

Community, Sustainable Development and Tourism: North Cyprus as a failure of capabilities theory?

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In 1960, the British colony of Cyprus attained independence. A complicated constitutional arrangement established a bicomunal Greek/Turkish republic. In less than four years the state failed, and the smaller of the two communities, the Turkish Cypriots, ceased to play any part in the government, and were confined to small enclaves scattered across the island. In 1974, a coup against the Cypriot government, organised from Greece, led to the invasion of the island by Turkey. Since the ceasefire of August 1974, Cyprus has been divided de facto into two ethnic zones. Greek Cypriots fled south, ahead of the Turkish army; later, Turkish Cypriots travelled north into the area captured by Turkey. In 1983 the Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared their independence.

The Constitution of the Turkish Cypriot state (the TRNC) guarantees a number of individual rights, which comport well with the capabilities approach: the items on Martha Nussbaum's list of basic human capabilities are well-established. Turkish Cypriots are probably the most secularised Moslems in the world – equality of men and women is constitutionally guaranteed, and observed in practice at least as well as in western countries. The democratic structure of the country generally allows political participation by all citizens, although sometimes opposition groups have found their activities curtailed, for (allegedly) reasons of national security.

But the Turkish Cypriot community is not flourishing. The TRNC authorities are quick to blame this on the isolation of the TRNC (a pariah state in the eyes of all except Turkey); I shall attempt to show that the loss of an appropriate sense of community is probably a more fundamental cause. The consequences of this are illustrated by some of the problems faced in achieving sustainable development in the areas of management of water resources and of tourism development.

The position I wish to defend is that capability-satisfaction alone is not enough: capabilities divorced from societal structures do not produce a complete model for human development. The ahistoric nature of the capabilities approach directs attention away from the importance of past experience in producing a flourishing society. Indeed, the capabilities approach, although it has a "thin" conception of societal good (in that societies that allow higher level of functionings are superior to ones that do not), does not give sufficient specificity to the parameters of what constitutes a good society. Professor Nussbaum's affiliation capability defines societal relations in terms of individual rights alone, thereby ignoring important elements of group dynamics. Formal non-discrimination requirements are insufficient for a true understanding of what it is to live in community.

Introduction

The Capabilities Approach provides a welcome broadening of vision in the field of development studies. It provides an opportunity to view development as more than just economic growth, and goes beyond an augmented measure, such as the HDI, which looks at economic growth plus some other factors. Ending the concentration on simply aiming to increase GDP per capita has changed

the focus in development, to a far more fruitful approach of looking at what really matters to real people. The writings of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have developed and popularised the capabilities approach to the extent that textbooks have started to take notice.¹

A further advantage of the capabilities approach is that it moves attention away from looking at aggregate figures to questions of distribution. Deprivation amid plenty (of the sort that exists in Saudi Arabia, or in pockets of the USA) is hidden by both average GDP per capita figures and (albeit to a lesser extent) by the HDI. The concentration on "capabilities-for-all" shifts the focus naturally towards those who are most deprived. In ancient Israel, the prophets Amos, Hosea and Isaiah directed society's attention to the plight of the widows, the orphans, foreigners and refugees, the excluded elements in society. Just as the Bible takes the state of these to be the most important indicator of whether or not the Israelite nation was truly flourishing, truly in a state of shalom, (Kammer, 1991) so the capabilities approach similarly focuses attention on the marginalized, and, especially in Nussbaum's work, the situation of poor women.

While Sen has concentrated on seeing the advantages of the capabilities approach in both absolutist and instrumentalist terms, Nussbaum has focused our attention on a definitive list of capabilities, and on the imperative of gender equality, a concern that motivates much of her work.

For Nussbaum, the list of basic capabilities serves as a political agenda - a platform to which people of widely differing beliefs can rally. They will see (and perhaps even agree) that the achievement of at least a certain threshold level of attainment of these capabilities will not only be perfectly consistent with many divergent individual conceptions of the good. She grants, though, that people should have the ability to choose not to use their capabilities - not to function, as Sen puts it. She argues that the basic capabilities she enumerates (Nussbaum 2000: 78-80) have universal applicability, and, therefore, that there are universal values concerning what is good. This is a "thin" view of the Good, in that establishing and endorsing her list of capabilities leaves plenty of space for differing "thick" or complete theories of the Good. Nussbaum's aim is to be as inclusive as possible. Amish groups that decide not to exercise the right to vote can (and do) nevertheless agree that having the right to vote is a good thing, and not something that they would want to deny to others. She has no quarrel with the Moslem woman who decides, after due reflection, that an arranged marriage and a lifetime of wearing the chador in public is what she wants.² Rather, she is concerned with countering those who, whether for religious, cultural or other reasons, want to limit the freedom of others.

The capabilities approach is closely linked to the idea of human flourishing; that to live a fulfilled life, certain basic capabilities, at least, are necessary. And, as everyone, by virtue of our common humanity, is equally entitled to these capabilities, in the way in which Rawls' contractors in the Original Position are entitled to some form of equality (Rawls, 1971 chapter 3).³

¹ See, for example Todaro and Smith (2003). The eighth edition of this text contains a new section on Sen's work on capabilities.

² But she does believe that, for certain fundamental capabilities, even for adults a certain level of functioning is required as evidence that the person does have the capability. For example, practical reason (the capability) can only be recognised when it is used (Nussbaum, 2000: 93).

³ Nussbaum herself points out this and other similarities between Rawls' theory and the Capabilities Approach (Nussbaum, 2000: 65-69). The difference is that Rawlsian equality is stated in terms of equal access to resources, rather than in terms of the ability to use those resources to further one's conception of the Good.

The capabilities approach is also closely linked to the Human Rights tradition - in fact, Nussbaum argues that her list is, in effect, a list of basic rights. For rhetorical purposes, among others, though, she still feels that the language of rights is enhanced and complemented, rather than supplanted, by that of capabilities.

In her recent work, Nussbaum has linked the idea of capabilities more explicitly to a notion of social justice (as, for instance, in Nussbaum 2003). A society where capabilities are not guaranteed is, she believes, fundamentally unjust. She acknowledges that, in her work so far, she has not articulated a full account of social justice: we await, not always patiently a magnum opus to rival John Rawls' (1971) classic *A Theory of Justice*. It is already clear how the outlines of such a theory would go - that a society where capabilities are trampled on would not be a just society; and, although Nussbaum would probably wish to repudiate a form of capabilities-utilitarianism, a society with greater functionings and capabilities for all its citizens would be (Pareto) superior to one which had fewer, although, if resources are limited, some priorities would need to be established. An answer needs to be given to the problem Annapurna faces: which of the three deserving people, Dinu, Bishanno or Rogini, should be given the job of clearing up her garden? (Sen, 1999:54-56)

I have considerable sympathy with this programme; but I fear that by focusing attention solely on capabilities, and on the individual, something important is lost. That is, a sense of community may be exceedingly important for a flourishing life, and the capabilities approach neglects this. Also, for real people, the sort we're interested in, history as well as societal relationships is important. One's perception of one's history (or the history of one's community) colours one's view of the present, one's hopes for the future, and the way in which one's conception of the Good is stated and developed. History matters!

Towards a broader vision

An inscription commissioned by the city of Halicarnassus, composed in honour of the emperor Augustus, gives the following as the result of his achievements:

Land and sea have peace, the cities flourish under a good legal system, in harmony and with an abundance of food, there is an abundance of all good things, people are filled with happy hopes for the future and with delight at the present...⁴

Wengst goes on to point out that what was arguably a Golden Age for some of the Roman upper classes living in the centre; the poor, the widow, the orphan, that is, those living on the periphery of the social system (and, a fortiori, for those on the geographical frontier) found life anything but golden. By directing attention to just one set of indicators, the problems in other parts of human society are easily missed.

⁴ *The Collection of Ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum* vol. IV, ed. G. Hirschfeld, London, 1893, inscription 894; quoted in Wengst, 1987:9

The individual basis of analysis of the capabilities approach is attractive to people today, who tend to see society in terms of a set of atomised individuals; relations between those individuals, the "social glue" that holds community together, is of secondary importance. The importance of society as a whole, the flourishing of cities, rather than just the flourishing of the citizens, is not its primary focus. The capabilities approach has, as a motivation, an improvement in the lot of the poor and marginalized, and, by extension, the widow, the orphan and the refugee. But by directing attention to individuals, any concern with the health of society, of a broader concept of shalom, is in danger of being obscured. Social institutions do not arise in a vacuum, and to ignore them, or to assume that they are of secondary importance, runs the danger of missing something important.

The capabilities approach formally leaves open the question of whether a society where individual capabilities are established at a high level will be unambiguously superior to one where capabilities are less prominent, but where the provision of certain collective goods is greater. Could there be a trade-off between capabilities and other good things, such as security, or public health, especially if these social goods are unevenly distributed? The thrust, though, of the capabilities approach is to suggest a negative answer, that is, that individual capabilities are prior to any collective goals.

As mentioned above, the Capabilities Approach implies a "thin" view of the good, in that it is consistent with widely divergent visions and conceptions of the good. Perhaps too thin: a capable society could still be unjust. Systemic social evils could still exist. For example, opponents of globalisation point out that, although the World Trade Organisation gives formal equality in trading practices between nations, the global south still finds it hard to harness the benefits of trade.

Others might argue that, by taking an individualistic approach to flourishing and the Good, the capabilities approach is privileging certain conceptions of the good. To be sure, the implementation of some types of views of the good is ruled out, particularly those views with other-regarding preferences that require the domination of one group over another. For example, the Muslim scholar and exegete, Abu l-A'la Mawdudi argued that, while the religion of Islam might not endorse enforced conversion, Islam does regard all non-Islamic governments as unjust and therefore oppressive (Mir, 1991:118). Conversely, one could speculate over the fate of Turkey had not Mustafa Kemal Atatürk enforced the reforms he made in the 1920's, riding roughshod over rights (and preventing the exercise of certain capabilities) as he did so.

In practical politics, too, collective goals, although they lack universal acceptance by a society, will sometimes nevertheless trump certain individual rights, and, potentially at least, impair capabilities. The US Patriot Act perhaps comes into this category; the legal doctrine of necessity (that empowers states to act unconstitutionally if the letter of the constitution is upheld) has similar potential.

Like Rawls' theory, the Capabilities Approach is ahistoric: a vision of the good is articulated that is not only universally valid, but which takes little account of the situations that people find themselves in. In the real world, one cannot divorce any actual society from its history: to some extent, the current role of traditions, the status and design of the various institutions of society is what economists call path dependent: that the current state-of-affairs depends crucially on its prior development. The capabilities approach partially captures this point by allowing a good deal of flexibility in the way that particular capabilities might be achieved; and Martha Nussbaum is

concerned with the effect of history on stated preferences (the problem of inappropriately-adaptive preferences).

In any case, as David Clark (2002) points out, the Aristotelian origins of the capabilities approach may well surprise us: that a basis in (timeless) Greek myth in a society rather like that of ancient Rome, should provide an adequate basis for a 21st century theory of human flourishing. People don't live in social vacuums. Societal traditions, peer pressure, affect the way people think and behave, what they want, and, importantly, what the value of particular freedoms might be to them.

If there is a trade-off between capabilities and certain other good things, it might be possible to show that a society with compromised capabilities is, in some respects, superior to one of atomised but capable individuals, but I am here going to suggest a different test. That is, could a society with advanced capability fulfilment still be impoverished, could still fail to flourish? Or, are there other aspects so important that they can impair people's ability to flourish?

There are a number of examples one might use to build this thesis. Russia in the 1990's is one - where the growth of a form of mafiaisation has led to a society that is fractured, despite the high level of capability fulfilment. Another example might be that of African Americans, whose history seems to hold captive in striking ways. In the United States, despite forty years of Civil Rights legislation and affirmative action, the Supreme Court still thinks that another generation will be necessary before compensatory discrimination can be ended.

Instead, though, I want to look at the example of the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus. Relatively isolated as a result of the events of 1974, the Turkish Cypriot state has been able to produce a moderately high standard of living (GDP of almost \$5000 per capita, a high score on the HDI, constitutional freedoms, and the enjoyment of a high level of capabilities; and yet the Turkish Cypriot community cannot be described as flourishing. Part of the explanation of this is the deleterious effects of the recent past on the Turkish Cypriot community, so it is necessary to digress to examine this history.

Cyprus

Cyprus attained independence from Britain in 1960. The constitution of the new state, drawn up in consultation with Greece and Turkey, and accepted by those two powers, specified a functional federation between the two Cypriot peoples, Greeks and Turks.⁵ It set up separate electoral roles for the Greek and Turkish communities - Greek Cypriots would elect the country's President, the Turkish Cypriots its Vice-President. The Council of Ministers, chosen by the President and Vice-President, would have ten ministers - seven Greek Cypriots, and three Turkish Cypriots. The legislature would comprise 50 members - 35 Greek Cypriots elected by the Greek community, and 15 Turkish Cypriots, elected by the Turkish Cypriot community. This was a deliberate attempt to secure some form of balance between the communities - the Turkish Cypriots, who comprised

⁵ Members of the smaller Maronite, Latin and Armenian communities voted to join the Greek Cypriots for official purposes

about 18% of the population, were given a disproportionate 30% share of power.⁶ In addition, certain types of Bills, such as those on taxation, needed separate majorities in both communities to pass. In effect, 8 Turkish Cypriot MP's could thwart the will of the remaining 42 members. The Vice-President also had considerable veto powers.

Similar divisions held throughout the administrative structures of the new state: the 70:30 ratio applied to the Civil Service; and the Constitution specified for each of the independent officers of the new Republic (the auditor general, the governorship of the Central bank), that the Office-holder and his Deputy must be from different communities. (In practice, this meant a Greek head, and a Turkish deputy.) This led to frustration, as (Greek) civil servants complained that they did not get the promotion they deserved; as it was necessary to promote a Turkish Cypriot to maintain the 70:30 ratio.

For the judicial system, cases involving members of one community were to be tried by judges from that community; when cases involved members of both communities, a panel of judges, at least one from each community, tried the case. The Court of Appeal comprised two Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot, and a "neutral" chairman (a Canadian), who had two votes. The Supreme Court had three judges - one Greek, one Turkish, and one neutral (the German, Dr Ernst Forstoff). As with the voting arrangements, these provisions were entrenched in the Constitution - they could not be altered or abolished by the parliament or President. Presumably, only a new agreement between Britain, Greece and Turkey (who jointly guaranteed the Cyprus settlement) could change matters.

Within three years, an impasse had been reached. The Constitution mandated the establishment of separate Greek and Turkish municipal government in the five major towns on the island; the Greek Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, refused to introduce the requisite legislation. The Turkish Cypriot MP's voted down the 1962 Income Tax law as in retaliation. As there was no deadlock resolution mechanism, both sides appealed to the legal system. When the Supreme Court found for the Turkish Cypriots on the municipalities issue, Makarios announced that he would not follow what the court said, causing Forstoff to resign.

Instead, Makarios proposed 13 amendments to the Constitution, which together would have had the effect of removing most of the Turkish Cypriot veto powers. Turkey immediately rejected the amendments. Before the Turkish Cypriots replied, violence had broken out between the communities (December 1963) When the dust had settled, the Turkish Cypriots found themselves unable to participate in Government, and with most them living in small enclaves, many as refugees, and occupying 3% of the island.

Eleven years later, a coup organised by the Colonels' regime in Greece, aimed at ENOSIS, the union of Cyprus with Greece, (a "national aspiration" of the Greek Cypriots in the struggle against the British in the 1950's, but a policy abandoned by Makarios) met, five days later, with an invasion by Turkey, citing her treaty obligations to uphold the 1960 settlement. In a two-stage offensive, dubbed a "peace operation" in Turkey, Turkish troops took the northern third of the island. Greek

⁶ A similar idea is in use in Britain, where Scottish and Welsh seats have fewer voters than English ones, to give Scotland and Wales a voice in the UK. And in the US, each state elects 2 senators, regardless of its population, thus giving less populous states a disproportionate say in government.

Cypriots fled south, or were expelled; Turkish Cypriots came north. In all, about 240,000 people were displaced and became refugees.

The United Nations condemned Turkey's actions; the world views the land Turkey conquered as occupied territory. Turkey recognises it as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC); declared in 1983 after talks on reunification failed.

I have dwelt on this at length partly to give some background for what follows, but also because I believe that this cautionary tale has a moral - to attempt to secure the rights of a minority by giving them privileged access to resources (in this case, power), is likely to breed resentment and frustration in the majority. Thus attempts to secure racial or gender equality by mandating quota systems (something that Martha Nussbaum seems to advocate, or, at least, to applaud) not only creates an injustice, but also runs the risk of destroying the fabric of the society implementing it, unless there is sufficient consensus about the need for the quota.

Turkish Cyprus today

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was unilaterally declared in November 1983. Unrecognised by any country except Turkey (and, perhaps, by Chechnya), it is in a sort of political limbo. The Turkish Cypriots complain of an international embargo against their state (especially since a 1995 European Court of Justice decision decided that TRNC certificates of origin did not qualify as proving a Cypriot genesis of the goods they came with, thus making them subject to the European Union's Common External Tariff). Lack of employment opportunities have led to many Turkish Cypriots leaving for Britain, America or Australia.⁷ Settlers from Turkey, encouraged to come to the island by the offer of citizenship and free, ex-Greek Cypriot land, have not assimilated well with the indigenous population, being usually peasant farmers, whereas most of the Turkish Cypriots are educated urban-dwellers.

The TRNC constitution (TRNC 1985), adopted in a referendum in 1985, guarantees the sort of economic and social rights that the Indian constitution does. Chapter II deals with the rights, liberties and duties of the person, generally stated in terms of negative freedoms. For example, Article 14 guarantees personal immunity; article 22 freedom of movement and residence; article 23 freedom of conscience and religion. Later articles prescribe certain positive rights - article 59 guarantees a right to free education up to age 18 (but qualifies this that the State shall carry this out "in accordance with the principles and reforms of Ataturk"). Article 58, "Rehabilitation of the Poor", says that

The State shall take social, economic, financial, and other measures necessary for the purpose of rehabilitating socially and economically weak persons and rendering them useful to their families and to society.

⁷ It is worth noting that most of the Maronites, who were allowed to stay in their main village in the north, following the intervention of the Lebanese government, have, nevertheless, left for the south, where employment opportunities are greater

Article 66 injects an element of realism, limiting the state's responsibilities to what is feasible with the available resources. As part of the Ataturk legacy, a very strict separation of church and state limits religious expression in the political field. Article 23 (5) reads:

No person shall exploit or abuse, in any manner whatsoever, religion or religious feelings or things considered sacred by religion for the purpose of basing, even though partially, the basic social, economic, political or legal order of the State on religious precepts, or for the purpose of securing political or personal advantage or influence. In the case of physical or legal persons violating this prohibition or inducing others to do so, relevant legal provisions shall be applied and political parties in contravention of such provisions shall be permanently closed down by the Supreme Court sitting as the Constitutional Court.

Despite these small deviations from liberal-democratic principles (and the tendency of the Government to discourage certain forms of dissent by means of the courts⁸), the TRNC is generally an enabled society. The basis is present for the guaranteeing of capabilities at considerably more than a threshold level. In addition, other requirements for a fair society are met: a domestic justice system that more-or-less works and a fair degree of nepotism but little out-and-out corruption. At the cost of a high degree of dependence on Turkey (symbolised by the use of the Turkish Lira as the official currency), the effects of the perceived international injustice to the Turkish Cypriots are assuaged. Turkey takes any exports that cannot be sold to third countries, provides most of the TRNC's imports, most of the tourists, defence (provided by the 30,000 or so Turkish troops there, paid for by Turkey), and large subsidies to the Government budget, to make up for the shortfall from tax collection.

But Turkish Cypriots report relatively low levels of satisfaction with their lives. In contrast, in a recent Eurobarometer poll of 500 (Greek) Cypriots, 84% expressed a high degree of happiness with their lives – ahead of all other European Union applicant countries (EU 2003). The sense of historical injustice, the relative poverty of the Turkish Cypriots when compared with the Greek Cypriots, plus the feeling that the current political situation in Cyprus could be changed at any time play a large part in explaining this difference.

This *angst* of the Turkish Cypriots plays out in several ways. The enclave experiences of the 1963-74 period have a considerable effects even today.⁹ Turkish Cypriots returning from extended time abroad find Turkish Cypriot society very inward-looking, with an emphasis on self-sufficiency at the familial level. Outsiders are viewed with suspicion; or returning relatives are seen as suppliers of gifts.

Although it is now 29 years since the Turkish 'peace operation', which produced a form of stability to the island, Turkish Cypriots still have a fear that the Greek Cypriots might attack at any time. Also, even in the event of a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus Question, part of the current territory of the TRNC would be ceded to Greek Cypriot control, and, possibly, the post-1974 settlers from Turkey would be forced to return to the mainland. This possibility of the loss (or compulsory

⁸ Famously, the newspaper *Avrupa* ("Europe") was closed as the result of the loss of a libel case involving the TRNC's President, Rauf Denktaş. But it emerged a few days later, renamed as *Afrika*.

⁹ For a good psycho-analytic account, see the works by Vamik Volkan (Volkan, 1979; Volkan and Itzowitz, 1995)

exchange) of one's property reduces the incentive to maintain that property, and encourages short-term exploitation at the expense of long-term sustainable development.

One area where this plays out is in the use of water resources. Until a decade ago, the island was entirely reliant on the rainfall that it received, plus the accumulation of previous years' rainfall stored in the various aquifers that underlie much of the island. The most reliable rainfall falls in the south (Greek) sector – Mount Olympus, the highest peak, is here. The Greek Cypriots dammed rivers flowing north from Olympus, reducing the water supply to the Turkish side of the divide.

Traditionally, water resources in Cyprus were divided between villages according to long-established tradition; and water resources in towns went with ownership rights to property (often in very complex ways, as Lawrence Durrell (1958:56-7) records. In the post-1974 free-for-all, a tragedy of the commons situation has developed. Farmers pump as much water as they feel they need, with no regard to the needs of their neighbours. As a result, the citrus-growing industry of the Famagusta area has been destroyed, and then to the Morphou/Guzelyurt region is suffering a similar fate. As groundwater levels fall, seawater intrudes, and, in some cases, the aquifer ultimately collapses. In 1992, the annual water deficit was estimated at about 24 million m³; put another way, annual usage was some 30% higher than the average rainfall.¹⁰

The post-1974 development of the Turkish Cypriot tourist industry provides my second example. Following the division of the island, the Turkish Cypriots found themselves in possession of 55% of the coastline, and a goodly proportion of the hotel stock, mainly built by Greek Cypriots during the boom of the late 1960's and early 1970's brought about by cheap and reliable air services from Britain and continental Europe. Restrictions on travel (all services to North Cyprus must land in Turkey en route, thus raising both the cost and flight-time to six hours compared with four to the south), plus the lack of relevant skills, meant that most tourists went to the Greek Cypriot side of the island.¹¹

The Turkish Cypriot economy stagnated. Tourism development came slowly. Despite the heavy competition from Turkey, southern Cyprus and other parts of the Mediterranean, recent hotel building has been geared to mass-market tourism. The higher cost of north Cyprus, plus its unspoilt coastal scenery (it is still possible to have a beach to yourself at the height of the summer) and flora and fauna, makes this type of tourism development inappropriate. The advantage, though, is that one can expect a relatively large influx of visitors in the first few years (as holidaymakers try the latest new sun-and-sand destination); whereas sustainable eco-tourism takes longer to produce the same financial return. Interestingly, a survey conducted on both sides of the island in 1995 suggested that the Turkish Cypriots were far more optimistic about the benefits of mass tourism than their Greek compatriots (Akis *et al*, 1996), despite growing evidence that the economic impact on local communities was small, and that the stresses created (on water supply, and in terms of increased traffic and noise) were relatively large. Taking a short-term view here has important

¹⁰ Unpublished research by the late Professor Tevfik Tarimcioglu, Faculty of Engineering, Eastern Mediterranean University, North Cyprus.

¹¹ Following the Turkish invasion, the Greek Cypriot hotel industry migrated south from Turkish-held Varosha (south of Famagusta) to the Paralimni/Protaras/Ayia Napa region; and subsequently expanded along the southern coastline from Larnaca to Paphos

consequences: at a time when tourism to the region is falling (arrivals to southern Cyprus are 25% lower this year than in 2001), the number of beds available in northern Cyprus is increasing.

In the cases of both the use of water resources, and in the development of tourism, then, the negative effects of Cyprus' recent past have led to outcomes that are inappropriate. The flourishing of the Turkish Cypriot community is impaired because of its history.

Conclusion

What seems significant, then, is that a community that is fractured, as a result of history, or the effects of some other trauma, can fail to flourish, even if the capabilities of the people are not physically impaired.

Functioning requires more than just the potentiality and the ability to make choices; it requires a safe environment within which choices can be made. When this security is impaired, people fail to flourish. Note that the sense of security need not be based on any rational evidence (there was never any real chance that the Greek Cypriot forces would try to reconquer north Cyprus), but on one's interpretation of the situation. History is important; giving people capabilities, and even if they choose to function, does not guarantee flourishing.

However one views the current situation of north Cyprus (that of a case of part of a sovereign state invaded and occupied by an outside power; or as a state unfairly discriminated against by the rest of the world), there is a distinct absence of social justice. The current situation is unfair, as everyone recognises.

In short, capabilities are an important part of an overall vision of shalom, of peace and fulfilment, of being able to follow one's own conception of the good and flourishing but are not, in themselves, a guarantee of shalom. By focusing solely on capabilities, this broader vision may be lost sight of.

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