *Political Theory* 27 (1999), 176-202; *Cosmopolitan Deliberation*. Cambridge: Polity Press, forthcoming.

<sup>17</sup> For arguments that political participation is an aspect of human development and that democracy is an ethically and practically defensible ideal for developing countries, see United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). In addition to Baiocchi's case study on Porto Alegre, see T. M. Thomas Issac and Patrick Heller's study of decentralized democratization in India's Panchayat system of local, regional, and state governance ("Democracy and Development: Decentralized Planning in Kerala" in Fung and Wright, eds. *Deepening Democracy*, pp. 77-110).

<sup>18</sup> See also Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy*, 10, 3 (1999): 3-17.

<sup>19</sup> See also Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, *India and Participation* (Oxford University Press, 2002), ch. 1 and 10.

<sup>20</sup> Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 56.

<sup>21</sup> Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1999), p. 19. See also, Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 6, n. 18; p. 9.

<sup>22</sup> Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, p. 56.

<sup>23</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. xii-xiii.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>25</sup> G. A. Cohen makes this mistake when he charges Sen with "athleticism." G.A. Cohen, "Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities" in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds. *The Quality of Life* (Oxford: Clarendon, p. 25).

<sup>26</sup> See Philip Pettit,

<sup>27</sup> Amartya Sen, "Capability and Well-being," in Nussbaum and Sen, eds., *The Quality of Life*, p.36.

<sup>28</sup> Martha C. Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 87.

<sup>29</sup> Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, p. 110.

<sup>30</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 36.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>32</sup> Joe Kane, *Savages*, 2<sup>nd</sup>. Ed. (New York: Vintage, 1996), p. 75.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38.

<sup>34</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 242. See also *ibid.*, p. 241.

<sup>35</sup> Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, p. 130.

<sup>36</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 36.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247; see also pps. 36, 288 and UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, especially, ch. 2.

<sup>38</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 5.

<sup>39</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 287; see p. 288.

<sup>40</sup> Amartya Sen, *Rationality and Freedom*, p. 10.

<sup>41</sup> Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, pp. 70-71.

<sup>42</sup> Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development*, especially, ch. 1.

<sup>43</sup> Sen, *Rationality and Freedom*, p. 49.

<sup>44</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 287.

<sup>45</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 286.

<sup>46</sup> Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, p. 46, n 19. This passage is evidence that Nussbaum is mistaken when she says, "Sen nowhere uses the idea of a threshold" (Nussbaum, *Woman and Human Development*, p. 12).

<sup>47</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 195.

<sup>48</sup> Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, pp. 146-47.

<sup>49</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 92.

<sup>50</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 30.

<sup>51</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 110.

<sup>52</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 13.

<sup>53</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, pp. 155-56.

<sup>54</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 329, n 9.

<sup>55</sup> These include -- besides the anthology edited by Bohman and Rehg and the volume by Gutmann and Thompson, cited in n. 1 above -- the following: Jürgen Habermas, "Three Normative Models of Democracy," *Constellations* 1 (1994); Seyla Benhabib, "Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy," *Constellations* 1 (1994); James Fishkin, *Democracy and Deliberation* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971); Ralf Dahrendorf, *The Modern Social Contract* (New York:

Weidenfeld, 1988); Alan Hamlin and Phillip Pettit, eds., *The Good Polity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Cass Sunstein, *The Partial Constitution* (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1993). Among the most important volumes on deliberative democracy not cited by Sen (many of which were published after 1999), see above, n 2.

<sup>56</sup> See especially Cass Sunstein, *Designing Democracy*, ch. 1.

<sup>57</sup> Iris Young, *Democracy and Inclusion*, p. 5.

<sup>58</sup> See Henry Richardson, "Democratic Intentions," in Bohman and Rehg, ed. *Deliberative Democracy*, pp 349-82 and *Democratic Authority*, pp. 162-76.

<sup>59</sup> One problem, of course, is what can and should be done when members of deliberative groups believe that they are (and should be) second class citizens. The field experience of Sabina Alkire and Manu Mathai underscores this difficulty.

<sup>60</sup> Young, *Democracy and Inclusion*, p.

<sup>61</sup> Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 52.

<sup>62</sup> Gutmann and Thompson rely on Lawrence C. Becker's (*Reciprocity* [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986], pp. 73-144) concept of reciprocity as "making a proportionate return for good received." The principle, however, may plausibly be pitched on a more abstract level to include proportionate responses to bads as well as goods received. See Lawrence Crocker, "The Upper Limits of Punishment," *Emory Law Journal*, 41 (1992).

<sup>63</sup> Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 55.

<sup>64</sup> Gutmann and Thompson, "Why Deliberative Democracy is Different," p. 169.

<sup>65</sup> William A. Galston, *Liberal Pluralism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

<sup>66</sup> Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, in Stephen Macedo, ed., *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); p. 273.

<sup>67</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Authority*, p. 88.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 30.

<sup>70</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 63.

<sup>71</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 89.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 225.

<sup>74</sup> Fung and Wright, "Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance," p. 23.

<sup>75</sup> Baiocchi, "Participation, Activism, and Politics," p. 52.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>77</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 162.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>79</sup> The close link between process and outcome led Richardson in his essay "Deliberative Intentions," (published before *Democratic Autonomy*) to designate the joint intention as the fifth stage rather than the outcome of the deliberative process (Richardson, "Deliberative Intentions," p. 375).

<sup>80</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 166.

<sup>81</sup> Richardson's approach stresses the forging of joint intentions for future actions. It is sufficiently capacious, however, to include decisions about how we now should evaluate past actions. Although this later exercise, which is the kind that Alkire investigates, typically is part of a deliberation concerning future action, it might be performed as an end in itself.

<sup>82</sup> Jane Mansbridge seems right in arguing expressions of self-interest have a role in democratic deliberation: "As participants in deliberation, we cannot understand ourselves or others, or work out just resolutions to many conflicts, if we cannot formulate relatively accurately and express relatively well some conception of our own narrow self-interest" ("Practice-Thought-Practice" in Fung and Wright, eds., *Deepening Democracy*, p. 176. See also, pp. 179-83.

<sup>83</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 164.

<sup>84</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 82.

<sup>85</sup> Richardson's view is a promising third way between (1) Habermas's view that there should be no restrictions on the content of what is offered in public deliberation and (2) Rawls's contention that the idea of "public reason" should filter out whatever other citizens are unable to accept (John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited"* [Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press], pp. 140-48]. For an analysis of these two options and an argument for the second, see Osvaldo

Guariglia, *Una ética para el siglo XXI: Ética y derechos humanos en un tiempo posmetafísico* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica), pp. 147-55.

<sup>86</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 173.

<sup>87</sup> Sunstein, *Designing Democracy*, p. 57.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Sen, “A consensus on public decisions may flourish so long as the exact grounds for that accord are not very precisely articulated.” [*Rationality and Freedom*, p. 558; cited by Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, pp. 92-93]. See also Sunstein, *Designing Democracy*, pp. 56-58 and “Agreement Without Theory” in Macedo, ed. *Deliberative Politics*, pp. 123-50.

<sup>89</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 147.

<sup>90</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 165. Cf. my earlier distinction between solo running and the joint action of running together: “My intention is to run alone, on my own . . . I might run solo over a course crowded by other runners. Another runner might even cover the same route at the same time and pace. But we would be running solo, if we had no intention and made no effort to run together. The absence of a joint intention would be shown by the lack of mutual adjustment of intentions and action so as to stay together. If my ‘partner’ stopped to tie her shoe, I would not slow down for her to catch up” [David A. Crocker, *Praxis and Democratic Socialism: The Critical Social Theory of Markovic and Stojanovic* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press; Sussex, England: Harvester Press, 1983), p. 109.] I now would refine my idea of “mutual adjustment of intentions and actions” to include the idea of both runners doing their part – and helping the other if need be – to execute their joint intention.

<sup>91</sup> See Sen, *Development as Freedom*, pp. 254-61.

<sup>92</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 172.

<sup>93</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 204.

<sup>94</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 205.

<sup>95</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, pp. 32-33. See also p. 253.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. Gutmann and Thompson’s answer to the question of whether democratic procedures have priority over just outcomes or just outcomes have priority over democratic procedures: “Deliberative democracy rejects this dichotomy. It sees deliberation as an outcome-oriented process; citizens deliberate with the aim of justifying their collective decisions to one another as best they can. . . . Neither the principles that define the process of deliberation nor the principles that constitute its content have priority in deliberative democracy. Both interact dynamically in ways that overcome the dichotomy between procedure and outcome” (*Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 27).

<sup>97</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 164.

<sup>98</sup> Richardson, “Democratic Intentions,” p. 359.

<sup>99</sup> Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, p. 109.

<sup>100</sup> Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, p. 110.

<sup>101</sup> Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, p. 58.

<sup>102</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 76.

<sup>103</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 90.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid

<sup>105</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 89.

<sup>106</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 92.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Alkire describes the “empowerment” impact of the goat breeding project: “The decision-making process was educational and built confidence in the women’s individual and collective capacities and cognitive abilities” (*Valuing Freedoms*, p. 252). Fung and Wright make the same point about experiments in EPG as “schools for democracy” (“Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance,” p. 23).

<sup>109</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, pp. 187-88.

<sup>110</sup> Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 79.

<sup>111</sup> See Hans Oberdiek, *Tolerance: Between Forbearance and Acceptance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

<sup>112</sup> Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 80.

<sup>113</sup> Sen recently has convincingly rejected an identity essentialism and argued for our human ability to shape and transcend our identities. See especially Amartya Sen, “Reason Before Identity,” Romanes Lecture, given in Oxford, 17 November 1998; “Beyond Identity: Other People,” *The New Republic*, 223/25: 23-30. See also Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, pp. 140-41.

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<sup>114</sup> Richardson, *Democratic Autonomy*, p. 187.

<sup>115</sup> Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, p. 89.

<sup>116</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 225.

<sup>117</sup> Alkire's account would be enhanced by explicit attention to the ethical issues that emerge when outsiders elicit and clarify question insiders about their values. For contributions to this topic, see Deepa Narayan, Robert Chambers, Meera K. Shah, and Patti Petesch, *Voices of the Poor: Crying Out for Change* (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 2000), pp. and David A. Crocker, "Insiders and Outsiders in International Development Ethics," *Ethics and International Affairs* 5 (1991): 149-73. Reprinted in Christine Koggel, ed., *Moral Issues in Global Perspective* (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1999), pp. 147-62.

<sup>118</sup> Martha Nussbaum, in Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran Cronin, eds. *Global Justice and Transnational Politics* (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2002), p. 128.

<sup>119</sup> Martha Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development*, p. 5

<sup>120</sup> Martha Nussbaum, "Capabilities and Human Rights," p. 128.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 282. See p. 118.

<sup>123</sup> Sabina Alkire, personal communication, 6 April 2003.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 225.

<sup>125</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 224

<sup>126</sup> Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development*, p. 77. Nussbaum also allow that a community may contest and remake items on the list, but Nussbaum's list is meant to have a prescriptive and perhaps presumptive force.

<sup>127</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 38.

<sup>128</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 221.

<sup>129</sup> Sabina Alkire, personal communication, 6 April 2003.

<sup>130</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 225. Italics in Alkire's text.

<sup>131</sup> Sen, *Development as Freedom*, p. 11.

<sup>132</sup> Deepa Narayan notes that the investigations that issued in inter alia Deepa Narayan, et al, *Voices of the Poor* often failed in their moral obligations to share the results of their studies with the people whom they investigated. See p.

<sup>133</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 225

<sup>134</sup> Alkire, personal communication, 6 April 2003.

<sup>135</sup> For the way in which use of a local language can protect a community from fragmentation and outsider control, see Ariel Dorfman, "Into Another Jungle: The Final Journey of the Maticos?" in *Grassroots Development: Journal of the Inter-American Foundation*, 12, 2 (1988): 2-15.

<sup>136</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 289.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>140</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, pp. 127-28.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 128, n. 10.

<sup>142</sup> An important topic for further research would be the differences between national level – especially governmental – deliberative democracy and grassroots development projects, whether governmentally or nongovernmentally funded.

<sup>143</sup> Alkire, *Valuing Freedoms*, p. 129. See also p. 283.

<sup>144</sup> Fung and Wright, "Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance," p. 22.